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The fundamental question this dissertation seeks to answer is how late-Victorian 
horror fiction produced fear for its contemporary audiences. This study argues that the 
answer to this question lies in the areas of rhetoric—more specifically, oratory—and the 
body.  This may seem unremarkable, but the notion of a rhetorical body was problematic 
for Victorians due to suspicion of eloquence and anxiety over the instability of bodies.  
This ambiguity is expressed through recurring images in horror fiction of the destruction 
of the monstrous body—typically through cutting—in relation to rhetorical performance 
and display. This study appropriates a medical term to refer to this phenomenon, 
disarticulation, which means amputation. Disarticulation, then, becomes a form of control 
of the transgressing body. It is expressed in society and literature in three forms, either as 
allusions or direct representations: public execution, including torture and 
dismemberment; anatomical dissection and its suggestion of vivisection; and 
aestheticization, which refashions death as life. Proponents of these practices claimed that 
they produced social order, scientific knowledge, and art. In the larger culture, however, 
they produced horror. But disarticulation is just one explanation for the fear produced by 
late Victorian horror fiction. This study also speculates that dread is produced by 
epideictic, which seems peculiarly present alongside other Classically-inspired rhetorical 
performances and displays in the five primary texts selected for examination: 
Frankenstein by Mary Shelley; Dracula by Bram Stoker; The Island of Dr. Moreau by 
 
 
H.G. Wells; The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson; 
and The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: RHETORIC AND RENEWAL 
 
 
 If rhetoric died in Britain in the 1800’s, it rose from the grave before the end of 
the century as something monstrous and frightening. The starting point for this study is 
the premature burial given rhetoric in the nineteenth century.  As Susan Jarratt writes, 
“Though the Romantics are beginning to attract some attention … the death of rhetoric 
remains virtually unchallenged as the reigning metaphor for the second half of the 
century” (73). One of the scholars who does challenge rhetoric’s obituary is Don Paul 
Abbott.  “A remarkable number of critics and historians have proclaimed—sometimes 
with dismay, sometimes with delight—the death of rhetoric,” Abbott states (105). But 
rhetoric did not expire by the early nineteenth century due to linguistic nationalism and 
Romantic aesthetics, he argues: it actually enjoyed a renaissance. Interest and optimism 
about rhetoric were kept alive by the elocutionists, foremost among them Thomas 
Sheridan. In an age when men such as David Hume, Oliver Goldsmith, and Richard 
Polwhele were lamenting British ineloquence, Abbott explains, Sheridan asserted that 
restoring oratory to its rightful place at the head of the liberal arts curriculum would 
revitalize language, religion, and liberal learning in England (117). According to Abbott, 
the nation’s renewed interest in oratory is evident in eighteenth-century anthologies of 
parliamentary speeches (120).  After citing Sheridan’s belief that Shakespeare and Milton
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 owed much of their success to “‘their skill in oratory’” and that rhetorical education 
“‘would precipitate a cultural renaissance,’” though, Abbott offers nothing on rhetoric’s 
potential impact on literature (qtd. in 118). However, rhetoric can be seen as having a 
profound impact on British literature in the nineteenth century, and its impact may seem 
odd and unexpected. Rather than leading to what might be expected—the production of 
classically-inspired epics reflecting political, religious, and military unity—rhetoric 
inspired a violent literature of horror that interrogated claims about rhetoric’s motives, 
methods, and efficacy. 
Attitudes toward rhetoric in nineteenth-century horror fiction are decidedly 
negative. The basis for this claim is the frequent presence of rhetorical performance and 
display in the literature in connection with the destruction of the body or suggestions of 
the destruction of the body.  This study appropriates a convenient medical term to refer to 
this phenomenon: disarticulation. In a medical sense, disarticulation refers to amputation, 
but it is also a term with a general sense that can also be applied to human speech. 
Disarticulation, therefore, can be applied both to the body and its utterances. The trope 
involves the sundering of textual bodies leading to somatic destruction or transformation. 
Its primary images are of the penetration, cutting, and dismemberment of the body. These 
can be the bodies of characters involved in oratory as well as those of their audiences. 
The destruction of the body by any means is disturbing and profound. As John Knott 
writes, “The human body is man’s oldest and most important symbol” (13). He 
elaborates, “Even the very notion of a knife cutting into a human body is charged with 
emotion” (18). This study equates rhetoric with a bladed instrument. Disarticulation is 
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succinctly captured by Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, whose Faust imagines “rhetoric” 
as having an “edge” that “glints and cleaves” and “By which you curl the shavings of 
mankind” (Faust ll.554-5). Through Faust, a teacher of rhetoric, Goethe expresses an 
anxiety toward the subject that can also be said to characterize the British Romantics and 
Victorians. On the one hand, rhetoric could be used, as Sheridan believed, to unify a 
diverse nation, advance social progress, promote cultural production, and inspire 
religious devotion. On the other hand, it could be used, as in revolutionary France, to 
deceive, manipulate, judge, subject, and terrorize people. The main theory of this study is 
that rhetoric informs the characterizations and plots of some of Britain’s most popular 
fin-de-siècle horror stories, including Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde by Robert 
Louis Stevenson, The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde, The Island of Dr. Moreau 
by H.G. Wells, and Dracula by Bram Stoker. It is a rhetoric preoccupied with 
monstrosities, informed not only by ancient but also contemporary medico-juridico-
scientific1 practices that disciplined those bodies by destroying them for public 
consumption.  As a discursive system that claims bodies, it reduces them to parts, 
hybridizes them, displays them, and silences them. Rhetoric, therefore, is depicted as a 
monstrous, antithetical activity that not only produces monstrosities but also destroys 
them.  
                                                          
1 Although this comprehensive term may be used elsewhere, the only source in which I 
have encountered it is Janet Rago’s essay “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: A ‘Men’s Narrative’ 
of Hysteria and Containment.” 
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Within the aesthetics of late-Victorian horror novels, the body becomes a 
rhetorical object. Rhetoric, in these novels, is depicted primarily as oratory, one of the 
precedents established by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. The body can be depicted as 
acting, or it can be depicted as being acted upon, both in the context of rhetorical 
performance or display. Of course, such a literary aesthetics is not only problematic 
because it involves rhetoric, which Britons suspected: it is also problematic because it 
involves the body, which Britons contested. Clearly, conflict lies at the very heart of this 
aesthetics, and that conflict has the potential to inspire terror.  Borrowing from Soviet 
theorist Mikhail Bakhtin2, Helena Michie explains that not all nineteenth-century bodies 
were viewed as equal. Conceptions of bourgeois and aristocratic bodies were based on 
classical standards in that they tended to be seen as “impermeable,” “closed off and 
separate from the bodies of others” (Michie 408).  These bodies were static and, in 
theory, not susceptible to the transformative power of rhetoric. On the other hand, lower-
class bodies were seen as grotesque and permeable. “The grotesque body,” Michie 
contends, “is porous, its boundaries blurry …” (408). These bodies were open and 
susceptible to influence. This division between bodies based on class was pressured 
throughout the nineteenth century, and it was largely obliterated in the horror fiction of 
                                                          
2 Bakhtin’s critical project in the early twentieth century involved recovering 
ancient and medieval paradigms as part of his analyses of the scatological Renaissance 
French novels that made up Gargantua and Pantagruel. These satirical books, written by 
the humanist Rabelais in the early sixteenth century, tell the stories of father-and-son 
giants and their adventures, which often relate to the corrupt body and its unpleasant 
processes. Bakhtin labels this suppressed and ignored subgenre grotesque realism, and 
argues that its fragments persisted into the nineteenth century. 
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the late Victorian period, where upper-class characters are transformed into monsters. 
Perhaps the best known example is Jekyll and Hyde, in which the gentleman Jekyll 
becomes the bestial Hyde; but there other examples in Dracula, and even subtler ones in 
Dorian Gray and Moreau. The obvious implication here is that there is no essential 
difference between the bodies of the affluent and the bodies of the poor. Anatomical 
science helped tear down these distinctions, as the knowledge gained from the 
dismemberment of poor bodies was transferred to the treatment of affluent bodies. 
Victorians tried to preserve class distinctions even in death through funeral science; but 
Jani Scandura points to the irony in the fact that the photographed bodies used to promote 
embalming to wealthy customers were most likely the appropriated corpses of the poor 
gussied up to look like gentlemen (15). Scandura reveals that the 
 
embalmer … had the authority to play deadly tricks: as the costumer and the 
makeup artist to the dead, he knew that corpses had no essential class identity 
beneath their prettified appearance. The embalmed corpse became a threatening 
signifier of deception in a culture where appearance was all. (16) 
 
 
 So, by the late nineteenth century, the hierarchy of bodies based on social station 
had all but collapsed into the category of the grotesque, although the upper classes 
resisted the theory that a shift had taken place. What this meant was that all bodies, 
regardless of social position, had the potential to become monstrous and subject to 
control and possible destruction. This frightening prospect is reflected in the most 
popular horror fiction of the period, with its depictions of the coercive social control of 
the transgressing body—rhetorical presentation, judicial dismemberment, penal 
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dissection, and funerary and artistic aestheticization. Recovering these practices—some 
of them lost since the early nineteenth-century—can help modern readers better 
understand what late Victorians found frightening about their horror fiction.  Of 
particular interest is the peculiar presence of epideictic—or ceremonial speech most 
closely associated with the ancient funeral oration—and its inverted role of generating 
dread and division rather than euphoria and unity among audiences. With this in mind, 
this study posits an etymological link among the words declamation, monstrosity, and 
epideictic as displays involving the body intended to send some sort of message. 
At its most basic level, disarticulation is reflective of two European historical and 
cultural practices: elocution and execution. Both practices can be read as means of 
controlling bodies as rhetorical objects in the context of public display.  The bodies 
presented as most in need of correction through elocution and execution are those found 
to be monstrous, or marginalized in some way. Like execution, elocution involves both 
discipline and display of the body. Led by men like Sheridan, John Walker, and Gilbert 
Austin, the elocutionary movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped 
resuscitate classical rhetoric in England by marketing it to men at the edges of the 
growing empire who wished to integrate into proper society and improve their station in 
life. Interestingly, two of the writers included in this study, Wilde and Stoker, were from 
Ireland. A third, Stevenson, was from Scotland. A fourth, Shelley, spent part of her 
adolescence in Scotland. Likewise, the foremost elocutionists, Sheridan, Walker, and 
Austin were outsiders from Ireland. And elocution was largely about control of the body 
and the refashioning of the identity. An important aspect of elocution is declamation, or 
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forceful oratorical performance involving control of voice, emotion, body, and, in some 
cases, impersonation. Elocution, therefore, was about disciplining and norming bodies—
two interests it shared with execution. Execution, as treated in this study, goes beyond the 
simple fulfillment of a judicial death sentence to the exhibition of torture, mutilation, and 
dissection of condemned individuals as admonitions to people called to witness and 
participate in these spectacles, which continued well into the nineteenth century. These 
practices were meant, at least in part, to terrorize people, and that is what they did for 
many generations. Therefore, they had a rhetorical dimension, and that rhetoric persisted 
in the collective imagination and in print long after their public spectacles had ended.  
Two ancillaries of execution are dismemberment and dissection. As add-ons to 
judicial sentences, dismemberment and dissection have been completely lost to modern 
audiences, but they were very familiar to nineteenth-century Britons. The terror of the 
French Revolution as an inspiration for British Gothic fiction has become a commonplace 
among literary historians, but England had a long history of dismembering criminals 
before the late 1700’s. Foucault writes that in Europe, “England was one of the countries 
most loath to see the disappearance of public execution” (Discipline and Punish 14). He 
speculates that this may have been due to the faith the nation had in its criminal justice 
system, but it was most likely because the country did not want to lessen the deterrence 
of its laws during the social unrest of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
(14). For much of the nineteenth century, executions were performed in public for people 
to witness. They were intended not only to serve justice but also to serve as admonitions 
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for those who might break the law. These forms of justice must be recovered and 
examined alongside horror fiction texts to recognize their influence. 
Liberal reforms eventually abolished public torture, and executions were hidden 
from public scrutiny. Likewise, live dismemberment to produce social order became 
postmortem dissection to produce scientific knowledge. However, the terror that these 
spectacles inspired simply passed into print. Removing the dismemberment of criminal 
bodies from public view and replacing it with textual reports helped create the medium in 
which literary disarticulation grew. Mary Ellis Gibson notes this transformation in an 
analysis of Robert Browning’s The Ring and the Book alongside the popularity of the 
sensation novel: “Private reading about crime replaces the public spectacle of hanging 
and criminal dissection” (77). Foucault writes that one effect of closeting the drama of 
trial and execution was the creation of a new form of literature: the detective story 
(Discipline and Punish  69). The connection that Foucault makes here could be extended: 
penal reform also gave birth to the horror story, including tales of the supernatural, 
fantastical, and uncanny. The horror story crystallized the sense of terror inspired by 
public executions and carried it forward for future generations to experience. As 
disturbing as the spectacles of torture and execution must have been for audiences, they 
were also significant events in the lives of their communities. They served at least three 
important functions: they provided an entertaining catharsis by allowing audiences to 
witness and to a certain extent participate in executions, they reaffirmed the normative 
standards of the community, and they assured the public that the law had force. While 
nineteenth-century horror fiction can be seen as performing the same functions, it does 
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not offer exact reproductions of judicial torture, dismemberment, and execution like those 
that Andrew Fleck analyzes in Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller. Fleck has the 
grisly executions of Cutwolfe and Zadoch, as well as Nashe’s descriptions of massacres 
and epidemics, to consider as he ponders the significant relationships between the foreign 
“body reduced to its parts” and disciplined (296), the “tropes of the body politic” (314), 
and English nationalism. Even without these spectacles, nineteenth-century horror fiction 
performs the same functions of catharsis and reaffirmation.  In so doing, however, it 
interrogates those functions by exposing their moral relativism and coerciveness.  
The horror, controversy, and social unrest inspired by dismemberment and 
dissection easily obscure the reality that they helped found a new aesthetics based on the 
body.  The aestheticization, or refashioning, of the grotesque body in fin-de-siècle horror 
fiction is an offshoot of sixteenth-century anatomy.  Just as the body yielded social order 
under the executioner’s hand, and scientific knowledge under the anatomist’s hand, it 
yielded new meanings under the artist’s hand.  Tim Marshall writes, “In the anatomy 
literature there is much slippage between the surgeon, the dissector, the murderer—and 
then the writer and the artist: after all, artists have relied on anatomical dissection, and 
writers vicariously kill” (13). The iconoclasm of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood 
involved the painters’ depictions of anatomical rather than stylized bodies. Though 
sensational at the time, their art has come to emblematize the Victorian period in many 
ways. But bodies were not just written about and used as models in painting: they also 
became a medium for enbalmers in a growing funeral industry whose methods for 
refashioning bodies included not only penetration and cutting but also painting, 
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costuming, and posing to create the illusion of genteel life and conceal biological 
corruption. A major figure in the aestheticization of the body was Andreas Vesalius, a 
professor of anatomy at the University of Padua, who in 1543 published his De Humani 
Corporis Fabrica, an illustrated tome that would revolutionize the conduct of dissections. 
De Fabrica challenged the authority of second-century Roman physician Claudius Galen 
and eventually helped displace him. Vesalius had a grand vision of anatomy that 
incorporated but also transcended the physical bodies of the dissector and his subjects. 
This vision included the merger of anatomy and art, as well as anatomy and theater. A 
similar vision can be found in late-Victorian horror fiction. 
Rhetoric in fin-de-siècle British horror fiction, therefore, can be seen as a means 
of controlling grotesque, unstable bodies alongside the more violent and visible methods 
of execution, torture, dismemberment, dissection, and aestheticization.  These 
relationships constitute disarticulation, a trope which expresses the tension between 
speech and the body by yoking oratorical performance and somatic destruction.  In late-
Victorian horror fiction, all bodies are subject to disarticulation, not just the murderer and 
robber traditionally judged as transgressing, criminal, and monstrous. This awareness is 
one of the sources of the fear inspired by this literature. 
Chapter Overview 
 Applying the theory outlined in this introduction to a study of the selected novels 
will involve the following basic steps: locating disarticulation in the texts by identifying 
their main rhetorical performances and depictions of bodily dismemberment, dissection, 
or aestheticization; analyzing their use of declamation and its relationship to the 
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monstrosities in the novels; pointing out the association of the main characters with 
criminality; explaining the presence of epideictic in the stories; acknowledging, where 
possible, these same patterns in other works by the same writers; and sharing relevant 
biographical details about the authors. 
 The second chapter of this study presents background crucial to an understanding 
of disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction. That background includes three basic 
elements: the elocutionary movement, which focused on normalization and regulation of 
the body through speech and rhetorical performance; declamation, an ancient rhetorical 
training exercise and elocutionary practice with links to monstrosity and epideictic as 
displays involving the body; and the “Death of Cicero Tradition,” which began in Rome 
as a collection of declamation exercises and persisted centuries later in the union of 
oratory, violence, and bodily dismemberment informing disarticulation. 
 Chapter three focuses on Frankenstein as a foundational work in the study of 
rhetoric in horror fiction. Published in 1818 and revised in 1831, Frankenstein depicts a 
monster delivering a classical oration to persuade an audience. It is the centerpiece in a 
highly rhetorical novel that helps establish Mary Shelley’s negative attitude toward 
persuasive speech. The novel reflects Shelley’s the classical learning alongside her 
husband, Percy Shelley, and her admiration of the great Roman orator Cicero, whose 
death and dismemberment factors significantly into the theory of disarticulation outlined 
in this study. Frankenstein also offers readers early glimpses of the use of epideictic to 
generate dread and discord. In this way, the novel helps serve as a benchmark for the 
study of the development of epideictic in fin-de-siècle horror fiction, where its presence is 
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even stronger. Frankenstein, therefore, helps illustrate the link this study posits between 
monstrosity, declamation, and epideictic. 
 While leading off this study with a chapter on Frankenstein may seem logical, 
following up with a fourth chapter on Dracula may illogical. But these two novels are the 
great “bookends” of nineteenth-century British horror fiction, and Dracula shows how 
much the subgenre progressed over seventy-nine years. Indeed, Dracula offers the 
strongest example of disarticulation in that it seems to gather up all of the forms and 
patterns presented in the other novels analyzed in this study. Seen as such, Dracula is not 
just a novel about a vampire, it is a vampiric novel. It feeds off the others. The primary 
focus of chapter four is judicial dismemberment as one of the four Victorian practices 
involving coercive social control of the transgressing body. The others are rhetorical 
presentation, penal dissection, and aestheticization.  One of Stoker’s short stories that 
helps establish his interest in execution practices is “The Squaw.” Linked to rhetorical 
performances by Abraham Van Helsing and Count Dracula, judicial dismemberment 
effects disarticulation in the novel. The main victim of dismemberment is the undead 
Lucy Westenra, whose slaying is evocative of early-modern executions. But Dracula and 
the vampire women at his castle in Transylvania are also dismembered.  Van Helsing’s 
oratory is forensic and deliberative, seeking to prove that vampires exist and building 
consensus to destroy them. Dracula’s, on the other hand, is epideictic. His speech closely 
resembles the model funeral oration presented by Socrates in Plato’s Menexenus in that it 
praises the war dead and allows them to speak. Plato intends this figuratively, but Stoker 
presents it literally in that Dracula is undead. Dracula’s epideictic also transforms his 
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English audience through Jonathan Harker from gentlemen into savages who resort to 
criminality to destroy the count.  
 Chapter five focuses on two novels, The Island of Dr. Moreau from 1894 and  
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde from 1886.  The main focus of the chapter is 
penal dissection as a means of means of social control that also advances scientific 
knowledge. Both books were written by men deeply influenced by science. Wells’s 
pedigree included schooling by T.H. Huxley, Charles Darwin’s foremost defender. 
Stevenson initially set out to become an engineer, but became a writer and a scientific 
hobbyist with interests closely aligned with Darwin’s. This affinity with Darwin is 
expressed in Stevenson’s short story “The Scientific Ape,” which also interrogates the 
practice of vivisection. Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde both contain images of the cutting of 
the body. In Jekyll and Hyde, Jekyll—who lives in a compound with an old anatomy 
theater—uses chemistry to vivisect and double himself as a monster based on the 
Victorian ape-man trope used to lampoon Darwinism. In Moreau, the doctor vivisects 
beasts, which, in the context of Darwin’s blurring of the animal-human boundary and the 
Victorian social concerns about animal welfare, can be seen as stand-ins for human 
subjects. The images of the cutting of the body in both books are informed not only by 
the penal dissection of criminal corpses but also by the horrifying reality that any body, 
be it of a rich or poor person, that could be stolen from a funeral home or graveyard could 
end up on an anatomist’s table, where it would be stripped of its identity and 
dismembered. Stevenson’s concern with the practice of grave-robbing to supply medical 
schools with cadavers informs his short story “The Body-Snatcher.” This anxiety over the 
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destruction of bodies is joined, in both books, to oratory. The main rhetorical 
performance in Moreau is the doctor’s explanation and defense of his vivisection project. 
The byproduct of Moreau’s project, however, is the epideictic of his Beast People, which 
bestializes the novel’s main character, Edward Prendick. The rhetorical moments in 
Jekyll and Hyde are more subtle and revolve around the character of Gabriel John 
Utterson, Jekyll’s attorney and the novella’s finder of fact. The book’s main rhetorical 
display is declamation, as Utterson reads letters by the departed Jekyll and his scientific 
rival Hasty Lanyon and thereby assumes their personas to unravel the enigma of the 
murderous Edward Hyde. The epideictic emanating from the monster Hyde frightens and 
disgusts onlookers. It invades Utterson’s dreams and transforms him into a primitive 
hunter in nocturnal London.  The ultimate monstrosity of Utterson’s declamation is that it 
wholly consumes him. The novella, having shifted to Lanyon’s and Jekyll’s first-person 
statements, never returns to the third-person narrator that hovers near Utterson in telling 
the first part of the story. In the end, the book proves to have an incomplete  frame, and 
Utterson’s character is never recovered. 
The sixth chapter of this study focuses on The Picture of Dorian Gray from 1891 
and its concern with the aestheticization of the human body in relation to rhetorical 
performance. Aestheticization is used here in two senses: the body as an inspiration for 
the art, and the body as a medium of art. Dorian Gray is perhaps the finest expression of 
disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction. All of the elements noted in the other 
works examined in this study are present in Dorian Gray, including manipulative rhetoric 
and the destruction of the body through means that seem distant echoes of execution 
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practices. Moreover, Dorian Gray contains two sources of epideictic: the declaimer 
Henry Wotton and the ghastly portrait of Dorian Gray. Wotton is a declaimer because his 
words seemingly are not his own. At least some of his words originate with critic Walter 
Pater and reveal Wilde’s inspiration and possible reaction against the Art for Art’s Sake 
movement. Wotton’s friend, the painter Basil Hallward, says that Wotton’s words are 
insincere. Nevertheless, the sophistic Wotton’s epideictic praising beauty and youth, 
coupled with Hallward’s enchanting portrait of Dorian, transform the young man. He 
becomes a monstrous hybrid of humanity and art known ironically as “Prince Charming” 
with no integrity between body and soul. In this way, art is portrayed as vampiric in that 
it drains the life of its subject and replaces it with a horrifying double. The premise of 
Dorian Gray, of course, is that while Dorian’s portrait ages, he does not. His grotesque 
portrait becomes a reflection of his soul. Wilde was an erudite classicist, and Dorian’s 
concern for his soul can be traced to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, which attacks rhetoric as 
deceitful and posits that justice cleanses the soul of the offender. Dorian, however, never 
faces punishment for his crimes, which include Hallward’s murder and the destruction of 
his body. Hallward is killed just after Dorian shows him the corrupt portrait. The 
epideictic power of the portrait repulses Hallward and reveals to him Dorian’s true nature 
as living corpse. This makes Dorian a prototype of Dracula, like another of Wilde’s 
characters, Simon de Canterville. “The Canterville Ghost” also suggests Wilde’s interest 
in the aestheticization of the body and execution, which is more fully expressed in his 
play Salome. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BACKGROUND: RHETORIC AND MONSTROSITY 
 
 
In his 1981 essay “Why We Crave Horror Movies,” author Stephen King asserts 
that “the horror movie is innately conservative, even reactionary” in its depictions of 
monstrosities and their destruction, and the feelings of essentially normality the genre 
restores in its audiences (562). Much the same could be said of late-Victorian horror 
fiction: it is reactionary, searching primarily Classical and Renaissance history for 
familiar rhetorical forms and patterns to construct the unfamiliar as monstrous, judge it as 
abnormal, and then destroy it. This is one approach to understanding disarticulation as a 
trope that figures rhetoric as a coercive form of discipline seeking to normalize and 
control transgressing bodies. It is a project that in late-Victorian horror fiction is doomed 
to failure due to British suspicion of eloquence and anxieties about the recalcitrance of 
grotesque body.  
Understanding disarticulation is aided by a knowledge of the immediate rhetorical 
background of nineteenth-century Britain. This background was conducive to bodily 
tropes, especially those associated with monstrosities. It included not only the 
disciplining of the voice but also of the body to shape into an instrument capable of 
conveying meaning. The background features three basic elements, each of them 
interconnected. The first element is the elocutionary movement, which transmitted 
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ancient forms and patterns and also focused on the body as a rhetorical object that had to 
be figuratively divided into parts to achieve control of expression. The second element is 
declamation, an elocutionary concern with links to monstrosity and epideictic as displays 
involving the body. And the third element is the “Death of Cicero Tradition,” a collection 
of Roman rhetorical exercises that linked declamation and dismemberment. All of these 
elements are detectable in various forms in Frankenstein, Dracula, Moreau, Jekyll and 
Hyde, and Dorian Gray. 
Elocution and Assimilation 
The elocutionary movement was essentially a phenomenon that originated in the 
British Romantic period, with an epicenter in Ireland. It focused on the effective delivery 
of speeches through control of the voice, body, and emotions in. Philippa Spoel describes 
the elocutionary movement as a “proliferation of handbooks and public lectures on the 
fifth canon of rhetoric,” delivery (“The Science” 5). The elocutionary movement has 
largely fallen into obscurity; but in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the 
elocutionists’ lessons found a receptive audience and their philosophies spread 
throughout Britain.  Three of elocution’s foremost purveyors were Thomas Sheridan, 
John Walker, and Gilbert Austin. Each man added his own emphasis to the movement, 
which had a “significant cultural influence” (Harrington, “Remembering the Body” 68). 
Sheridan and Walker concentrated largely on training the voice, while Austin 
concentrated on training the body.  All three were Irishmen, indicating the interest of men 
on the margins to assimilate into proper British society. Jean Dietz Moss writes that 
Sheridan “was well aware of the impediments to professional advancement that the 
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regional accents and dialect of Irish students presented” (401). Moreover, these were 
British subjects whose bodies were often demonized as grotesque and inhuman. Lisa 
Wade writes that, like people of color, the Irish were often caricatured and satirized as 
apes as a tactic of imperial oppression. So, passing for English would require more than 
just proper enunciation: it would also involve training the body. “What was needed, 
Sheridan believed was … the proper finish for a gentleman, thus enabling him to play and 
effectual role in society,” Moss writes (400). Clearly, an education that involved a certain 
amount theatrical training was in order, and both Sheridan and Walker had been actors 
before they became teachers. Indeed, Sheridan’s work in two Dublin theaters, which also 
included serving as a manager like the Irish Stoker more than one hundred years later, 
opened his eyes to the need for “tutoring actors in proper diction and gesture” (Moss 
399). As former actors, Sheridan and Walker were understandably interested in the 
theatricality involved in declamation, a concept that will be defined later in this chapter. 
Unlike Sheridan and Walker, Austin was a clergyman. Their mutual concern, however, 
was teaching regulation of speech and the body, the assumption being that individuals did 
not naturally possess the self-control needed for effective oratory and proper social 
interaction. 
The most famous of the elocutionists, Sheridan is often associated with “natural” 
delivery. To train orators, Sheridan stressed the importance of oral reading and regulating 
“‘hurtful or dangerous’” passions to produce positive emotions (qtd. in Harrington , 
“Remembering” 72). He posited that there was a “‘language of the passions’” and drew a 
distinction between it and the “‘language of speech’” (qtd. in 72). According to Sheridan, 
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words actualize emotions, “which suggests the potential power that speech practices have 
in shaping the inner emotions of the speaker” (75). The idea was to associate not only 
words but also gestures with the “right feeling” (75). This association allowed for control 
of the student—control of himself and control by society—through the instructor and 
textbooks. Central to Sheridan’s program for controlling emotions was reading aloud 
with the proper expression. Teachers often modeled the reading, and students imitated 
their teachers. Imitative reading trained students in socially acceptable speech and also 
taught them to control their emotions, which Sheridan—like other rhetors before him—
believed would “have powerful, long-term effects on the dispositions of students” (80). 
Dana Harrington points out the Classical origins of imitative reading in Plato, who 
praises the study of poetry and the eulogies of great men as crucial to character 
development. On the other hand, Plato believed students should be discouraged from 
imitating women, bad men, and the insane (80-1). Through Socrates, Harrington writes, 
Plato expressed that imitative reading was a way to control the mind and body as well as 
speech. Socrates asks, “‘… have you not observed that imitations, if continued from 
youth far into life, settle into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and 
thought?’” (qtd. in 81). Imitative reading was intended not only to help students identify 
with great characters but also to absorb their ethics. Harrington points out that Quintilian 
later presented reading as a process that “engaged the entire body,” teaching a student 
such lessons as when to breath, when to pause, how to inflect his voice, and when to 
speed up or slow down (82). 
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Like Sheridan, Walker was concerned primarily with the voice; however, Walker 
is often associated with “mechanical” delivery. He accepted the link between voice and 
emotion and believed that intoning correctly would produce the corresponding feelings.  
In oral reading, he taught that pronouncing words accurately resulted in the correct 
feelings and allowed the speaker to read with expression. Walker is best known for the 
notational system he developed to indicate to students when to raise and lower their 
voices. He called these movements “inflections.” Also marked were “circumflexes,” 
which were turns of voice which involved rising and falling inflections (Fritz, “From 
Sheridan” 77). Under Walker’s method of instructions, teachers would show students 
how to read passages, and the students would be asked to imitate the teacher. The teacher 
would also mark texts to indicate inflections and pauses (78). As for gesture, Walker 
believed that assuming postures associated with emotions could affect students’ emotions 
and aid in delivery. Using the body as a rhetorical object, however, was disputed. Dana 
Harrington explains that Walker was aware of the disputes surrounding gesture in 
oratory, and recommended that it be “used as a last resort” (85). Instead, Walker 
recommended that speakers first use their imagination to produce feeling, and the “bodily 
movements … associated with this passion” would “then automatically follow the 
directions of the imagination and will” (Harrington, “Remembering ” 86).  Walker was 
also concerned with orators’ expression of emotions through facial expression and 
gesture.  His Elements of Elocution, for example, contains descriptions of the effects of 
more than sixty emotions affecting the face and body. Spoel argues that including these 
descriptions is inconsistent with Walker’s emphasis on self-restraint in oratory. But, she 
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says, Walker justifies including them “on the basis that practicing the physical expression 
of passions may assist the student to recapture these emotions during performance” 
(“Rereading” 88).  
While Sheridan and Walker were primarily concerned with training the voice, 
Austin focused on the body in his Chironomia: or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery.  
“Chironomia” means “the art of gesture” (Fritz, “From Sheridan” 85).  Debra Hawhee 
notes that in the ancient Greece the term also referred to shadowboxing (153). True to his 
avocation as an amateur chemist, Austin in his Chironomia strives for scientific 
precision.  The book is best remembered for its numerous engravings and notations that 
prescribe bodily motions to complement oratory. Austin writes that his system is intended 
to “‘produce a language of symbols so simple and so perfect as to render it possible with 
facility to represent every action of an orator throughout the speech … and to record them  
for posterity for  repetition and practice, as was all common language recorded …’” (qtd. 
in Fritz, “From Sheridan” 86). Although Chironomia may seem excessive and absurd 
today, Charles A. Fritz writes that the book, “with its mechanical treatment of action 
exercised an enormous influence upon elocutionary writers for a long time …” (88). 
Indeed, Chironomia has almost come to epitomize elocution. G.P. Mohrmann writes that 
it is “the best single introduction to the elocutionary movement” (“The Real Chironomia” 
19). Of Austin’s scholarship, Mohrmann writes that “nothing in the elocutionary 
movement can begin to compare with it” (20). All of the elocutionists scavenged classical 
ideas and reformulated and synthesized them, but Mohrmann writes that Austin’s is 
remarkable for its number of quotations, including fifty from Cicero (21). And Cicero  
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looms large over disarticulation in that rhetoric and dismemberment intersect in his body.  
Austin’s Chironomia is also significant for its embodiment of rhetoric. The treatise 
exhaustively identifies basic positions and movements of the body, feet, arms, hands, and 
fingers, with numbers to show sequence and letters to show direction. Among its 
annotated illustrations—which were plagiarized by a number of other works during the 
nineteenth century—are ones showing the correct position of the feet, including the foot 
that should be bearing the weight of the body and the one that should be used for balance. 
Others show hand gestures. Perhaps the best known illustration depicts a male speaker 
inside a sphere.3 It resembles Leonardo da Vinci’s “Vitruvian Man” drawing, which is 
intended to show the ideal proportions of the male human form. Austin’s spherical 
diagram indicates “the elementary positions and symbols of notation that make up 
(Austin’s) system” (Spoel, “The Science” 21).   Spoel writes that this “division of the 
body into parts” aids in analysis (18). Taken as a whole, however, Austin’s illustrations 
suggest the dismemberment of the body, with diagonal, vertical, and horizontal lines that 
seem to partition the speaker's body. This inference is not inconsistent with Spoel’s 
conclusion that Chironomia’s “science of bodily rhetoric aims at normalizing the implied 
speaker’s body” (23). She writes that part of the work’s appeal for “Austin’s implied 
students” is that it “offers a technique of bodily discipline that … will help them to 
maintain or improve their social rank and professional identities” (24). The figurative 
breaking apart of the body, therefore, represented a way to discipline, reformulate, and 
                                                          
3 See figure 1. 
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normalize it to conform to middle-class social standards. In addition to its classical 
origins, Austin’s Chironomia is reflective of the “new bodily canon” that Mikhail 
Bakhtin traces to the Renaissance. This canon not only saw the body as distinct from 
other bodies and complete, but also emphasized its “individually expressive and 
characteristic and expressive parts … the head, face, eyes, lips….”  Bakhtin writes that 
the “exact position and movements of this finished body in the finished outside world are 
brought out, so that the limits between them are not weakened” (321).  
The link between elocution and the body perhaps makes it easier to understand 
how Sheridan’s utopian vision of national renewal through rhetorical instruction may 
have been unsettling.  Evidence of Britons’ negative attitudes toward rhetoric are clearly 
displayed in Frankenstein, Dracula, Dorian Gray, Moreau and. In Jekyll and Hyde, the 
depiction of rhetoric is ambiguous, at best. Possible explanations for this reaction include 
Britons’ aversion to theory and their suspicion of eloquence.  Moreover, Britons 
generally had a negative view of ancient Athens, and, by association, rhetoric. Karen 
Whedbee writes:  
 
… eighteenth-century historians and political commentators considered the 
Athenian democratic experiment to have been a contemptible failure. In Athens, 
speakers … distorted and fabricated the truth in order to extort money and 
property from wealthy citizens. The demagogues of Athens achieved power by 
appealing to the ever-changing emotions of the crowd rather than to law or moral 
principle. (74) 
 
 
Thus, rhetoric was seen as playing a role in the destruction of Athens. A clear parallel can 
be drawn here between ancient Athens and revolutionary France, which scholars have 
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argued helped inspire Gothic literature in England. Radicalism in France also led to more 
a reactionary government in England, where political dissenters were subject to harsh 
punishment.  This leads to the final reason that elocution may have generated anxiety 
among Britons: it was actually a product of France, or at least a Frenchmen (Howell, 
“Sources” 6). Scholars generally concur that the elocutionary movement in England 
began with the translation of Michel Le Fracheur’s Traitte de l’action de l’oratuer, ou la 
Prononciation et du geste. The treatise was first translated into Latin in 1690, making it 
available to the rest of Europe, and then into English in 1702. It was reprinted in English 
in 1727. Le Fracheur was another figure who confused categories. He was born in 
Geneva in the late 1500’s and eventually became a Protestant preacher and theologian 
before his death in Paris in 1657 (6).  
It seems significant, then, that the ascendance and popularity of elocution in 
England was contemporaneous to the French Revolution. Like execution, elocution 
involves both discipline and display of the body.  However, elocution’s bodily rhetoric 
was also problematic, as the body itself was increasingly becoming a site of anxiety and 
conflict due to the political and scientific revolutions that enthralled writers and readers. 
As Spoel points out in her analysis of Sheridan’s and Walker’s systems, the elocutionary 
movement reconfirmed the “undeniable but uneasy status of pathos and bodily rhetoric 
within the rhetorical tradition” (“Rereading” 89). By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the seeds of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution had already been planted by 
men such as his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin. The idea that species were not static and 
fixed but could change over time through random mutations greatly contributed to 
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understanding of the human body as fluid and unstable. Indeed, much of the nineteenth 
century’s fiction of horror, the uncanny, and the supernatural reflects the notion that 
evolutionary time can be collapsed and that individual bodies can mutate in a relatively 
brief time span rather than numerous bodies over multiple generations. Borrowing from 
writer William Hope Hodgson, Kelly Hurley labels these changing, grotesque bodies 
“abhuman” (5). These hybridized bodies are presented as objects of fear, corruption, and 
disgust beyond the power of words to describe. All of the monstrosities examined in this 
study are hybrids of one sort or another, and all of them have the power to inspire the 
type of dread that Hurley describes. This study relates that power to epideictic. 
Declamation 
So, elocution had to do with delivery. And central to elocution was declamation, a 
concept with many shades of meaning. Like elocution, declamation largely disappeared 
from rhetorical education after the nineteenth century. However, while elocution was 
mostly forgotten, declamation as a term remained in currency and took on the meaning of 
hyperbolic speechmaking (“declamation”). Declamation was part of the larger subject of 
epideictic, or ceremonial, ritualized oratory. Declamation began as a training exercise for 
students in ancient Greece, where it later “became a prestigious form of performance art” 
(Webb, “Rhetoric and the Novel” 527). It grew out of the “progymnasmata,” or the 
elementary exercises first referred to in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum of the fourth century 
B.C. These exercises required students to retell fables and parables, which they were to 
amplify with “paraphrase, illustration, comparison, and citation” (Conley 31). As the 
students progressed, they were assigned the argumentative exercises of refutation and 
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confirmation to critique stories. In commonplace exercises, they elaborated on stock 
themes. Practicing encomium and vituperation, students were asked to praise a person or 
thing for being virtuous or blame it for being wicked, the basis for epideictic. Comparison 
exercises required them to evaluate two people or objects. As part of impersonation, or 
prosopopoeia, they would assume the character of a historical or fictional figure and 
present monologues that they had composed. Exercises in description, or ekphrasis, asked 
students to describe something in vivid terms.  Thesis assignments required students to 
argue a general claim about a topic. Finally, students would participate in exercises in 
which they would argue for or against an issue of law, either real or imagined. More 
advanced students would go on to compose declamations on selected topics with 
deliberative or forensic themes (31). 
As in Greece, declamation served as a training exercise for students in Rome and 
was “at the heart of … aristocratic education” (Roller 110). Matthew Roller writes that 
Roman declamation involved two basic exercises, suasoriae and controversiae.  
Suasoriae were exercises in deliberative oratory depicting a famous figure from literature 
or history debating courses of action. The student declaimer’s assignment was to urge one 
course of action over another. Controversiae were exercises in forensic oratory 
presenting fictional legal cases and problematic applications of laws. The student 
declaimer had to argue from one side of the case or the other (110). Declamation in these 
forms has been most closely associated with the early empire of the Augustan age, but 
similar exercises can be found in earlier sources, such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium and 
Cicero’s rhetorical works from the first century B.C. (110).  In addition to Cicero, 
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Antony, Octavian, and Pompey were all trained through declamation, according to the 
Roman historian Suetonius (111). 
Additional links are revealed through a deeper study of declamation’s history. 
Students participating in declamation exercises were asked not only to consider 
contradictory social values and disturbing situations.  “Over and over again,” Thomas 
Habinek writes, “the controversiae require the student to consider relations between 
fathers and sons, men and women, and powerful men and their social inferiors” (68). A 
number of declamation scenarios have been handed down by Seneca the Elder. Many 
feature a tyrannical figure, whether it be a leader or a father. In one scenario, a young 
man’s father refuses to ransom him from pirates, so the son agrees to marry the pirate 
chief’s daughter to gain his freedom. When the young man returns home, however, his 
father orders him to divorce the pirate chief’s daughter and marry a wealthy woman to 
gain her property. In another scenario, a man rapes two women in one night. Under 
Roman law, a woman can force her rapist to marry her or order him to be executed. The 
declaimer in this case must ask himself what would happen if both of the women choose 
to marry the man, or if one chooses to marry him and the other demands his execution. In 
yet another scenario, a king grants slaves permission to kill their masters and rape their 
mistresses. One slave refuses, and defends his mistress’s virginity. When her father 
returns from exile, he gives her in marriage to the slave. But the son opposes the father by 
charging him with insanity (68-70).  Ruth Webb writes that this Roman “taste for 
paradox and the macabre” was also characteristic of “sensational declamation themes” in 
ancient Greece (528). 
 
28 
 
Dismembering Cicero 
It is through Roman oratory that dismemberment merges with declamation in 
what has come to be known as the “Death of Cicero Tradition.” This macabre tradition 
consisted of various declamatory exercises inspired by the stories surrounding the 
assassination and dismemberment of Cicero. Cicero’s discursive body is of great 
significance to disarticulation. He himself promoted the concept of the integration of the 
body and rhetoric, and he encouraged the use of the body as a rhetorical instrument. 
Motions of the hands, fingers, arms and feet should be carefully choreographed to 
emphasize emotion and communication in a natural language beyond words. In this way, 
the body speaks. “Action, is as it were, the language of the body, and therefore ought to 
correspond to thought,” Cicero writes in Da Oratore (294). William Forsyth, who wrote a 
biography of Cicero in 1865, recognized the fusion of body and rhetoric in the great 
orator, writing that his “‘whole body was instinct with the fire that burned upon his lips, 
and the accents that rambled upon his tongue found corresponding expression in the 
movement of his limbs,’” (qtd. in Rosner 171). The destruction of Cicero’s body, 
therefore, was freighted with rhetorical meaning. Depending on the legends one adheres 
to, Cicero was either killed by decapitation, or killed and then beheaded in 43 BC as a 
result of Marc Antony’s proscriptions. Accurate or not, sources indicate that Cicero’s 
body was further mutilated after his death when one or both of his hands were cut off. 
This dismemberment supposedly symbolized Cicero’s posthumous punishment for 
writing against the Triumvirate. As part of Cicero’s punishment, his head and hand(s) 
were reportedly affixed to the rostrum and displayed in the Roman Senate in a gruesome 
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show of power against one who had declaimed against the state. Roller points out that 
displaying Cicero’s body parts in the Senate was symbolic because of its “close 
identification with Cicero’s life’s work” (121). Depending on the source one consults, 
Antony’s wife Fulvia may also have taken part in mutilating Cicero’s body out of 
revenge for his famed eloquence. According to the legend, Fulvia took Cicero’s severed 
head and shoved hairpins in his tongue. Historians have found it impossible to sort 
through these stories and piece together an accurate account of Cicero’s death. But 
historical truth does not matter here. What does matter is that, early on, declamation as a 
rhetorical exercise was linked to violent dismemberment and mutilation in practices used 
to train normative males, many of who would go on to assume positions of leadership in 
Rome. Roller writes that “the vivid description of violence wrought upon the body (e.g. 
torture, execution, dismemberment), is widely present in both the declamatory and non-
declamatory treatments of Cicero’s murder” (122). He also explains, “Such violence is a 
common topic of declamatory descriptio” (122).  
Monstrosity  
 Declamation, therefore, was originally a rhetorical training exercise that engaged 
students’ imaginations and asked them to adopt personas to deliver formal speeches. This 
training, Thomas Habinek writes, taught students to “impersonate a wide variety of 
characters, from slaves to gods, foreigners to Roman heroes, male and female, young and 
old, indiscriminately” (68). Some of these characters and situations were disturbing, if 
not horrifying. In this way, rhetorical training exercises helped forge an enduring link 
between declamation and monstrosity. Fully understanding this link requires readers to 
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momentarily set aside associations of monstrosity with something frightening, freakish, 
unnatural, or large. The word monster has had multiple definitions throughout the years, 
and many of those definitions found their way into nineteenth-century culture. A 
forerunner of the modern word monster in the Old French of the twelfth century was 
mostre, which meant a “prodigy” or “marvel,” according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary. One correspondence found in the OED is an obsolete early modern definition 
of monster as a verb meaning “to assume the appearance of greatness.” Here is a clear 
connection to declamation as the act of assuming the persona or a great historical figure 
to deliver a formal speech. The links, however, do not end with one possible meaning. 
Another archaic definition of monster found in the OED is “to exhibit” or “to point out as 
something remarkable.” This usage is true to the Latin origin monstrāre, meaning “to 
show” or “point” (“monster”). The same word is the origin for the French montrer, and 
the English “demonstrate” (“demonstrate”). As Michel Foucault points out in Madness 
and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, “monsters” are 
“etymologically, beings or things to be shown” (68).  Foucault refers specifically to the 
practice of publically exhibiting insane people, a practice that continued in England until 
the early nineteenth century. Foucault writes that according to a House of Commons 
report, “lunatics” at the hospital in Bethlehem were being exhibited on Sundays, with 
spectators being charged a penny. The annual revenue from the displays totaled nearly 
400 pounds, indicating 96,000 visits per year (66).  The insane people in these shows 
come closer to the modern sense of the word monster as something abnormal or 
deformed, something freakish. Yet another meaning for the word monster is suggested by 
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the Latin word monēre, which means “to warn” (“monster”). The meaning of monster as 
a warning is explained by Chris Baldick: “In a world created by a reasonable God, the 
freak or lunatic must have a purpose: to reveal visibly the results of vice, folly, and 
unreason, as a warning” (10). So, both “declamation” and “monstrosity” can be construed 
generally as a display involving the body intended to send some sort of message. In this 
sense, “declamation” and “monstrosity” approximate the meaning of epideixis, the root of 
epideictic, whose “nearest equivalents in English are ‘display,’ ‘show,’ ‘demonstration’” 
(Carey 237). Hawhee writes that “epidexis primarily meant a material or bodily 
display…,” one that “becomes manifest via discourse” (175). This link to epidexis adds 
another consideration, which is that no display is possible without an audience and its 
reaction. Hawhee cites Simon Goldhill’s point that “‘epidexis requires an audience’’”  
(qtd. in 175). She also states that “viewers … are not passive recipients of the display and 
the knowledge it produces.…”  (176). Drawing on other scholarship, Hawhee writes that 
epideictic requires observation and judgment: “…epideictic discourse demands an active 
evaluation and response” (176). This is an important concept for this study, which claims 
that nineteenth-century horror fiction uses epideictic to produce fear in audiences by 
depicting characters’ encounters with monstrosities such as Frankenstein’s creature, 
Dracula, Edward Hyde, the Beast People, and Dorian Gray. Epideictic is evident in the 
characters’ negative reaction to the monstrosities, their inability to express it effectively 
in speech, and their transformations after the encounters. 
One way declamation was transmitted to nineteenth-century writers of horror 
fiction was through the elocutionary movement, which stressed rhetoric as a means of 
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controlling marginal bodies and speech. Declamation—with its links to monstrosity and 
epideictic—also offered writers a source of frightening characters and scenarios 
constituted through rhetoric. Perhaps the best examples of declamation in nineteenth-
century British literature are the dramatic monologues of Robert Browning and Alfred 
Lord Tennyson. These poems isolate historical speakers—some of them monstrous, such 
as the Duke in Browning’s “My Last Duchess”—within a rhetorical performance before 
imagined audiences. They cast readers as members of those audiences, attempt to deceive 
them into believing that they are actually listening to the historical personages speaking, 
and invite them to make a judgment. Similar rhetorical moments are found throughout 
nineteenth-century horror fiction. 
This chapter has examined the background of disarticulation as a trope in late-
Victorian horror fiction that figures oratory as a form of discipline seeking to normalize 
unstable bodies, ultimately through the coercion and violence expressed in images and 
threats of dismemberment. This background includes the elocutionary movement, with its 
emphasis on intense training not only of the voice but also of the body as part of the 
science of oratorical delivery. Among elocution’s methods was imitation, both in reading 
and in oratory. Imitation in oratory was often part of declamation, an oratorical training 
exercise dating back to ancient Greece that asked students to assume the persona of a 
historical figure to deliver a famous speech or to resolve a dilemma. The role-playing 
often involved sinister scenarios and characters, which seems appropriate considering 
declamation’s etymological links to monstrosity and epideictic as displays involving the 
body. One set of declamation exercises was inspired by legends surrounding the slaying 
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and dismemberment of the great Roman orator Cicero, who emphasized the use of the 
body in oratorical delivery. Practiced in England through much of the nineteenth century, 
declamation exercises helped forge the peculiar link between oratory and violence that 
informed the rhetorical education of the professional classes and that can be located in 
late Victorian horror-fiction. 
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Figure 1. Spherical Illustration from Gilbert Austin’s Chironomia (“File: Chironomia 
Sphere”). 
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CHAPTER III 
MONSTER AS ORATOR IN FRANKENSTEIN 
 
 
By the end of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein, the protagonist, Victor 
Frankenstein, is a ruined man.  Frankenstein begins life full of promise. Doted on by his 
loving parents, he is sent to one of the finest universities in Europe. However, 
Frankenstein is a tragically flawed character. He is a secretive man driven by his 
obsession to conquer death, create life, and have his creation worship him. His corrupt 
ambition consumes him and leads to the deaths of his innocent friends and family 
members. His final obsession is to destroy the monster he has created. Pursuing the 
creature to the Arctic, Frankenstein is rescued by a crew of English explorers on an ice-
bound ship. On board the ship, the dying Frankenstein tells his life story to the captain 
and the novel’s scribe, Robert Walton. He warns Walton to beware if he encounters the 
creature: “‘He is eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had even power over my 
heart; but trust him not. His soul is as hellish as his form, full of treachery and fiendlike 
malice’” (165). 
Frankenstein is a foundational novel for the study of rhetoric in nineteenth-
century horror fiction for its compelling depiction of monster as orator. It establishes the 
crucial link between declamation, monstrosity, and disarticulation that can be found in 
later horror fiction. Disarticulation is present in Franksentein in that the monster is the
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product of cutting. His liminal body—destroyed, dismembered, reconstructed, and 
reanimated without memory, identity, conscience, or soul— is depicted as using rhetoric 
in a forceful, emotional speech. Indeed, his eloquence constitutes his monstrous nature, 
which leads him to destroy William Frankenstein, Justine Moritz, Henry Clerval, and 
Elizabeth Frankenstein. The creature is monstrosity through and through. However, the 
rhetorical nature of Frankenstein is not limited to the creature’s speech and deed. His 
oration simply is the centerpiece of a novel with a clear rhetorical theme, which is the 
manipulative, self-serving, and violent nature of persuasive speech. Although the monster 
can be seen as declaiming, the true declaimer is Frankenstein, who recalls the creature’s 
speech for Walton. Frankenstein also uses rhetoric, albeit unsuccessfully, in his efforts to 
get Walton and his crew to continue their journey. Walton serves not only as the audience 
for the novel’s rhetorical performances, but also as a scribe and arbiter of the truth. 
Walton successfully resists Frankenstein’s impassioned rhetoric, and he also criticizes the 
creature’s false rhetoric. This chapter considers the rhetoric of the creature’s entreaties to 
Frankenstein as following the pattern of a classical oration. As such, the speech can be 
seen as carefully planned, rehearsed, and lacking sincerity. 
Classical Influences 
That Frankenstein has classical influences is indisputable. The subtitle, The 
Modern Prometheus, makes clear that Greek mythology is at least one of those 
influences. What is not so obvious is the extent of some of Shelley’s other classical 
influences, including rhetoric. Her use of rhetoric in the depiction of monstrosity reveals 
her deeper engagement with the classics. One of Shelley’s first influences was Percy 
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Shelley, who was her lover when she began writing Frankenstein in 1816, and her 
husband by the time it was published in serial form in 1818. Percy Shelley served as her 
co-author as well as her mentor, editor, and literary agent.  Mary Shelley received no 
formal schooling. She was schooled at home by her father, the radical political 
philosopher and writer William Godwin. After running away with Percy Shelley in 1814, 
Mary Shelley was left to educate herself. Percy Shelley, on the other hand, received the 
elitist education that only the sons of well-to-do families would have received in his day 
to prepare them for public life. Percy Shelley’s classical learning undoubtedly influenced 
Mary Shelley’s intellectual curiosities and the production of the novel. His reading 
selections apparently sparked Mary Shelley’s interests in the classics. Studying the 
couple’s early reading lists in Mary Shelley’s surviving journals, one sees that Percy 
Shelley’s selections are heavy with the classics, including Cicero, Petronius, Suetonius, 
Livy, Seneca, Plutarch, Herodotus, Thucydides, Theocritus, Plato, Aeschyulus, and 
Sophocles. Mary Shelley’s early reading lists, on the other hand, include mostly novels, 
poetry, and polemics, and later grew to include selections from the classics. Over the next 
few years, however, she was reading widely in the Greek and Roman classics, according 
to her journals. Her yearly reading lists and daily journal entries show specifically that 
she read selections from Homer, Pliny, Lucian, Horace, Cicero, Virgil, Tacitus, Ovid, 
Plutarch, and Suetonius. She also read Gibbon. By the time Mary Shelley began 
Frankenstein she was a budding classicist. This interest was piqued by Percy Shelley, 
who was fluent in Latin but still learning Greek (Wittman 90). Mary Shelley began 
studying Greek on her own in September 1814, “less than two months after her 
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elopement with Percy,” observes Ellen Herson Wittman (88). Mary Shelley’s 
determination to learn Greek “betrays a desire on her part not merely to learn from Percy 
but to hold her own in an area where Percy had as yet little advantage” (90). Mary 
Shelley began learning Latin in 1815 (90). In 1818, Percy and Mary Shelley worked 
together on a translation of Plato’s Symposium. Percy Shelley was a student at Eton when 
he was introduced to Plato. At the time, “the influence of Plato was considered 
subversive as compared with that of Aristotle” (90). This is significant, as Plato’s 
influence may have shaped Frankenstein’s essentially negative presentation of rhetoric as 
a false and misleading practice, one that is concerned with swaying audiences and 
winning arguments rather than with leading people to truth and advocating best actions. 
Critics continue to find much material to work with when studying Mary 
Shelley’s classical influences in Frankenstein. Terry W. Thompson points out in his 2008 
article “‘Victor, He Is Murdered’: Greek Stage Decorum and the Five Killings in 
Frankenstein” that the reports of the reports of the deaths of  William, Justine, Henry, and 
Elizabeth are similar to the reports of off-stage slayings in Greek tragedies such as 
Medea, Oedipus Rex, Agamemnon, Electra, and Antigone. Thompson writes that 
 
given Mary Shelley’s self-documented love of Greek tragedy … and considering 
the many other Greek influences that permeate the pages of her first novel, the 
restrained manner in which she presents the monster’s … killings offers telling 
and meaningful echoes of classical stage decorum. (65) 
  
 
In an earlier article, Thompson focuses on Mary Shelley’s reading of Ovid in 
1815 and the parallels between Hercules in Metamorphoses and the creature in 
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Frankenstein. “In many ways,” Thompson writes in his 2004 article “‘A Majestic Figure 
of August Dignity,’” “Victor’s forlorn and unnatural creature offers poignant echoes of 
Hercules, the greatest and most fearsome of all the heroes in Greek Mythology, yet also 
one of the loneliest and most tragic figures in the Western canon” (36). Another article—
“Testimony and Trope in Frankenstein” by Sara Guyer—examines the functions of the 
tropes of prosopopoeia and apostrophe, “figures that it relies upon for its presentation 
and the constitutive tropes of the romantic lyric” (98). Using prosopopoeia, a speaker or 
writer addresses as an audience as an imaginary or absent person. In many cases, the 
person is absent due to death. Both Plato and Cicero use this rhetorical device in their 
dialogues by “speaking” through other characters, such as Socrates and Crassus. In 
Frankenstein, Victor uses prosopopoeia when he retells the creature’s story to Walton. 
And, in Walton’s narrative, both Victor and the creature become figures of prosopopoeia.  
The Shelleys moved to Italy in March 1818, and during an outing in December 
1818 visited Cicero’s tomb in Gaeta. In a journal entry dated December 30th, Mary 
Shelley explains that the tomb was “erected on the place where he was murdered in the 
midst of the olive wood” (241). Shelley was captivated by the beauty of the scenery, 
which overlooked a bay “sanctified by the fictions of Homer … and the ruins of the Villa 
of Cicero …” (241). The tomb, Shelley writes, is about a mile from the ruins: “A poet 
could not have a more sacred burying place in an olive grove on the shore of a beautiful 
bay—sheltered by the range of bleak hills which contrast with the beautiful wooded plain 
at their feet” (241). The serenity of the setting described by Shelley, however, belies the 
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violent nature of Cicero’s death and the legendary mutilation of his dismembered head, 
which constitute a defining moment in disarticulation. 
Shelley’s poetic meditations on Cicero reveal the affinity she felt for the great 
Roman orator whose ideas on rhetoric had such a profound influence on Frankenstein.  
Indeed, Shelley seems to have closely followed Cicero’s De Inventione in crafting the 
creature’s oration to Frankenstein, which begins near the end of Volume II, Chapter II, of 
the 1818 text and continues to Chapter IX. This speech can be broken down into the 
various sections that Cicero identifies in De Inventione: introduction, narration, partition, 
confirmation, refutation, and conclusion. 
The Monster’s Oration 
Before analyzing the monster’s speech, it is first enlightening to analyze his body. 
Of course, the creature’s body is assembled from other dismembered bodies. He is not 
born: he is manufactured. For this study, the most significant tie between the creature and 
the classical world is this notion that bodies and their dispositions can be recreated. In 
ancient Greece, men were not born orators: they were built into orators. Their bodies 
were not naturally invested with rhetoric: it was ingrained into their bodies to the point 
that it appeared natural. The term Debra Hawhee has coined to describe the concept of 
the creating a person’s nature is phusiopoiesis. The theory here is that “the body’s 
constitution can be remolded so that it is more suitable for further training” (93). The 
body, then, and its instincts can be rebuilt. Hawheee says that “Aristotle suggests that 
habits become so ingrained in a person that they become almost instinctual responses and 
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most closely approximate a ‘natural’ state” (95). This reconditioning was accomplished 
through the “Three Rs”: rhythm, repetition, and response (141).  
In fourth and fifth centuries BC, this education took place in the gymnasium, a 
space for physical exercise but also for rhetorical training. It was a space for talking and 
exchanging ideas (114). The epicenter of rhetoric was Athens. Hawhee writes that 
gymnasia were prime gathering spots for itinerant sophists, as were the agora, or 
marketplace. “Apparently, all of Athens was swarming with sophists,” Hawhee writes. 
“These mobile teachers were particularly drawn to the spaces where they were likely to 
be most visible to potential clientele: the agora and the gymnasium both served this 
function” (111). Within these spaces, Hawhee writes, a “specific syncretism” took place 
“between athletics and rhetoric ….” It was “a crossover that contributed to the 
development of rhetoric as a bodily art: an art performed by and with the body as well as 
the mind” (111).  Gymnasia were where “citizen production” took place. “It was in the 
gymnasia that most of Athens’ future leaders were trained, a least to some degree,” 
Hawhee writes (116). Music from aulos, a wind instrument similar to a bagpipe, set the 
tempo for “the practice, regulation, and production of bodily movements” (138). Two of 
the primary methods for “habit formation” were repetition and imitation.  Students 
imitated their instructors. “The teacher … must offer himself as a model,” Hawhee 
writes, for there is “a portion of the art of oratory that cannot be transferred through 
explicit discussion of compostion, arrangement, and style” (151).  Part of what was being 
taught through modeling was bodily control, or deportment. Hawhee explains that 
“training in deportment took on a bodily manner, with attention to self-presentation, 
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bodily carriage, standing, sitting, and walking” (151). This training had not only to do 
with the “polite,” Hawhee says: it also had to do with the “politic” (152). Observers made 
inferences about character based on the body. This was the “habituated practice of bodily 
reading,” Hawhee states, drawing on Aristotle’s belief that character is judged through 
body (152). Here we see an emphasis on impersonation and bodily control that will 
persist in declamation through Roman oratory and the elocutionists directly into the 
nineteenth century. 
A final concept that must be considered in the study of bodily reformation 
through rhetoric and athletics is agōn. Agōn means “contest or struggle” (15). It is more 
than simple sparring or competition with a goal of victory: its emphasis is on the struggle 
itself as crucial to the development of body and “virtuosity,” or aretē (17). Aretē, Hawhee 
explains, “was an ethical concept … associated with bodily appearance, action, and 
performance as much as it was conceived of as an abstracted ‘guide’” for action (17).  
Agōn could refer to physical trials or rhetorical trials. Both types of struggle prepared 
students for the rigors of public speaking. Hawhee writes of the “sheer bodily strength” 
that scholars believe was “required to deliver powerful, effective speeches” in large 
venues, some of them outdoors (153-154). 
Ancient Greek speakers, therefore, projected a certain monstrousness, a larger-
than-life physicality and presence. This is just one of the characteristics that Shelley’s 
creature shares with classical orators. He is depicted as being physically large with 
incredible endurance. Spying on his adopted family, the DeLaceys, from his secret hiding 
place, he learns through instruction and imitation. He is also affected by the music that 
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they play. His agōn involves wandering in the wilderness, where he is rejected and even 
shot. All of these experiences shape his reconstructed body and his character and prepare 
him for his oratorical challenge, which is to persuade Frankenstein to create a mate for 
him. To achieve this goal, the creature—whose primary model is Milton’s Satan, another 
great literary orator—must overcome Frankenstein’s vehement objections and minimize 
what Frankenstein strongly suspects and will soon have confirmed, that the creature 
killed William and brought about Justine’s execution. 
Both the creature and Frankenstein treat the rhetorical occasion as something of a 
legal proceeding. The creature sees it as a civil dispute. He asserts his “‘right’” (111) and 
demands “‘recompense’” (73). Frankenstein, on the other hand, sees it as a criminal 
prosecution. He accuses the creature of having “‘diabolically murdered’” William and 
Justine (72). The creature replies, “‘The guilty are allowed, by human laws, bloody as 
they may be, to speak in their own defence before they are condemned. … You accuse 
me of murder; and yet you would, with a satisfied conscience, destroy your own 
creature’” (73-4). Here, and throughout his oration, the creature makes it clear that he is 
familiar with the law—a primary arena of rhetorical endeavor. Law is one of the subjects 
that he manages to learn during his time in the German wilderness spying on the 
DeLaceys, a French family living in exile. Significantly, when the creature later 
confesses to killing William, a child of about five years, he calls the slaying “murder” 
(110), not manslaughter or some other lesser offense. Recounting the crime, the creature 
says that after he abducts William near his family’s home in Geneva and learns he is a 
Frankenstein, he tells him, “‘… you belong to my enemy—to him towards whom I have 
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sworn eternal revenge; you shall be my first victim.’” Grasping the boy’s throat “‘to 
silence him,’” the creature kills him. This is not a “tragic accident,” as Thompson 
describes it (“A Majestic Figure” 39).  The creature is not remorseful. On the contrary, he 
celebrates the murder: “‘I gazed on my victim, and my heart swelled with exultation and 
hellish triumph: clapping my hands, I exclaimed, “I, too, can create desolation …”’” 
(109). After strangling William, the creature says he steals a locket with a picture of the 
boy’s dead mother Caroline Frankenstein and secretly hides the locket in the folds of 
Justine’s dress. He knows what will happen if the servant girl is found in possession of 
the locket because he is familiar with the “sanguinary laws of man” and has “learned how 
to work mischief” (110). For his part, Frankenstein says that he agrees to hear the 
monster partly to find out if he really did kill William: “I eagerly sought a confirmation 
or denial of this opinion” (74). And the creature casts Frankenstein in the role of his 
judge and juror: “‘Oh, Frankenstein, be not equitable to every other, and trample upon me 
alone, to whom thy justice, and even thy clemency and affection, is most due’” (73). He 
adds, “‘Listen to my tale: when you have heard that, abandon or commiserate me, as you 
shall judge that I deserve’” (73). As we will see, such flattering language is part of the 
creature’s strategy for swaying Frankenstein and getting him to agree to create a female 
companion for the monster. 
Exordium 
According to Cicero’s De Inventione, the purpose of the exordium is to bring “the 
mind of the hearer into a suitable state to receive the rest of the speech; and that will be 
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effected if it has rendered him well disposed towards the speaker, attentive, and willing to 
receive information” (I.XV). Cicero writes that the exordium 
 
ought to have a great deal of sententiousness and gravity in it, and altogether to 
embrace all things which have a reference to dignity; because that is the most 
desirable effect to be produced which in the greatest degree recommends the 
speaker to his hearer. (I.XVIII)  
 
 
It has two divisions. The first is a beginning in “plain words” that will disarm the 
audience and thereby avoid raising any “suspicion of preparation and artificial diligence.” 
The second division is language “calculated to enable the orator to work his way into the 
good graces of his hearers.” Cicero identifies five types, or “causes,” of exordiums: 
honorable, astonishing, low, doubtful, and obscure. 
Using these terms, the creature’s exordium is best considered as “astonishing,” 
which describes a rhetorical situation in which the orator and audience are alienated from 
one another. In such a hostile situation, Cicero advises that it is still necessary to obtain 
an audience’s good will. If the audience is “excessively alienated … then it will be 
necessary to have recourse to endeavours to insinuate oneself into their good graces,” 
Cicero counsels. In other words, the orator must present himself in a positive light in an 
effort to win the audience’s favor and defuse their animosity. Another piece of advice 
that Cicero presents is that an orator should not present the second part of his speech, the 
narration, “in an unseasonable place” (I.XXI). He should also promise that he will be 
brief and “that we will in a very short time prove our … cause” (I.XVI). 
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The creature seems to follow Cicero’s advice carefully. During his exordium, the 
creature repeatedly pleads for a hearing: “‘I entreat you to hear me....’” (72). “‘Listen to 
my tale.’” (73); “‘But hear me.’” (73); “‘Hear my tale.…’”(74); “‘…listen to me.…’” 
(74). While Frankenstein heaps insults on the monster, calling him not only a 
“‘wretched’” and “‘abhorred’” devil, but also a “‘fiend,’” the creature maintains his 
dignity as he speaks with deference to his creator: “‘I am thy creature, and I will be even 
mild and docile to my natural lord and king.…’” (73). Clearly, the creature uses this 
ingratiating language to appeal to one of Frankenstein’s weaknesses—his vanity. Earlier 
in the novel, Frankenstein describes one of his motives for creating life: “A new species 
would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe 
their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I 
should deserve theirs” (34). 
The monster tries to begin establishing his good character in his exordium: “‘I 
was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be 
virtuous’” (73). He repeats: “‘I was benevolent; my soul glowed with love and 
humanity’” (73). When Frankenstein resists his rhetoric, the monster sounds as if he is 
considering his oratorical strategies: “‘How can I move thee? Will no entreaties cause 
thee to turn a favourable eye upon thy creature’” (73). The exordium has its desired effect 
on Frankenstein. After initially refusing an audience with the creature, Frankenstein 
agrees. He says that he considered the creature’s “arguments … and determined to listen 
to his tale” (74). He continues: “I was partly urged by curiosity, and compassion 
confirmed my resolution. … For the first time, also, I felt what the duties of creator 
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towards his creature were, and that I ought to render him happy before I complained of 
his wickedness” (74).Before beginning his narration, the creature also seems to be 
following Cicero’s advice when sees to Frankenstein’s comfort by inviting him out of the 
cold into his hut.  He says, : “‘… the temperature of this place is not fitting to your fine 
sensations’” (74). Well into his narration, the creature also indicates his concern for time 
and says that he will quicken the pace: “‘I now hasten to the more moving part of my 
story’” (86). 
Narratio 
Cicero writes that narratio, or narration, “is an explanation of acts that have been 
done, or of acts as if they have been done” (I.XIX). The narration is a statement of 
particulars of a case, and the creature’s is central to his argument. Scrutinizing the 
creature’s narration, one can discern several themes, all of which are introduced in his 
exordium: he is essentially good and has been turned evil by the abuse he suffers at the 
hands of mankind; he has been wronged by his creator; he has fine sensibilities and is 
affected by beauty, literature, music, and learning; he has been excluded from human 
society based on his appearance; and he has powerful emotions and a capacity for 
violence. 
Establishing that he is an essentially good is of the utmost importance to the 
creature’s argument. As Cicero points out in De Inventione, “Good-will will be procured 
… if exploits are mentioned which have been performed … with bravery, or wisdom, or 
humanity” (I.VVI). The monster’s kindness and bravery must also seem to outweigh the 
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despicable crimes he has committed in killing an innocent child and effecting the 
execution of a guiltless girl for the slaying, not to mention arson. 
The creature recalls that he performed acts of kindness and generosity for the 
DeLaceys after witnessing their love for one another and learning that they have been 
exiled from their home country, that they lead lives of poverty and toil, and that they are 
going hungry. One of the first kindnesses that the creature says he performs for the 
cottagers is to stop stealing food from them and to begin living on “berries, nuts, and 
roots” that he scrounges in the forest (82). He also tells Frankenstein that he collects 
firewood for the DeLaceys, clears the snow from the path to their cottage, and does other 
chores typically performed by Felix, the son and brother. All the while, he remains in 
hiding. He says the cottagers are “‘greatly astonished’” by the occurrences, “‘and once or 
twice I heard them … utter the words good spirit, wonderful …’” (85). Even after he is 
violently and painfully rejected by the DeLaceys, the monster says that he performs an 
act of heroism by saving a girl from drowning in a “‘rapid’” river and tries to revive her, 
only to be shot by a “‘rustic’” with a gun (108). 
Another theme of the creature’s narration is his belief that he has been wronged 
by his creator, who abandoned him right after his “‘birth.’” In one of Frankenstein’s 
many Miltonic allusions, the creature declares in his exordium, “‘I ought to be thy Adam; 
but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed’” (73). 
Indeed, the monster’s descriptions of his wanderings after he is abandoned by 
Frankenstein seem intended to cast himself as a babe in the woods and produce guilt in 
his creator. One recalls Frankenstein’s own description of the newly resurrected creature 
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as an infantile being: “His jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while 
a grin wrinkled his cheeks” (38). A short time later, the monster is wandering alone. He is 
cold, hungry, thirsty, exhausted, and confused, and his senses are not fully developed 
(76). “‘I was a poor, helpless, miserable wretch,’” the creature tells Frankenstein (75). At 
the DeLacey’s cottage, the “‘kennel’” that he monster secretly dwells in is beside a “‘pig-
stye’” (79). He sleeps in “‘straw’” like an animal and lives like a rodent  in the shadows, 
emerging only in the DeLacey’s absence. 
Despite the hostile feelings that the monster argues that he develops as a result of 
his mistreatment by humans and his outcast status, he tries to impress upon Frankenstein 
that he is a sensitive being deeply affected by beauty, literature, music, and learning. Like 
his maker, the creature takes pleasure in nature. One of his first memories is of gazing at 
the moon (76). He takes pleasure in the songs of the birds in the forest (76). He loves the 
sights and smells of flowers blooming in the spring, and the “‘pale radiance’” of the stars 
in the “’moonlight woods’” (88). The monster is captivated by the “‘beauty’” and 
“‘gentle manners’” (81) of the cottagers.  He is charmed by the strains of the elder 
DeLacey’s guitar, which produces “‘sounds sweeter than the voice of the thrush or the 
nightingale’” (80). Later, when Safie joins the family and the creature hears her play 
DeLacey’s guitar, the music “‘at once drew tears of sorrow and delight from my eyes’” 
(88). From the DeLaceys, he learns language, “‘a godlike science … I ardently desired to 
become acquainted with.…’” (83). He also learns world history—including the 
“‘stupendous genius and mental activity of the Grecians’” and the “‘wonderful virtue of 
the early Romans’”—as Felix reads to Safie from Volney’s Ruins of Empire (89). 
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“‘These wonderful narrations inspired me with strange feelings,’” the monster says, as he 
ponders mankind’s duality: “‘He appeared at one time a mere scion of the evil principle, 
and at another as all that can be conceived of noble and godlike’” (89). The creature also 
learns independently. In the woods one night, he says he finds a trunk containing three 
books: Paradise Lost, Plutarch’s Lives, and Sorrows of Werther. “‘I can hardly describe 
to you the effect of these books,’” the monster tells Frankenstein. “‘They produced in me 
an infinity of new images and feelings, that sometimes raised me to ecstasy, but more 
frequently sunk me into the lowest dejection’” (97). 
The creature’s feelings of dejection from learning lead to another theme in his 
narration: his anguish at having been excluded from human society based on his 
monstrous appearance. The text offers a few glimpses of the creature’s appearance before 
his narration begins. For instance, Frankenstein tells Walton that he decided to make the 
creature of “gigantic stature; that is to say, about eight feet in height, and proportionally 
large” (34) to simplify his construction. As he recounts for Walton the night of the 
monster’s restoration, Frankenstein states, “I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature 
open” (37). Later in the same chapter, he gives a fuller description: 
 
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of his muscles and arteries beneath; his 
hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these 
luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed 
almost the same color as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his 
shriveled complexion, and straight black lips. (37) 
 
 
Later, Frankenstein says that the creature’s “unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too 
horrible for human eyes” (72). Early on, the monster is unaware of his ghastly 
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appearance. One of the first indications occurs when he wanders into a hut and frightens 
an elderly man so badly that the man runs away “with a speed of which his debilitated 
form hardly appeared capable” (78). The creature says the man’s reaction surprises him 
(78). When he finally sees his reflection in a pool of water, he has difficulty recognizing 
himself: “‘At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected 
in the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I 
am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification’” (85). The 
cottagers’ rejection of the monster traumatizes him and sends him on a quest to find his 
creator. He emphasizes the arduousness of his winter journey, using heroic terms to refer 
to his “‘labours’” (108) and “toils” (109) as he endures snow and ice. “‘My travels were 
long, and the sufferings I endured intense,’” he says. “‘The agony of my feelings allowed 
me no respite’” (107). The monster concludes his narration by telling Frankenstein, “‘I 
am alone, and miserable; man will not associate with me.…’” (110).  
Another of the creature’s themes is that he is an emotional being with a capacity 
for violence. At several points during his narration, the creature says that he cries. “‘I sat 
down and wept,’” the monster says, recalling that he was overwhelmed by hunger, thirst, 
cold, fear, and pain he felt Frankenstein abandoned him (75). After learning that the 
cottagers have been abandoned their home in fear, the creature has a cathartic “gush of 
tears” (107). Later, he cries out of joy: “‘Soft tears again bedewed my cheeks, and I even 
raised my humid eyes with thankfulness towards the blessed sun. …’” (107). The 
creature also appreciates other people’s feelings. He watches as Agatha is moved to tears 
and sobs by the music her father makes. He says, “‘I felt sensations of a peculiar and 
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overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain and pleasure, such as I had never 
before experienced …’” (80). He is touched by the sacrifices that the children make for 
their father by going without food, unknown to him. “‘This kind of trait moved me 
sensibly,’” he tells Frankenstein. He says that he empathizes with the cottagers: “‘…when 
they were unhappy, I felt depressed; when they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys’” 
(83). 
The creature’s emotions of joy and sadness are overshadowed by his negative 
emotions—anger, hatred, and rage. Meditating upon the “‘injustice’” of his gunshot 
wound, the monster says that “‘a deep, deadly revenge’” is the only compensation for 
him (108). Previously described was William’s murder. However, the creature describes 
another of his crimes—arson—in his narration. Although no one is killed or injured in the 
blaze, it reveals much about the monster’s character. Filled with rage at the departure of 
the DeLaceys and “‘unable to injure anything human,’” the creature burns down the 
family’s deserted home. On a windy night, the creature first destroys the family’s garden 
then sets fire to the cottage. In a frightening scene, the “‘fierce wind’” causes the monster 
to go into “‘a kind of insanity in my spirits, that burst all bounds of reason and 
reflection.’” Lighting the fire, the creature says he “‘danced with a fury’” and let out a 
“‘loud scream’” (106). After he is sure no one will be able to save the cottage from 
burning to the ground, the monster says he flees. The creature describes his state of mind 
by comparing himself to Milton’s Satan: “‘I, like the arch fiend, bore a hell within me; 
and … wished to tear up the trees, spread havoc and destruction around me, and then to 
have sat down and enjoy the ruin’” (104). 
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It may seem odd for the creature to confess his crimes to Frankenstein, the maker 
he hopes will restore his happiness, but the creature clearly has a strategy for overcoming 
the damage these disclosures may cause the case he is pleading. The monster tells 
Frankenstein there was a time when he was ignorant of violence and could not understand 
it. It was not part of his character. He says the seed of violence was planted in him 
through mankind’s example in Volney’s Ruins of Empire, and at first he was repulsed by 
this violence (90). Moreover, the creature’s admission of his crimes can be seen as a 
courtroom ploy known as dicaelogia, in which a defendant confesses but defends his 
actions as necessary or justified (Lanham 35). In the eyes of a jury and in public opinion, 
such a maneuver can subtly shift blame away from the accused and toward the accuser, 
calling into question societal hypocrisy or systematic injustice.  The creature’s implied 
argument is that, yes, he killed William and framed Justine, but he was the victim of an 
earlier crime, a far greater crime, in his very creation as a hideous monster who was 
abandoned in a hostile world where he would be feared and detested.  
Propositio 
Cicero writes that a propositio, or proposition, is a brief  “arrangement of the 
subjects to be mentioned in an argument, when properly made, renders the whole oration 
clear and intelligible” (I.XXII). .The propositio, or proposition, of the creature’s oration 
comes at the end of his narration, when he finally reveals his purpose to Frankenstein. 
Once again, he seems to follow closely Cicero’s advice. Overall, the monster’s 
proposition is brief, occupying just three sentences, less than half a paragraph of the 
novel. He states a point on which both can agree, that the creature he has been excluded 
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from human society. He leads up to the next matter on which he is about to speak by 
observing that “‘one as deformed and horrible as myself would not deny herself to me. 
My companion must be of the same species, and have the same defects.’” He then states 
his demand: “‘This being you must create.’”  In the next paragraph, Frankenstein refers to 
this as the creature’s “proposition” (110). 
Confirmatio 
Cicero writes that the confirmatio, or confirmation, is “that by means of which 
our speech proceeding in argument adds belief, and authority, and corroboration to our 
cause” (I.XXIV). It brings into sharper focus the speaker’s argument. As Cicero writes, in 
a confirmation, “ … it appears to be not an inconvenient course to disentangle what is not 
unlike a wood, or a vast promiscuous mass of materials all jumbled together …” 
(I.XXIV). 
The monster’s confirmation begins at the outset of Chapter IX, with Frankenstein 
“‘bewildered, perplexed, and unable to arrange my ideas sufficiently to understand the 
full extent of his proposition’” (110). The creature then presents his demand clearly, 
along with his arguments: “‘You must create a female for me, with whom I can live in the 
interchange of those sympathies necessary for my being. This you alone can do; and I 
demand it of you as a right which you must not refuse’” (111). The creature’s main 
arguments in support of his demand are, first, Frankenstein alone has the power to 
produce a mate; and, second, that this mate is the monster’s right.  
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Refutatio 
Frankenstein’s initial refusal (111) to grant the creature’s request leads to the next 
section of his oration, the refutatio, refutation. Cicero writes that “Reprehension is that by 
means of which the proof adduced by the opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is 
disparaged, or is reduced to nothing” (I.XLII). Corbett and Connors point out that 
counterarguments can be refuted through reason and emotion (279). The creature uses 
both types of refutation. 
The first objection that Frankenstein raises to the creature’s demand is the danger 
a second creature would pose to mankind: “‘Shall I create another like yourself, whose 
joint wickedness might desolate the world’” (111). The creature responds, “‘I am content 
to reason with you’” (111). He goes on to say that he is an object of hatred, but that he 
would live peacefully alongside man if that was possible: “‘But that cannot be; the human 
senses are insurmountable barriers to our union’” (111). If he cannot be loved, then he 
will be feared; and he will seek revenge against mankind and his maker. Again, he 
threatens Frankenstein: “‘I will work at your destruction, nor finish until I desolate your 
heart, so that you curse the hour of your birth’” (111). As the creature speaks, his anger 
grows. Frankenstein observes that “a fiendish rage animated him” and “his face was 
wrinkled into contortions too horrible for human eyes to behold” (111). 
Regaining control of his temper, the creature again emphasizes his rationality. “‘I 
intended to reason,’” he said. “ ‘This passion is detrimental for me …’” (111). He 
continues by restating his request: “‘What I ask of you is reasonable and moderate; I 
demand a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself’” (112). However, the 
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monster’s next ploy is to appeal to Frankenstein’s emotions, and particularly his ego and 
vanity: “‘Oh! My creator, make me happy; let me feel gratitude towards you for one 
benefit!’” (112). The strategy works, and Frankenstein begins to feel persuaded: “I was 
moved…. His tale, and the feelings he now expressed, proved him to be a creature of fine 
sensations; and did I not, as his maker, owe him all the portion of happiness that it was in 
my power to bestow?” (112). 
The monster senses Frankenstein’s “change of feeling” (112) and continues his 
appeal, repeating that he will exile himself along with his new mate to the “‘vast wilds of 
South America’” (112). He presents an idyllic image of him and his mate living in their 
own Eden where nature will satisfy all of their needs: “‘The picture I present to you is 
peaceful and human, and you must feel that you could deny it only in the wantonness of 
power and cruelty’” (112). Seeing “‘compassion’” in his creator’s eyes, the monster all 
but prostrates himself before his maker. At the same time, he reminds his audience that 
he is employing rhetoric deliberately. He says, “‘…let me seize the favorable moment, 
and persuade you to promise what I so ardently desire’” (112). 
Frankenstein, however, is still not convinced, and he tells the creature to “cease to 
argue the point” (112). His second objection is that the creature, a social animal, will not 
be content to remain in “‘exile’” (112). He fears that the creature will again seek human 
society, and he will again be rejected. This time, though, he will have a helper to aid him 
in his “‘task of destruction’” (112). But the monster is undeterred. He repeats his promise 
to “‘quit the neighborhood of man’” and live “‘in the most savage of places,’” where he 
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will find the sympathy of a companion and lose his “‘evil passions.’” Then, at the end of 
his life, he says, “‘…I shall not curse my maker’” (113). 
Feeling the power of the monster’s rhetoric, Frankenstein says, “His words had a 
strange effect upon me. I compassionated him” (113). He says, “I had no right to 
withhold from him the small portion of happiness which was yet in my power to bestow” 
(113). Still, Frankenstein is concerned that he has no reason to trust the creature, who 
might very well be deceiving him. He asks the monster, “‘Might not even this be a feint 
that will increase your triumph by affording a wider scope for your revenge?’” (113). 
This concern raises the larger question of whether the creature’s entire tale has been a 
fabrication and his emotions insincere. In De Inventione, Cicero never states that a 
narration must be truthful, only that it “appear like the truth” (I.XXI). Few, if any, of the 
details in the monster’s story can be independently corroborated. Even if Frankenstein 
wanted to try to confirm the tale, he could not, for he has essentially become a hostage. 
The creature tells him, “‘We may not part until you have promised to comply with my 
requisition’” (110).  
Interestingly, the creature does respond to Frankenstein’s concern that he might 
be practicing deception with an avowal of his honesty. Instead, he responds indirectly, in 
a head-shaking manner, with a question: “‘How is this?’” (112). He tries to shame 
Frankenstein by saying, “‘I thought I had moved your compassion, and yet you still 
refuse to bestow on me the only benefit that can soften my heart and render me 
harmless’” (113). The creature then restates his earlier refutation, that he will be reformed 
by love. He says, “‘My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor; and my 
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virtues will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an equal’” (112). In a 
paradox, the monster states that, even though he will be cut off from humanity, the 
“‘affections of a sensitive being’” will make him like other men: “‘I shall … become 
linked to the chain of existence, from which I am now excluded’” (113). 
Peroration 
With this final refutation, the creature’s speech ends. The peroration, or 
conclusion, is provided by the thoughts of Frankenstein as he reflects on “the various 
arguments” the creature “had employed” (113). Cicero writes in De Inventione that the 
“conclusion is the end and terminating of the whole oration” and that it can take three 
forms: “enumeration, indignation, and complaint” (I.LII). From Cicero’s description, 
enumeration is similar to recapitulation, or summary. It takes “matters which have been 
related in a scattered and diffuse manner” and collects “together … for the sake of 
recollecting them” and bringing them “under our view” (I.LII). Cicero’s thoughts on 
using complaint in a conclusion are also significant for Frankenstein. Cicero writes that 
complaint “is a speech seeking to move the pity of the hearers. In this it is necessary in 
the first place to render the disposition of the hearer gentle and merciful, in order that it 
may the more easily be influenced by pity” (I.LV).  If such a conclusion is handled 
properly, Cicero writes, “the minds of men are greatly softened” and they will be 
“prepared to feel pity, while they consider their own weakness in the contemplation of 
the misfortunes of another” (I.LV). Cicero identifies sixteen “topics” for a complaint:  
 
The sixth topic is one by which the person spoken of is shown to be miserable, 
when he had no reason to expect any such fate; and that when he was expecting 
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something else, he not only failed to obtain it, but fell into the most terrible 
misfortunes. (I.LV) 
 
 
This topic corresponds directly to the creature’s sufferings: his rejection by the cottagers, 
the gunshot wound, and the “‘labours’” and the “‘toils’” he later experiences. These are 
his agōn. In reviewing the major strands of the monster’s oration, Frankenstein considers 
“the promise of virtues which he had displayed on the opening of his existence, and the 
subsequent blight of all kindly feeling by the loathing and scorn which his protectors had 
manifested towards him” (113). Frankenstein says he also weighs the creature’s “power 
and threats” (113). In explaining his decision to honor the creature’s request, 
Frankenstein says that it arose partly from concern for mankind and the creature, but it is 
also clear that he is motivated by the same hubris that creature appealed to during his 
oration: “After a long pause of reflection, I concluded, that the justice due both to him 
and my fellow-creatures demanded of me that that I should comply with his request” 
(114). 
Frankenstein’s creature is a product of disarticulation in that he is produced by 
cutting. He is formed of dead body parts sutured together and resuscitated. To construct 
his creature’s mate using the same process, Frankenstein eventually travels to a remote 
area of Scotland. Having overcome his disgust at the thought of assembling a second 
monster from dead matter, he begins his project. However, he aborts the project after he 
discovers that the creature has followed him to Scotland. Describing a moment of 
epideictic shock reminiscent of the first time he saw his creature (37), Frankenstein 
recalls catching the monster spying on him in Scotland and observing: “I trembled, and 
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my heat failed within me; when, on looking up, I saw, by the light of the moon, the 
daemon at the casement. A ghastly grin wrinkled his lips as he gazed on me…” (130). 
Frankenstein says he is “trembling with passion” when he destroys the female monster he 
is creating. He says that he “tore to pieces the thing on which I was engaged” (130). It is 
a significant moment, not only because it incenses the monster and motivates his murder 
of Clerval and Elizabeth, but also because it expresses Frankenstein’s desire to do what 
he cannot do to the creature: act on his loathing and dismember the monster’s grotesque 
body.  
Frankenstein, Walton, and Rhetoric 
Although the creature’s oration is the dominant focus in this analysis of 
Frankenstein, it is not the only occasion when a character uses rhetoric in the novel. On 
the contrary, the monster’s oration to Frankenstein is presented within Frankenstein’s 
speeches to Walton and his crew, which are in turn presented within Walton’s discursive 
letters to his sister. Clearly, Frankenstein and Walton—who share many similarities—
both have rhetorical motives and functions within the novel. 
Frankenstein employs rhetoric unsuccessfully when he tries to persuade Walton to 
take on his quest for the monster. This effort begins quite subtly, after the crew finds 
Frankenstein near death and floating on a “large fragment of ice” (12). Frankenstein, 
however, does not ask for help. Instead, he wants to know where the ship is headed. 
Walton is stunned. He writes to his sister: 
 
You may conceive my astonishment on hearing such a question addressed to me 
from a man on the brink of destruction, and to whom I should have supposed that 
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my vessel would have been a resource which he would not have exchanged for 
the most precious wealth the earth can afford. (12-13) 
 
 
Ironically, Frankenstein does indeed see Walton’s ship as a potential “resource” in his 
pursuit of the creature, and he is “satisfied” and boards the vessel when Walton tells him 
that they are bound for the North Pole “on a voyage of discovery” (13).  
On board the ship, Frankenstein’s oration to Walton comprises most of the novel. 
It is not as focused, structured, and purposeful as the creature’s oration, perhaps due to 
Frankenstein’s grief and exhaustion, or perhaps due to his weaker rhetorical skills. One 
recalls that Frankenstein and the creature are educated differently. Both are largely self-
educated, as is Walton. However, Frankenstein focuses on occultism, natural philosophy, 
and chemistry. In some ways, the monster has a more formal education than his maker, 
studying the classics and the moderns. Walton, on the other hand, says he read his uncle’s 
volumes about sea-faring voyages of discovery and later Homer and Shakespeare. His 
thwarted ambition is to become a poet. Failing at that, he becomes an explorer. 
Frankenstein, tragically, lacks many of the qualities that a rhetorical education 
could have provided. Likewise, the creature lacks a formal rhetorical education, so the 
development of his moral being is also stunted. Although he is eloquent, he is not 
virtuous. He lacks aretē. He is not the “perfect orator,” the “good man” trained in the 
“science of speaking well,” envisioned by Quintilian in his Institutes of Oratory (XV.33). 
A reflection of his creator, he is motivated by self-interested motives rather than by any 
concern with the greater good. In Frankenstein, eloquence hides baseness. It pours forth 
from the characters’ inner torment, as it does with Satan in Paradise Lost, whose 
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deformity, wicked spirit, and misleading rhetoric loom over the entire novel. As the poet 
sings of Satan in Paradise Lost: 
 
                     …horror and doubt distract 
His troubled thoughts, and from the bottom stir 
The hell within him, for within him hell 
He brings, and round about him, nor from hell 
One step no more than from himself can fly 
By change of place … (IV.18-23) 
 
 
Although Frankenstein is not as accomplished an orator as his creature, he uses 
some of the same methods. For instance, he dwells on his sufferings through the losses of 
his family and friends. He also confesses his crimes in desecrating bodies for his project, 
but he makes it clear that his motive is noble, to eliminate death. The proposition of 
Frankenstein’s lengthy narration is to enlist Walton’s aid in destroying the demonized 
creature. If I die, Frankenstein says, 
 
…swear to me, Walton, that he shall not escape; that you will seek him, and 
satisfy my vengeance in his death … if the ministers of vengeance should conduct 
him to you, swear that he shall not live—swear that he will not triumph over my 
accumulated woes, and live to make another such wretch as I am. … thrust your 
sword into his heart. I will hover near, and direct the steel aright. (165) 
 
 
Frankenstein urges the crew to continue northward when they falter. Their cowardice 
provokes Frankenstein and prompts him to deliver a rousing oration in Walton’s cabin. 
He reminds them of the glory they sought in the voyage and the courage they knew 
would be required of them to succeed. Drawing on what sound like his own motives, 
Frankenstein tells the crew, “‘You were hereafter to be held as the benefactors of your 
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species.…’” He mocks them for wanting to “‘shrink away’” at the “‘first imagination of 
danger,’” and go down in history “‘as men who had not strength enough to endure cold 
and peril; and so, poor souls, they were chilly, and returned to their warm firesides.’” 
Continuing his mocking oratory, Frankenstein tells the crew that they did not have to 
travel so far and work so hard to drag their captain “‘to the shame of defeat, merely to 
prove yourselves cowards.’” His conclusion makes striking use of the trope of simile, and 
makes a significant reference to an unnamed “‘foe’”:  
 
Be steady to your purposes, and firm as a rock. This ice is not made of such stuff 
as your hearts might b.… Do not return to your families with the stigma of 
disgrace marked on your brows. Return as heroes who have fought and 
conquered, and who know not what it is to turn their backs on the foe. (170) 
 
 
Walton notes that Frankenstein delivers his oration “with a voice so modulated to the 
different feelings expressed in his speech” and “with an eye so full of lofty design and 
heroism.” It is not the first time that Walton comments on Frankenstein’s eloquence 
before the crew: “…when he speaks, they no longer know despair; he rouses their 
energies, and, while they hear his voice, they believe these vast mountains of ice are 
mole-hills, which will vanish before the resolutions of man” (169). However, 
Frankenstein’s oration to the near-mutinous crew in Walton’s cabin ultimately fails. 
Walton “cannot withstand” his crew’s “demands” and decides to return home, his “hopes 
blasted by cowardice and indecision” (173).  On his deathbed, Frankenstein says his 
earlier “‘motives’” were “‘selfish and vicious’” (174). But he repeats his request that 
Walton kill the creature—if not in the Arctic, then wherever they might meet. He leaves 
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Walton to weigh his arguments for the creature’s destruction: “‘But the consideration of 
these points … I leave to you’” (174). 
Just as the creature casts Frankenstein in the role of judge for his oration at the 
heart of the novel, Frankenstein places Walton in the same role at the end of the novel. 
He is asked to become a recorder of the tale before he becomes a participant. Up to this 
point, Walton has simply recorded Frankenstein’s story, transferring it from oral to 
written form. When Frankenstein discovers that Walton is recording  his story, 
Frankenstein becomes Walton’s editor. His main focus is dramatizing his meeting with 
the creature at Montanvert. He does not want his “‘narration … mutilated’” (166). 
With Frankenstein dead, Walton focuses on shaping his own narration and putting 
it to use for his own rhetorical purpose, which will be to provide some explanation of 
why he ended his expedition before reaching his goal. One recalls that Walton aspired to 
be a poet, but failed. His search for a northern passage and the source of magnetism in a 
mythical “region of beauty and delight” (5), of “country of eternal light” (6), leads him to 
a wasteland of icy darkness made even more inhospitable and dangerous by the 
destructive passions he finds in Frankenstein, the creature, and himself. He nevertheless 
makes a great discovery. He encounters what every aspiring writer longs for—a story. 
After giving in to the crew’s demands to quit the expedition, Walton also says that he 
needs “philosophy … to bear this injustice with patience” (172). However, the story at 
this point has no ending, and it requires one appropriate to the overall rhetorical nature of 
the novel. Walton provides this ending in his audience with the creature. He writes to his 
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sister, “…the tale would be incomplete without this wonderful and final catastrophe” 
(175). 
Walton meets the creature after the monster sneaks on board the ship, only to find 
his creator dead. He is alerted to the creature’s presence by the sound of a voice in the 
cabin where Frankenstein’s body has been laid. Entering the cabin, Walton finds the 
creature wailing over the coffin. The monster’s appearance is so “appallingly hideous” 
that Walton momentarily forgets Frankenstein’s rhetoric and his duty to slay the creature 
(175). He is rendered speechless by the monster’s “unearthly … ugliness” (175). 
Walton’s reaction to the monster is another of the novel’s epideictic moments, for, up 
until this point, there has been no way to corroborate the creature’s existence and, 
therefore, his deformity. Rather than creature, he could have been a creation of 
Frankenstein’s imagination, or perhaps a rhetorical device. Thus, Frankenstein establishes 
the definition of epideictic as the power of monstrosities to produce intense fear and 
disgust in an audience at an essential level. To borrow a popular expression, it is a “gut 
reaction.” This definition of epideictic may seem contradictory to those that explain 
epideictic as a ceremonial oration, one given at a funeral or some other significant 
gathering. In Plato’s Menexenus, Socrates comments on the power of epideictic to put an 
audience in a state of euphoria through praise. Readers must keep in mind, however, that 
there is a crucial division at the heart of epideictic. Defining epideictic as one of the three 
branches of rhetoric, Aristotle says in Rhetoric that it is “oratory” that “either praises or 
censures somebody” (2:2159).  In other words, epideictic is split between two 
counterparts, two opposing principles. It is its own dark double, its own contradiction. 
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Walton’s speechlessness before the creature is brief before his disgust pours forth. 
After the creature laments Frankenstein’s death, Walton speaks in a “tempest of passion” 
(175). He rejects the monster’s “repentance,” saying it comes too late. He also says that if 
the creature had listened to his conscience earlier, Frankenstein would be alive. In reply, 
the creature gives what is the novel’s first indication that he is sorry. Walton says he is 
moved by the monster’s “misery,” but then he recalls Frankenstein’s warning about the 
creature’s “powers of eloquence and persuasion,” and his “indignation” returns (176). 
“‘Wretch!’” Walton says, “‘… it is well that you come here to whine over the desolation 
that you have made’” (176). He then alleges that if Frankenstein were still alive, the 
monster would still be seeking vengeance, not “‘pity’” and forgiveness: “‘Hypocritical 
fiend! … you lament only because the victim of your malignity is withdrawn from your 
power’” (176). The creature denies this, saying he is not seeking commiseration: “‘No 
sympathy may I ever find,’” he says (177). Instead, the creature laments his lost 
“‘virtue.’” He is the “‘fallen angel becomes a malignant devil’” who says that even he 
cannot believe his “frightful catalogue of … misdeeds (177): “‘I have murdered the 
lovely and the helpless’” (178). But, once again, the creature seeks to justify his sins by 
saying that others sinned against him. “‘Was there no injustice in this?’” he asks (177). 
Saying that he hates himself more than others could hate him, he tells Walton that he will 
carry out his own execution by fire. He envisions the “‘funeral pile’” consuming his 
“‘burning miseries’” and causing him to “‘exult in the agony of the torturing flames’” 
until the fire dies, his body turns to “‘ashes,’” and his “‘spirit’” rests (179). 
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In telling his story to Walton, Frankenstein mentions his early interest in the 
occult: “The raising of ghosts and devils was a promise liberally accorded by my favorite 
authors, the fulfillment of which I most eagerly sought …” (23). Frankenstein believes he 
was always unsuccessful, but the creature proves otherwise. His emphasis on his “spirit” 
at the end of the novel suggests that he is a spirit of rhetoric uttered into being by his 
creator. After bringing about destruction, he will dissipate into nothingness, like the 
spoken word. The creature has no name, just as Aristotle says rhetoric has no real subject 
of its own (2:2156). And, like rhetoric, the monster is patchwork of different textual 
bodies and systems. Furthermore, he is all eloquence and no virtue, for no moral core has 
developed in him. Finally, the creature—often identified with his creator under the name 
of Frankenstein—has lived on in spirit to become a rhetorical boogeyman summoned 
since the nineteenth century in dialogues and debates about controversies as diverse as 
slave emancipation and human cloning. The creature conveys Mary Shelley’s Platonic 
recognition of rhetoric’s potential as an instrument of evil. Consequently, eloquence is 
highly suspect. Frankenstein and Walton only reinforce these notions. A study of the 
context of Frankenstein shows that both Mary Shelley and her husband, Percy Shelley, 
were students of the classics, so they would have had numerous models for the 
character’s rhetoric in the novel. The ancient who seems to have had the greatest 
influence on the creature’s oratory is Cicero and his De Inventione. This influence is most 
noticeable in the structure of the creature’s oration to Frankenstein. Frankenstein and 
Walton are also crucial to the novel’s rhetorical nature. Although Frankenstein is a 
declaimer who clearly uses languages for persuasion, he ultimately fails as an orator. 
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Walton resists both Frankenstein’s and the creature’s impassioned eloquence, and in his 
hands their story becomes a fable about mankind’s inability to control not only its 
passions and technology, but also its rhetoric.
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CHAPTER IV 
EXECUTION AND DISMEMBERMENT IN DRACULA 
 
 
The link between execution and performance in English literature was forged in 
Elizabethan England several hundred years before Bram Stoker wrote Dracula. In her 
analysis of the slayings in Thomas Kyd’s gory and influential Senecan revenge play The 
Spanish Tragedy, Molly Smith points out that the Triple Tree, the “first permanent 
structure for hangings in London,” was built at Tyburn in 1571, “during the same decade 
which saw the construction of the first public theater” (218). Smith writes that 6,160 
people were hanged at Tyburn during Elizabeth’s reign: 
 
Elizabethans were certainly quite familiar with the spectacle of the hanged body 
and disemboweled and quartered corpse. In Kyd’s treatment of the body as 
spectacle, we witness the most vividly the earliest coalescence of the theatrical 
and punitive modes of Elizabethan England. (217) 
 
 
Spectators could buy seats and rent rooms in houses overlooking the scaffold, while 
vendors sold food as well as literature about the condemned prisoners’ crimes. “In short, 
hangings functioned as spectacles not unlike tragedies staged in public theaters,” Smith 
writes (218). She speculates that “the success of Kyd’s play might be attributed to the … 
ingenious transference of the spectacle of public execution with all of its ambiguities 
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from the sociopolitical world to the cultural words” (229). Stephen Greenblatt detects the 
same merger, suggesting that its traces can be seen throughout the early modern period 
and beyond (qtd. in Smith 229). Indeed, the spectacle of public executions persisted in 
England until the Capital Punishment Amendment Act of 1868 (Gibson 77), deeply 
conditioning people to associate performance with the punitive destruction of bodies. 
Simply abolishing the spectacle, however, did not dissolve the association. It simply 
drove it entirely into the realm of literature. Mary Ellis Gibson writes that by the 1870s,  
 
the criminal body has disappeared: the text, the body, and the trial then come to 
substitute for the spectacle of the criminal’s public torture, execution and 
dissection. The criminal, once anatomized in the operating theater, is now 
anatomized in the text. The once displayed in the public execution, is now 
displayed in the trial and in the text. (75). 
 
 
Although Gibson is discussing Browning’s The Ring and the Book and its 
parallels to the sensation novel, her words could easily be applied to Dracula. Although 
no trials are depicted in the novel, their elements are certainly present: judgments moved 
by rhetoric, and the destruction of deviant bodies.  Chronologically speaking, Dracula is 
the last among the fin-de-siècle novels included in this analysis. However, it most clearly 
demonstrates the persistence through the Victorian era of Mary Shelley’s use of classical 
rhetoric in the production of horror fiction.  But Dracula does not simply bear witness to 
the persistence of classical rhetoric: the novel incorporates declamation and intensifies its 
relationship to disarticulation. Indeed, control of the body through eloquence and 
dismemberment is at the heart of the novel. Moreover, among the novels included in this 
study, Dracula most effectively introduces epideictic, a branch of rhetoric that 
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figuratively allows the dead to speak, making it seem the most vampiric of Aristotle’s 
three branches of rhetoric. In Plato’s Menexenus, an odd dialogue devoted to the 
Athenian funeral oration as epideictic, Socrates describes oratory as penetrating the body: 
“The speaker’s words and the sound of his voice sink into my ears…” (951). A creature 
of the ancient past who is as mysterious and paradoxical as he is frightening, Dracula is 
the locus of the epideictic mode in Stoker’s novel. Opposing him is Abraham Van 
Helsing, a figure of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment whose rhetoric is solidly 
forensic and deliberative. His rhetoric figures Lucy Westenra as monstrous and results in 
her destruction in a process reminiscent of early-modern European traditions of public 
execution and dismemberment. In this way, Dracula establishes a pattern of two 
rhetorical currents running counter to one another, one of them rational and the other 
sublime, generating a discursive tension that disarticulates textual bodies constituted 
beyond normative Victorian standards. 
Declamation 
Dracula’s desire to refashion himself into an Englishman through speech is one of 
novel’s elocutionary concerns. The count’s plan to emigrate to England that sets the 
entire story in motion. Dracula never really explains what he plans to do in England. To 
the visiting Jonathan Harker, he simply expresses excitement at the prospect of being part 
of a large city: “‘I long to go through the crowded streets of your mighty London, to be in 
the midst of the whirl and rush of it humanity, to share its life, its change, its death and all 
that makes it what it is’” (26).  
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Stoker presents Dracula’s purpose only through the inferences of his enemies, 
who surmise that the count intends to colonize and conquer England, which at the time 
was the center of a global empire. What is clear is that Dracula desires to fit in. He 
initially detains Harker—figured as a stereotypical Briton—in the castle to perfect his 
English. Harker, then, is forced into the role of an elocutionary instructor. Dracula tells 
Harker, “You shall, I trust, rest here with me a while, so that by our talking I may learn 
the English intonation; and I would that you tell me when I make error, even of the 
smallest, in my speaking” (26). Dracula’s desire to gain social acceptance through speech 
directly corresponds to the elocutionary movement’s efforts to refashion men from the 
margins of the expanding British empire into gentlemen (Abbott 119). It was just one of 
the threatening aspects of elocution. Some saw the erasure of an old identity and the 
creation of a new identity as monstrous. Philippa Spoel points out that, as Irishmen and 
Scots, many of the leaders of the elocutionary movement “inhabited the periphery of the 
socially polite world that their … instruction promised to make available to their 
students” (“Rereading” 64). And the elocutionists themselves had benefitted from the 
“increasing social fluidity of eighteenth-century British culture” (65). Spoel quotes 
Thomas P. Miller: “‘Elocutionists were resented by some for blurring class distinctions’” 
(64). This was revolutionary, revealing elocution’s Romantic impulse. Andrew McCann 
writes that the “entire project of elocution was based on the notion of an apparently 
apolitical subject integrated into moral and aesthetic norms that held for all men 
regardless of class” (223). Underlying fears about the obscuring of class distinctions were 
anxieties that bodies were essentially the same: grotesque and unstable. 
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As noted earlier, declamation was instrumental in the rhetorical training that 
offered marginalized men the chance to assimilate into British society. Jean Dietz Moss 
writes that declamation was an important part of rhetorical education until the late 
nineteenth century at Trinity College, Dublin (388), attended by both Stoker and Oscar 
Wilde. For years students practiced declamation weekly alongside another rhetorical 
training exercise, disputation, although disputation had begun to fade from the curriculum 
by the late 1800s (388). A disputation at one Trinity College rhetorical society became so 
“heated” in 1773 that the chairman wrote a seven-page warning to members about 
coarseness and bad language in debate. The topic of the disputation was a beheading, that 
of Mary Queen of Scots, with most of the students siding with the tragic victim (407-
408). Another “perennially provocative question” put to students was whether the 
government had the right to execute prisoners for any crime (407). 
When Dracula speaks to Harker about his nation’s history, Harker detects the 
declamatory nature of the count’s speech, and he conveys its elocutionary effect. He 
notes Dracula’s theatricality and oratorical skill. He remarks that Dracula uses “we” 
when he refers to his ancestors and sounds “like a king speaking” (33). He also gives 
readers an indication of the emotion of Dracula’s declamation, in which he plays the role 
of tyrant: “He grew excited as he spoke, and walked about the room pulling his great 
white moustache and grasping anything on which he laid his hands as though he would 
crush it by main strength” (33). Dracula’s speech is inflated and theatrical, both in these 
passages and at other points in the novel. Dracula and earlier Victorian works, therefore, 
bear witness to the legacy of declamation as transmitted through the elocutionary 
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movement. Ruth Webb explains that declamation was significant in the development of 
Greek literature. The same can be said of nineteenth-century horror fiction. Webb writes, 
“The study of declamation provided a training in the representation of character and of a 
complex fictional word, complete with relations between people and a developed social 
and cultural background” (“Rhetoric and the Novel” 529). Declamation was likewise 
useful to nineteenth-century horror writers such as Stoker because it gave them familiar 
means to depict the unfamiliar and the strange.  Here, the intimate link between 
declamation, monstrosity, and epideictic proves quite useful. Declamation constitutes 
monstrosity and the effect it produces for audiences, which is epideictic. 
The stock characters of ancient declamation exercises are echoed in Dracula. 
Already noted has been Dracula as tyrant. And the seemingly irrational father figure 
emerges in Van Helsing as he discusses his intentions toward Lucy’s body. Seward and 
later Holmwood react to Van Helsing as if he has lost his mind. When Van Helsing tells 
Seward he wants to dismember Lucy by cutting off her head and taking out her heart, 
Seward is shocked. “The poor girl is dead,” Seward says. “Why mutilate her poor body 
without need?” He says this would be “monstrous” (149). Van Helsing appeals for and 
receives Seward’s trust in the matter, but then he calls off his plan, saying somewhat 
cryptically that it is “too late” because a servant had stolen a gold crucifix from the room 
in which Lucy’s body is lying (150). Only after reading newspaper accounts of the 
“bloofer” (159) does Van Helsing revisit plans to dismember Lucy’s body that seem 
bizarre to Seward. He tells Seward, “I shall cut off her head and fill her mouth with 
garlic, and I shall drive a stake through her body.” Seward shudders at the thought of 
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“mutilating” Lucy’s “body” (179). Van Helsing again meets resistance when he asks 
Holmwood, “May I cut off the head of dead Miss Lucy?” An appalled Holmwood at first 
refuses, but then is persuaded by Van Helsing to agree. 
Dismemberment   
Bodily dismemberment in Dracula is evocative of the “Death of Cicero 
Tradition.” Legends of Cicero’s mutilation would not have been alien to late-eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century Britons. Mary Rosner writes that fascination with ancient Rome 
persisted in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Edward Gibbons’s 1781 The Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire remained popular, and other histories were published 
throughout the nineteenth century. “Rome was the fashion,” Rosner writes (167). During 
the same period, many new biographies of Cicero were reprinted and new ones 
published, along with collections of his works, orations, and letters (167-168). “His life 
story was entertaining and didactic,” Rosner writes (181). The elocutionists also 
perpetuated interest in Cicero by praising him, criticizing him, and borrowing from him 
in their treatises (158-164). “Interest in Cicero continued even while the status of rhetoric 
and of classical education fell,” Rosner states (164). What’s more, the stories of Cicero’s 
dismemberment at the hands of his political enemies would have sounded familiar to 
Britons, whose own criminal justice system destroyed bodies as rhetorical objects not 
only to punish but also to admonish. Generations dating back to the nation’s earliest 
history had witnessed the protracted spectacles of state-administered torture, 
dismemberment, execution, and display of body parts. They were socially familiar with 
brutal forms of justice that have been completely lost to modern audiences. Dorothy and 
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Thomas Hoobler point out that Mary Shelley’s childhood home on Skinner Street in 
London was a hundred years from the Old Bailey, a venue for numerous hangings. At a 
double hanging in 1807, twenty-eight spectators were trampled to death. An abattoir in 
the vicinity regularly filled the air with the cries of livestock (46). And among the 
thousands of spectators for Marie Manning’s hanging on November 13, 1849, was 
Charles Dickens. Manning, a Swiss domestic servant, had been “convicted along with her 
husband of killing her lover” for his railroad shares (Mullen C5). Dickens, who watched 
the execution from a rented rooftop, wrote that he was appalled by the spectacle. 
American writer Herman Melville watched from another rented rooftop nearby (C5). 
Although it would be difficult to assess fully the impact that these spectacles had on the 
lives of Britons, it is still worth recovering them and examining them alongside horror 
fiction texts to gain some understanding of their influence on writers. Public torture, 
dismemberment, and execution were meant to shape people’s lives. They were not only 
intended to serve justice but also to serve as warnings for those who might break the law. 
Executions, therefore, had a clear rhetorical purpose. 
England had a homegrown tradition of slaughtering criminals, both before and 
after execution. For Englishmen at the turn of the eighteenth century, however, the 
French Revolution presented the foremost example of dismemberment. When Percy 
Shelley wrote in and 1816 letter to Lord Byron that the French Revolution was the 
“master theme of the epoch in which we live,” he said more than perhaps even he knew 
(qtd. in “The Romantic Period: Topics”). The “terror” presented the spectacle of judicial 
dismemberment on a grand scale. Between 1793 and 1794, revolutionary courts sent 
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more than 16,000 people to the guillotine. Thousands more died in massacres or perished 
in prisons while awaiting trial and execution (Gough 2). Horror stories of thousands of 
public beheadings made a profound impression on Britons that lingered well into the 
nineteenth century and impacted their culture. It provided the historical setting for 
Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, which critic Elana Gomel argues exhibits a 
“bodily synecdoche.” It is a “rhetoric of the fragmented body,” Gomel writes: “This 
rhetoric … operates on all levels of the text, reducing the body to a collection of 
disjointed parts…” (“The Body of Parts” 49). A Tale of Two Cities was published in 
1859. In the following decade, the French terror echoes in Count Guido Franchescini’s 
rhetoric as he awaits execution for the slayings of his wife and her parents in The Ring 
and the Book. Although the poem is set in Early Modern Italy, Franceschini imagines his 
execution by a “man-mutilating engine” similar to a guillotine (XI. 204-5). In one of the 
finest expressions of disarticulation, Browning’s villain says that at the moment of his 
beheading, a “master-stroke of argument / Will cut the spinal cord” (231-3).  
While England was spared from a history-altering upheaval, her people were not 
spared from a certain amount of tyranny as a result of the French Revolution. In response 
to the revolution in France, the British government became more defensive and 
reactionary, fearing similar rebellions among radicals at home and threats from across the 
English Channel. Britons, however, shared a long history of public torture, 
dismemberment, and execution with France, Germany and other European nations. These 
spectacles were official pronunciations. They were judicial and political, as Michel 
Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (47). According to 
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Foucault, a crime has as its victim not just the person against whom it is committed, but 
also the sovereign power inherent in laws (47). Public execution, Foucault theorizes, 
repairs the “injured sovereignty” (48). It is the “most spectacular” display of sovereign 
might (48-9). Foucault writes: 
 
And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of physical strength of the 
sovereign beating down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it: by 
breaking the law, the offender has touched the very person of the prince; and it is 
the prince—or at least those to whom he has delegated his force—who seizes 
upon the body of the condemned man and displays it marked, beaten, broken. The 
ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of terror. … The public execution 
did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power. (49) 
 
 
As in any rhetorical situation, the audience’s reaction to and possibly their participation 
in an execution—including any judicially prescribed torture and dismemberment—were 
an essential component. “An execution that was known to be taking place, but which did 
so in secret, would scarcely have had any meaning,” Foucault states (58). Calling the 
public to watch an execution was meant frighten them, but it was also an invitation for 
them to act as “guarantors … of the punishment … because they must to a certain extent 
take part in it” (58). Witnessing an execution was the right of the people, and they 
sometimes participated by humiliating and assaulting condemned criminals (59). This 
participation forged a tenuous bond between the monarch and the people. “The 
vengeance of the people was called upon to become an unobtrusive part of the vengeance 
of the sovereign,” Foucault writes (59). The result was a certain measure of sanctioned 
disorder, as “the sovereign tolerated for a moment acts of violence, which he accepted as 
signs of allegiance…” (59). The danger was that the crowd might turn against the 
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sovereign and protest the execution as unjust, possibly assaulting the executioner and 
rescuing the condemned individual.  Foucault writes that 
 
the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals 
intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power; never did 
the people feel more threatened , like them, by a legal violence exercised without 
moderation or restraint. (63) 
 
 
This solidarity between the people and their criminals could be threatening to the 
sovereign, who tried to break it through “penal and police repression” (63). The 
audiences of public executions also embarrassed the sovereign through the people’s 
overall idleness, rowdiness, disorder, and criminality (63).  “It was evident that the great 
spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to whom it was 
addressed,” Foucault writes (63). Even though public executions were not intended as 
entertainment, they had a “carnival” (61) and “festival” nature “in which violence was 
instantaneously reversible…” (63). 
In addition to the embodied rhetoric present in the spectacle of execution, there 
was spoken rhetoric. One attraction of the gallows or scaffold was the words that might 
be uttered there. The state’s interest was for the condemned criminal to confess and 
legitimate his or her sentence, fulfilling a final requirement of the law (66). While some 
condemned criminals used the final moments to ask forgiveness and warn witnesses not 
to duplicate their sins, others did not. With nothing left to lose, they were free to “curse 
the judges, the laws, the government and religion,” Foucault writes (60). “The public 
execution allowed the luxury of these momentary saturnalia, when nothing remained to 
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prohibit or punish,” Foucault states. “Under the protection of imminent death, the 
criminal could say everything and the crowd cheered” (60).  Molly Smith writes, “In such 
circumstances, the formal efficacy of the execution diminished considerably and events 
could easily transform into celebration of the condemned victim’s role as a defier of 
repressive authority” (221).  The importance of these final utterances is attested to by the 
rise of a literary genre called “gallows speeches” or “death songs.” The content of these 
speeches had to conform to a certain rhetoric, including an acknowledgement of the 
condemned person’s crime and the justice of his or her conviction. While some of these 
published reports likely were accurate, many were probably embellished to conform to 
the requirements of the law. “Justice required these apocrypha in order to be grounded in 
truth,” Foucault writes (66). Another important function of these broadsheets was to 
transfer the judge’s written punishment, which remained secret until the time appointed 
for the execution, to the body of the condemned criminal (66). In this way, text was 
figuratively transferred to body. Through sanctioned violence, the sentence was inscribed 
on the body, which was then publically displayed for viewers to see and recorded for 
them to read. 
Rhetorical Performance and Disarticulation 
The body is central to Dracula’s two main rhetorical performances. Dracula’s 
performances occur in Chapter III and in Chapters XIII-XVI. The first is delivered by 
Dracula, and the second by Van Helsing. Both performances resume in parts of later 
chapters. Central to the rhetorical performances of both characters is the body as proof:  
Dracula’s proof is his own body while Van Helsing’s proof is Lucy Westenra’s body. 
 
81 
 
Both bodies suffer brutal disarticulation, but the brutality is most evident in the undead 
Lucy’s destruction. Of all of the episodes of disarticulation considered in this study, 
Lucy’s methodical butchering most closely parallels early-modern European traditions of 
public execution and dismemberment. Stoker’s interest in torture and execution is also 
suggested by at least one of his short stories, “The Squaw,” published in 1893 after 
Stoker and Henry Irving visited Nuremberg’s historic torture tower while touring the 
Lyceum’s Faust on the continent. This connection to the continent is underscored in 
Dracula through Van Helsing and his frequent trips between England and Holland. While 
at the Nuremberg tower, Stoker and Irving saw the “Nuremberg Virgin,” a sarcophagus-
like execution device lined inside with iron spikes. A similar device impales and crushes 
the obnoxious American Elias P. Hutcheson in “The Squaw” (Haining 85). In the story, 
however, a young woman only witnesses the accidental execution. In Dracula, a young 
woman is purposefully executed. Even Dracula’s eventual disarticulation at the end of the 
novel cannot compare with Lucy Westenra’s. What is even more unsettling about Lucy’s 
execution and dismemberment is that it is carried out by the heroic men of the novel, 
rallied by Van Helsing. Van Hesing plays the paradoxical role of early-modern 
executioner, who serves justice but is stigmatized by his connection with criminality and 
death.  Like Van Helsing, early-modern executioners had assistants, Joel Harrington 
points out. This detail further reduces the degrees of separation between Dracula and the 
men who seek to destroy him. Even the crucial distinction that Dracula’s violence is 
sexualized, involving penetration and the transmission of blood, largely disappears when 
one considers that Van Helsing also penetrates Lucy’s body repeatedly and that he, 
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Holmwood, Seward, and Morris all give her blood transfusions before her death. Van 
Helsing recognizes the sexual nature of these transmissions, and it amuses him. The 
conflict between Dracula and Van Helsing suggests that even though epideictic may seem 
frivolous and superficial compared to the more direct and forceful forensic and 
deliberative modes, its influence can be far more pervasive and enduring. 
In some respects Van Helsing’s forensic and deliberative rhetoric seems more 
potent and successful than Dracula’s. After all, his rhetoric is that of the official word, of 
legislative assemblies and courtrooms, and of science halls and textbooks. It is easily 
equivocated with fact and evidence. It is the most familiar to readers, and it is the most 
abundant in the novel. Van Helsing simply talks a lot more than Dracula. Van Helsing’s 
rhetoric is, by far, the more conspicuous. It is also more brutal, partly because readers can 
“see” its end results of his rhetoric in the executions of Lucy, Dracula’s vampire women, 
and Dracula himself. But the skepticism of Van Helsing’s audience suggests that his is 
not the more influential rhetoric, at least not in and of itself. John Seward, Arthur 
Holmwood, and Quincey Morris resist Van Helsing’s arguments until they finally see the 
undead Lucy.  Without this proof, his rhetoric most likely would fail. Dracula, on the 
other hand, seemingly has no point to prove, other than the superiority of his heritage. His 
epideictic rhetoric is about display. Its results are subtle, if not hidden. For instance, 
readers do not see Dracula repeatedly feeding on Lucy. In its own way, however, 
Dracula’s rhetoric is far more effective than Van Helsing’s. It is about creeping influence, 
not persuasion, and it best exemplifies the Aristotelian notion that rhetoric is about 
“transforming souls” (Lockwood 64). 
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Van Helsing’s argument begins when he shares with Seward a newspaper article 
about children who had gone missing in Hampstead and been found later with puncture 
marks in their necks. Seward, Van Helsing’s former student, has called on his assistance 
in diagnosing and treating Lucy’s baffling illness. Van Helsing does not immediately 
share his theory with Seward, but instead tries to lead him to the discovery through 
dialectic. It is a frustrating approach for Seward, but one that Van Helsing feels is 
necessary to bypass Seward’s scientific mind. It seems a straightforward, rational 
argument would surely fail. Van Helsing says, 
 
You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your 
daily life is not of account to you. Do you not think that there are things which 
you cannot understand, and yet which are; that some people see things that others 
cannot? (170) 
 
 
In Van Helsing’s mind, this skepticism is a shortcoming of science, a “‘fault’” (171). He 
begins to circumvent science by rattling off a list of questions about natural phenomena. 
In so doing, Van Helsing uses the Classical rhetorical strategy of anaphora, or the 
repetition of similar words and phrases in successive sentences and clauses (Farnsworth 
16). In Van Helsing’s speech, these phrases are “‘Can you tell me’” and “‘Do you 
know.’” The effect is to make the listener, Seward, feel intellectually humbled and more 
open to explanations of phenomena beyond the physical world.  Near the end of this 
dialectic, which is recorded in Seward’s diary on “26 September,” Van Helsing expresses 
this strategy: It’s not the “‘big truth’” people see first, but the “‘small truth’” (Stoker, 
Dracula 172-3). Using this strategy, Van Helsing draws Seward closer to his theory. The 
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last of Van Helsing’s questions deals with blood-sucking bats that drink from cattle and 
horses. Seward asks, “‘Good God, Professor!’ … Do you mean to tell me that Lucy was 
bitten by such a bat; and that such a thing is here in London in the nineteenth century?’” 
(172). Waving off Seward’s exclamations, Van Helsing continues his list of anaphoric 
questions until Seward becomes “bewildered.”: “…he so crowded on my mind his list of 
nature’s eccentricities and possible impossibilities that my imagination was getting fired” 
(172). The success of Van Helsing’s rhetoric is signaled by Seward’s request for an 
explanation: “‘Tell me the thesis, so that I may apply your knowledge as you go on’” 
(172). Seward finds Van Helsing’s response even more bewildering: “‘My thesis is this: I 
want you to believe … To believe in things that you cannot’” (172). Van Helsing wants 
Seward to have faith, which he defines for him through an anecdote: “‘…that which 
enables us to believe things which we know to be untrue’” (172). Van Helsing’s final 
question to Seward in this dialectic is whether the same creature that made the puncture 
wounds in the Hampstead children’s necks also made the marks on Lucy’s neck. Seward 
says yes, but Van Helsing says he is wrong: The wounds on the children “‘were made by 
Miss Lucy!’” (173). 
In this manner, Van Helsing presents his real thesis. Seward’s initial reaction is 
anger and disbelief; but Van Helsing forecasts the next step of his argument, which is 
offering proof, if Seward will follow him. Seward’s next reaction is significant: it is more 
appealing to continue in disbelief and ignorance. “‘A man does not like to prove such a 
truth…,’” Seward thinks to himself (173). But Van Helsing promises that “‘proof will be 
relief’” (174). The ultimate proof that Van Helsing will offer is Lucy’s undead body. Van 
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Helsing’s argument sets up one of the most horrifying Gothic scenes in nineteenth-
century British literature: Van Helsing and crew’s encounter with the vampiric Lucy at 
the Westenra tomb.  
Perhaps no other body in English literature carries more rhetorical significance 
than does Lucy Westenra’s body, with the possible exception of Caesar’s body in 
William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. The viewing is set up by Van Helsing, who 
proposes that Seward to spend the night “‘in the churchyard where Lucy lies’” (174). 
Seward is fearful of the “ordeal” he senses before them, but he agrees. Before witnessing 
Lucy’s body, however, Van Helsing and Seward examine one of the Hampstead children 
and determine that the wounds on his neck are indeed similar to those that Lucy suffered 
before her death. This detail is significant, for Stoker depicts Van Helsing as using the 
rhetorical strategy of presenting a less convincing proof on his way to presenting the 
conclusive proof. Moreover, it is a child’s body that is presented as proof on the way to 
Lucy’s tomb, where the men of the novel will finally behold the grotesque perversion of 
the female body, from a site of mothering and giving life to one of consuming and taking 
life. In the Westenra crypt, Van Helsing and Seward prepare to open Lucy’s tomb. “‘You 
shall yet be convinced,’” Van Helsing promises (176). Seward compares the thought of 
opening Lucy’s tomb to her sexual violation. They find the sepulcher empty. Seward is 
shocked, and Van Helsing continues his argument. “‘Are you satisfied…?’” he asks 
(176). 
In this epistemological vacuum, Seward seeks alternative explanations. “‘I felt all 
the dogged argumentativeness of my nature awake within me…,’” says Seward, who 
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responds that the sight only proves that Lucy’s body is missing. Van Helsing applauds his 
“‘good logic,’” but asks how he explains the empty tomb. Seward raises the possibility 
that the corpse was stolen by a “‘body-snatcher,’” but even he doubts this 
counterargument. (176). Clearly, Van Helsing’s persuasion is working, but only Lucy’s 
body—reanimated through vampirism—will serve as conclusive proof. Even seeing a 
ghostly “white streak” in the dark churchyard a short time later and finding a child there 
do not convince Seward (177). The following night, Van Helsing and Seward find Lucy’s 
body returned to the tomb. Seward remarks that Lucy looks like she is alive  (178). But 
Seward is perplexed, not “convinced,” even as Van Helsing tries to make full use of the 
body as proof by pulling back Lucy’s lips to who her teeth “‘shaper than before’” (178). 
“Once more, argumentative hostility woke within me,” says Seward, countering that 
someone could have placed the body in the tomb since the previous night (178-9). At this 
point, Van Helsing fully reveals his thesis, that Lucy was bitten by a vampire and has 
become a vampire. The altered body is the evidence that Seward had been lacking. “This 
turned my blood cold, and it began to dawn upon me that I was accepting Van Helsing’s 
theories …,” Seward says (179). A few passages later, Van Helsing offers a conclusion 
with summation of all of the proofs of Lucy’s vampirism: the wounds in her throat, the 
similar wounds in the child’s throat, Lucy’s body reappearing in the empty coffin, and 
her lifelike appearance in death (180). 
As Van Helsing considers the most effective ways to anticipate the 
counterargument of Lucy’s fiancé Arthur Holmwood, Lord Godalming, and convince 
him of Lucy’s vampirism, readers learn that Seward is again losing certainty. “Yesterday, 
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I was almost willing to accept Van Helsing’s monstrous ideas; but now they seem to start 
out lurid before me as outrages on common sense,” Seward says after a “good night’s 
sleep” (181). In daylight, he continues searching for other explanations and even 
entertains the notion that Van Helsing has become “unhinged” and that he was 
responsible for moving Lucy’s body (181-2). Having witnessed none of the proofs 
Seward has seen, Holmwood is even more resistant to Van Helsing’s thesis that Lucy 
“‘might be Un-Dead’” (183). The final proof for both Seward and Holmwood comes later 
that night, when they confront the vampire Lucy entering her crypt. Joining them is 
Quincey Morris, the Texan. In his journal, Seward describes Lucy as a “dim white 
figure” carrying a child “at [her] breast.” She is wearing “cerements of the grave” and her 
“sweetness” has turned to “adamantine, heartless cruelty, and the purity to voluptuous 
wantonness.” Her “lips [are] crimson with fresh blood” that has “trickled over her chin 
and stained the purity of her lawn death-robe” (187). Like a “cat” she gives an “angry 
snarl” at the men and “growls” like a “dog.” Her “eyes [are] unclean and full of hell-fire, 
instead of the pure, gentle orbs we knew.” As “callous as a devil,” she flings the abducted 
child to the ground and tries to seduce Holmwood, who groans at her “cold-bloodedness” 
(188). Through these descriptions, Stoker conveys that the vampire’s influence has 
changed Lucy’s body, making it sexual, and her spirit, making it animal. She has lost her 
life, her innocence, and her humanity. In death, her identity has been erased. With the 
body as proof, Van Helsing’s argument is utterly convincing.  
In many ways, Dracula could be read as a culmination of the trope of 
disarticulation in Victorian horror fiction. In deploying disarticulation, Stoker was well-
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served by vampire folklore handed down through the ages. Like rhetoric, vampires 
descended from antiquity, with each generation adding to the discourse. Daniel Farson 
surveys many of the methods reportedly used to kill people through to be vampires, 
including impaling the heart; beheading and burning the body, and scattering ashes on a 
river (108-16). “It is obvious that Bram Stoker learnt of such stories during his research,” 
Farson writes (114). Stoker’s clearest and most graphic use of this folklore can be found 
in the killing of the vampire Lucy, an event which occurs near the heart of the novel. 
Even Dracula’s slaying pales in comparison to Lucy’s destruction. Stoker uses 
discussions of Lucy’s dismemberment among Van Helsing, Seward, and Holmwood to 
build tension leading up to the actual moment in the tomb when Holmwood drives a stake 
through Lucy’s undead body. Seward reports, 
 
Then he struck with all his might. The Thing in the coffin writhed; and a hideous, 
blood-curdling scream came from the opened red lips. The body shook and 
quivered and twisted in wild contortions; the sharp white teeth champed together 
till the lips were cut, and the mouth was smeared with a crimson foam. (192)  
 
 
Mina is threatened with the same horrific fate if she becomes a vampire like Lucy, 
although her execution never has to be carried out. Van Helsing does destroy the three 
female vampires at Dracula’s castle. In one of just two instances when Van Helsing 
contributes to the epistolary Dracula’s string of journal entries, diary pages, ship logs, 
notes, letters, news clippings, transcripts, memoranda, and telegrams, he recounts his 
“butchery” of the three vampire women. He describes the “horrid screeching as the stake 
drove home” and “the plunging of writhing form, and lips of bloody foam” (320). He 
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writes that “hardly had my knife severed the head of each, before the whole body began 
to melt away and crumble into its native dust….” (320-1). 
Although Stoker had hundreds of years of vampire lore to draw on in depicting 
Lucy’s death, the details parallel early modern-executions, particularly those in Germany 
as described by Joel Harrington in The Faithful Executioner, based on the long-running 
journal of an executioner in Nuremberg.  Although Van Helsing is not German, his 
association with the continent is emphasized through his repeated trips between England 
and his home in Amsterdam. And at one point in the novel, Van Helsing exclaims in 
German, “‘Mein Gott!’” (169). Significantly, this moment occurs as he reads a 
newspaper account that, in his mind, suggests that Lucy has become a vampire and that 
she must be destroyed. The subsequent chain of events quickly leads to Lucy’s execution, 
and her role as condemned criminal. One of the first indications of this status is Lucy’s 
“lawn death-robe” (187), which is “white” (177).  Joel Harrington writes that before early 
modern executions, prisoners were robed in “white linen execution gowns” (78). Just as 
Van Helsing has Holmwood carry out Lucy’s staking, early modern executioners also 
employed assistants: “Most master executioners supervised the procedure but left the 
actual dirty work to their more dishonorable assistants” (Harrington, The Faithful 
Executioner 61). But the most striking similarity is the method of Lucy’s execution. 
Harrington writes that the legal slayings of women posed a special challenge for 
executioners. Hangings were avoided, as they “allowed spectators to see under 
[women’s] skirts,” while “beheading was typically reserved for honorable men.” For 
women, the most common form of execution in the Middle Ages was “live burial under 
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the gallows” (68). This horror is raised in Dracula when Holmwood misunderstands Van 
Helsing and asks if Lucy has been buried alive (183). It is a reaction that Van Helsing 
anticipates (180). He tells Holmwood, “‘I did not say she was alive ... I go no further than 
to say that she might be Un-Dead’” (183). Live burial was considered so violent and so 
cruel that it was largely eliminated through penal reforms in the early sixteenth century.4 
Often practiced in its place was drowning in a sack, which concealed the prisoner’s death 
underwater. Live burial was, however, retained for women found guilty of infanticide 
(Harrington, The Faithful Executioner 68). The undead Lucy, of course, is preying on 
children when Van Helsing detects her and the vampire hunters execute her. The problem 
with live burial was that the condemned women sometimes fought back against the 
executioner, gaining the crowd’s sympathy (68). Harrington notes that in such cases, the 
crowd could turn on and attack the executioner (87). To expedite live burial and to show 
pity, the condemned women could be killed with a stake through the heart (68). Stoker 
recreates this moment of execution when he writes of Lucy’s execution: “Arthur never 
faltered. He looked like a figure of Thor as his untrembling arm rose and fell, driving 
deeper and deeper the mercy-bearing stake, whilst blood from the pierced heart welled 
and spurted up around it” (192).  This execution is interpreted in Dracula as freeing Lucy 
from evil and restoring her soul (192).  The notion of execution as an act of compassion 
                                                          
4 Although it is generally believed that Stoker did not know a great deal about the 
historical Dracula, it is intriguing that Dracula’s older brother Mircea was tortured and 
buried alive by Christian enemies in 1447 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 39). 
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is also present in early modern executions. Joel Harrington notes that the “condemned 
prisoner” was “traditionally referred to as the ‘poor  sinner’” (xvii). 
Epideictic 
While Van Helsing’s rhetoric is clearly forensic and deliberative, Dracula’s is 
epideictic. To understand this, we must first set aside the notion that for a discourse to be 
rhetorical, it must be intended to persuade an audience and prove something. While this is 
the goal of forensic and deliberative rhetoric, it is not necessarily the goal of epideictic. 
Epideictic speeches are typically presented at ceremonial occasions, from funerals to 
graduations. They typically praise their subjects, though they can also place blame. Thus, 
these speeches reveal the values of the cultures in which they are composed and 
delivered. One of the best-known examples of classical epideictic is Pericles’s oration for 
the Athenian war dead, which is recorded by Thucydides in his The History of the 
Peloponnesian War. Analyzing Pericles’s civic-minded speech, we find that it praises 
Athens as much, if not more, than it does the nation’s war dead. Pericles begins by 
honoring Athens’s ancestor, who handed down the country “free to present time by their 
valour” (396).  He praises Athens’s constitution and democracy, just laws, recreation, and 
openness to foreigners. When it comes to saluting Athens’s military, Pericles compares 
the country to Sparta, where boys “from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek 
manliness…” (396). In contrast, Athenians live as they choose and face danger when 
necessary with their land and naval forces. Athenians also avoid excess by cultivating 
“refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy…,” and by using 
“wealth” for fighting poverty (397). Pericles says that Athens’s power is proof of the 
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superiority of her ideas. And, he says, Athens’s greatness also means she has more to lose 
than other nations. Pericles says that the deaths of those who fought for Athens are also 
“definite proofs” (397) of her greatness, and that those deaths may also redeem of any of 
their “imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad …” (398). In their 
deaths, they resisted aggression rather than submitted, “met danger face to face, and after 
one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune” found glory (398). “So died these 
men as became Athenians,” Pericles eulogizes. “You, their survivors, must determine to 
have as unfaltering a resolution in the field…” (398). 
Clearly, Pericles’s memorial oration is a panegyric to the Athenian ideal of 
balance. In Dracula’s epideictic speech, however, all balance is lost, as the count presents 
what sounds like a military history of his nation—a history that exalts war, treachery, and 
conquest. In Dracula’s view, war is an essential part of the animalistic nature of his 
people, the Szekelys: “‘We … have a right to be proud, for in our veins flows the blood 
of many brave races who fought as the lion fights, for lordship’” (33). Dracula’s 
epideictic is marked by frequent references to the body, its parts, and its fluid. He speaks 
of the carnage of war and a lone figure emerging from the “‘bloody field where … troops 
were being slaughtered’” (35). He asks, “‘Where ends the war without a brain and a heart 
to conduct it?’” (35). He claims that the Dracula were the “‘heart’s blood’” of the 
Szekelys and “‘their brains’” (35). He also refers to the “‘Dracula blood’” and their 
bloodline. He declaims that he is a descendant of Attila the Hun, and that he sprang from 
a people whose blood mingled with those of “‘witches’” and “‘devils’” (34). Dracula’s 
emphasis on his bloodline is significant, for he wins adherents by chaining them to his 
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bloodline and thereby enslaving them. Later in the novel, during his attack on Mina, he 
tells her, “‘And you ... are now to me, flesh of my flesh; blood of my blood; kin of my 
kin ...’” (252). Dracula’s reference to his ancestor’s “brains” is also significant, for Van 
Helsing associates Dracula with his brain several times. For example, Van Helsing says 
of Dracula, “‘That mighty brain and that iron resolution went with him to his grave, and 
are even now arrayed against us’” (212). 
Dracula’s encomium to war continues as he tells Harker that the Huns repelled an 
invasion force from northern Europe and Asia that included “‘Berserkers’” who fought 
like “‘werewolves’” (34). Later, the Magyars charged the Szekelys with guarding the 
frontier against Muslim invaders. When the Magyars and Szekelys were defeated, the 
count claims it “‘was a Dracula’” who fought back by crossing the Danube and defeating 
the Turks in their territory. According to Dracula, this was a battle that was repeated 
through the ages. In addition to praising the Szekelys, Dracula also blames one of their 
princes—an “‘unworthy brother’” —for betraying them to the Turks and bringing “the 
shame of slavery on them!” (35). But when the Szekelys liberated themselves from the 
Hungarians, they were led by Draculas. The count says that “‘the Szekelys—and the 
Dracula as … their swords—can boast a record that mushroom growths like the 
Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs can never reach’” (35).   Dracula mentions freedom, but it 
is clear that his definition of “free” people are those who conquer others rather than those 
who are conquered by others. For the count, the agōn of war is the norm, and he laments 
its loss: “‘The warlike days are over. Blood is too precious a thing in these days of 
dishonourable peace; and the glories of the great races are as a tale that is told’” (35). 
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Dracula’s epideictic does not end with his speech in the castle. After he leaves his 
homeland, his rhetoric becomes mostly embodied, marked by his strange appearance, 
wardrobe changes, and shape-shifting. His eyes are among his most notable physical 
features. Harker describes them in his journal: “His eyes were positively blazing. The red 
light in them was lurid, as if the flames of hell-fire blazed behind them” (43). In Whitby, 
Mina sees Dracula’s “‘red, gleaming eyes’” in the darkness as he bends over Lucy (88). 
Later, Lucy recalls the “‘red eyes’” (19). While these repeated descriptions of Dracula’s 
eyes may have been included simply to produce a frightening effect, they are also 
reminiscent of what Debra Hawhee refers to as “Greek vision.” According to Hawhee, 
the Greeks believed that the eyes had agency in that they emitted fire that interacted with 
the outside world. “In other words,” Hawhee states, “the fiery eyes were thought to 
extend outward, to meet the flames that were issuing forth from things ‘outside,’ and in 
the mingling of flames, in the joining of light, to comprise an altogether new body …” 
(178). Dracula’s creation, the vampire Lucy, is described as having the same “‘eyes … 
full of hellfire.’” And she has the same epideictic power. As she flirts with the spellbound 
Holmwood, her voice has “diabolically sweet … tones…” Seward compares it to the 
“tingling of glass when struck” and says it “rang through the brains even of us who heard 
the words addressed to another.” When Van Helsing confronts Lucy with a crucifix, she 
becomes enraged and her “eyes seemed to throw out sparks of hell-fire…” (Stoker, 
Dracula 188). Hawhee writes that the  notion that the eyes emitted flames helped 
engender “ancient epideictic logic” that display required interaction with an audience 
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(177), which is present in Lucy’s graveyard scene and also in Dracula’s speech in his 
castle. 
When Dracula speaks in England, the theme of warfare, treachery, and conquest 
he establishes with his epideictic oratory in the castle is carried over into the rest of the 
novel. As with Van Helsing, all of Dracula’s utterances constitute a single rhetorical 
performance. As the novel progresses, Dracula continues in the epideictic mode, 
incorporating England and the vampire hunters as blameworthy in his rhetoric. Recalling 
that Eastern Europe once served as a firewall protecting the West against the spread of 
Islam, Dracula says to Mina: “‘Whilst they played wits against me—against me who 
commanded nations, and intrigued for them, and fought for them, hundreds of years 
before they were born—I was countermining them’” (251-2). Later, Dracula boasts of his 
conquests of Lucy and Mina to the vampire hunters: “’Your girls that you all love are 
mine already; and through them you and others shall yet be mine—my creatures to do my 
bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed’” (267). Even the fifty boxes of earth 
that Dracula has shipped from his castle to England can be read as part of the count’s 
epideictic: The earth from his home country sustains him and serves as a tribute to the 
land of the Szekelys. It is worth remembering that the earth of Dracula’s homeland is 
soaked with blood, making it a part of his body as well. He tells Harker, “‘Why, there is 
hardly a foot of soil in all this region that has not been enriched by the blood of men, 
patriots or invaders’” (27).  
Dracula’s epideictic speech is also remarkably similar to the demonstration that 
Socrates is depicted as presenting in Plato’s Menexenus. The occasion for this dialogue is 
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Socrates’ meeting with Menexenus as Menexenus is returning from the council chamber 
with news that the council will soon select a speaker for the public funeral of the 
Athenian war dead. He worries that the selection is coming too late for the speaker to 
prepare an oration. Socrates scoffs and tells Menexenus that the potential speakers 
already have their oration prepared and that they face the easy task of praising Athenians 
before Athenians. Their rhetoric is “canned,” so to speak. Socrates reveals that he already 
has a speech prepared for him by his teacher of oration, the famous Aspasia, who he says 
composed Pericles’s funeral oration. “I heard Aspasia declaim a whole funeral oration on 
these same dead,” Socrates says. “Thereupon she went through for me what the speaker 
ought to say, in part out of her head, in part by pasting together some bits and pieces 
thought up before  …” (952).  At Menexenus’ prompting, Socrates delivers the speech 
that Aspasia prepared for him. Although Plato’s intention in Menexenus is to expose the 
funeral oration as formulaic and insincere, his Socrates gives what sounds like a model 
speech, with the exception of metadiscursive commentary on the standard content of such 
a speech. As Michael F. Carter writes, “…even though Plato’s obvious purpose in the 
dialogue is to mock the epideictic oration, this purpose seems undercut by the oration 
itself” (213). 
One of the most notable similarities between Dracula’s speech and Socrates’s is 
the representation of national history as a tumultuous cycle of invasion, resistance, war, 
conquest, liberty, and peace. Dracula’s speech simply replaces Athenians, 
Lacedaemonians, Eretrians,  Persians, and barbarians with Szekelys, Hungarians, 
Magyars, Muslims, and berserkers. Both speeches emphasize the earth.  In Menexenus, 
 
97 
 
the land is personified as a nurturing mother who nurses the warriors and then welcomes 
them after they have fallen in battle. She also cares for the dead soldiers’ orphans and for 
their aged parents. “Our land is indeed most worthy of being praised not merely by us but 
by all of humanity,” Socrates says (953).  As in Dracula’s speech, the continuity of the 
bloodline is celebrated in Socrates’ speech when he says that the ancestors of the war 
dead “were not immigrants” who made their children “aliens in the land, but made them 
children of the soil” (953). The body is also referenced in Socrates’s speech. Socrates 
acknowledges the presence of the soldiers’ remains (953). He looks back on the 
generations of Athenians who fought against the Persians: “I declare that those men were 
fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom…” (957). The speech also notes the 
irony of “bodily beauty and strength” when it is paired with cowardice (962).  As Dracula 
does in his epideictic, Socrates praises his land as a bulwark against enemy invaders from 
the east. He says, “When the Persians held dominion over Asia and were trying to 
enslave Europe, the sons of this land checked them” (956).  
Perhaps the strangest similarity between Dracula and Menexenus is the notion 
that epideictic orators are able to speak for the dead. In Menexenus, Socrates figuratively 
speaks for the dead, delivering messages from the fallen fathers to their sons, and from 
the fallen sons to their parents. In Dracula, Harker notes that the count spoke of his 
ancestors’ battles “as if he had been present at them all”—a perception that Dracula 
explains away as a matter of pride and of the recognition of the interconnectedness of 
generations (33). However, Dracula actually speaks for the dead, including himself.  His 
funeral oration is self-inclusive and self-referential. While this may seem a point of 
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contrast between Dracula and Menexenus, it can be taken as a point of comparison. As 
Lockwood points out, the setting for Menexenus can be dated to 387 B.C., based on 
Socrates’ recitation of Athens’ history. Socrates, however, died in 399 B.C.  “This funeral 
oration presented as a model of speaking about the dead is itself delivered by a man 
twelve years dead, who claims to have learned it from a woman also long dead, 
Aspasia…,” Lockwood notes (116). Lockwood notes that Plato generally was not 
concerned about accurately dating his dialogues, but the anachronism of Menexenus begs 
for an explanation (113). Lockwood argues that this was Plato’s way of warning his 
readers not to take Menexenus seriously—a mistake repeated by generations on into the 
Renaissance (103). However, the explanation may be far less ironic, perhaps lying in the 
notion that, historically speaking, epideictic is the only branch of Artistotelian rhetoric 
that lets the dead make claims upon the living. From the surviving fragment of Gorgias of 
Leontini’s Funeral Speech from the fifth century B.C., readers also have this tantalizing 
passage spoken of the Athenian war dead: 
 
Wherefore thou they have died  
desire for them has not died, 
but lives on,  
though they live not, immortal in bodies not immortal (95). 
 
 
Exactly to whose “desire” is Gorgias referring in these lines that blur the lines between 
the living and the dead? A common assumption would be that it is the desire of the 
living; however, epideictic also characterizes the dead as being capable of desire. It 
allows the dead to influence the living. That influence is about transformation. Lockwood 
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writes, “The epideictic shapes our souls—structures our subjectivity—in a way that only 
a powerful and lengthy exercise of … self-examination, can undo” (127). It is interesting 
to consider that in the final pages of the novel, the surviving characters are still trying to 
“undo” Dracula’s influence. Seven years after the count’s death, the Harkers visit 
Transylvania and “the old ground … so full of vivid and terrible memories.” They even 
view the count’s castle “reared high above a waste of desolation” (326). Transylvania 
seems an odd choice of destinations for a pleasure trip. Why not visit Whitby? However, 
the return to Transylvania makes perfect—and frightening—sense once readers recognize 
the potency of Dracula’s epideictic rhetoric. Long dead, his influence persists, and he is 
still making claims on the living.  
Socrates speaks of the transformational power of epideictic in Menexenus, and it 
is present in Dracula as well. Socrates says funeral orators “do their praising so 
splendidly that they cast a spell over our souls, attributing to each individual man … both 
praise he merits and praise he does not … and praising the war-dead, all our ancestors 
before us, and ourselves, the living” (951).  Socrates says this praise puts him “into an 
exalted frame of mind.” “Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a 
different man, convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a 
sudden” (951). Socrates says this influence spreads to foreigners. “It often happens, too, 
that all of a sudden I inspire greater awe in the friends from other cities” in the audience 
(951). And this “high and mighty feeling, Socrates says, lasts for days (951).  
As noted earlier, Dracula’s speech is self-referential and self-inclusive, features 
that Harker notes.  Dracula is at once funeral orator and war-dead. His “city” is his 
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homeland. And his audience is an outsider, Harker.  Reflecting on the speech later as he 
writes in his journal, Harker indicates that his recording of it is fragmented and flawed. 
But he suggests that the count’s epideictic has spread its influence on him. He writes, “I 
wish I could put down all he said exactly as he said it, for to me it was most fascinating” 
(33). Harker experiences the “awe” that Socrates says outsiders feel when they hear 
Athenian funeral orations (951). Dracula’s influence does not become fully apparent until 
later in the novel, as the words in Harker’s journal spread Dracula’s epideictic to a wider 
audience in England. The effect of Dracula’s influence returns his audience to a more 
primitive, warlike state, causing them to resort to criminality as they desecrate Lucy’s 
tomb, break into the count’s homes around London, and plot ambushes. They also 
descend into savagery in dismembering vampires. As Nicholas Rance observes, Dracula 
“initiates the licentiousness of his victims” (449).  
Conjoined with Van Helsing’s forensic and deliberative rhetoric, Dracula’s 
epideictic also leads to disarticulation in the novel. This effect is most obvious in the 
atavism of the novel, as the men become associated with their bladed instruments and 
weapons. The first instance occurs innocently enough when Seward—“the lunatic asylum 
man”—nervously fiddles with a scalpel as he proposes to Lucy. Writing to Mina about 
the proposal, Lucy says that “he kept playing with a lancet in a way that made me nearly 
scream” (58). Then, there is Harker’s transformation into a knife-wielding warrior.  His 
weapon is a Kukri, a knife with a large, curved blade from India. As a symbol, the Kukri 
suggests that the British self-possession that Harker displayed in such abundance during 
his journey to Dracula’s castle has been forsaken. He says, “I care for nothing now … 
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except to wipe out this brute from the face of creation.  I would sell my soul to do it” 
(265). In the confrontation in London, Harker attacks Dracula, making “a fierce and 
sudden cut at him” (266). Missing his mark, Harker raises “the terrible knife aloft again 
for another stroke” at the count (266). Although Harker does not cut Dracula in this 
confrontation, Van Helsing says his “‘so fierce knife’” struck dread into the count (273). 
Later, as the vampire hunters pursue Dracula back to Transylvania, Seward describes 
Harker coolly sharpening his knife, “which he now always carries with him,” as the 
others are in a “fever of excitement” (291). Seward says Harker’s “hands are as cold as 
ice” (291). He continues, “It will be a bad look out for the Count if that edge of that 
Kúkri ever touches his throat, driven by that stern, ice-cold hand!” (291-2). Harker  uses 
the same knife to kill Dracula in the wild fight at the climax of the novel.5 Mina observes 
from a distance and describes the “sweep and flash of Jonathan’s great knife.” She sees it 
“shear through the throat” (325).  Seward also notes Harker’s raid physical decline from 
“a frank happy-looking man, with a strong youthful face” to a “drawn, haggard old man” 
with “white hair,” “hollow burning eyes,” and “grief-written lines on his face.” But 
Seward notes, “His energy is still intact; in fact he is like a living flame” (263). The 
“flame” is Harker’s savage, uncontrollable rage at the count for his violation of Mina. 
Harker, however, is not the only male character put into this state of mind. Seeing the 
undead Lucy, Seward says, “At that moment the remnant of my love passed into hate and 
loathing; had she then to be killed, I could have done it with savage delight” (188).  After 
                                                          
5 Although Dracula is most commonly associated with impalement, the historical figure 
was decapitated in 1476 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 116). 
 
102 
 
Holmwood impales Lucy, it is Seward who assists Van Helsing with her surgical 
decapitation and records the procedure in his diary (193). 
Of all of the men in the novel, Van Helsing is the one most closely identified with 
his blades. Preparing for Lucy’s dismemberment in the Westenra tomb, Van Helsing lays 
out “his operating knives.” Recording the incident in his diary, Seward writes, “To me, a 
doctor’s preparations for work of any kind are stimulating and bracing …” (190). Van 
Helsing removes these items black bag, which carries what he calls “the ghastly 
paraphernalia of our beneficial trade” (112). As he treats Lucy and his suspicions of 
vampirism grow, Van Helsing begins to carry his bag everywhere (123). Not only does 
Van Helsing carry surgical instruments, but also house-breaking and grave-robbing tools, 
such as a screwdriver and “fret saw” (176), and a “dark lantern” (185). Richardson writes 
that dark lanterns were among the common tools of burglars and body-snatchers. They 
were “designed to shed light where necessary, but not to attract attention” (Richardson 
59). Van Helsing’s black bag is one of the links that Rance sees between Dracula and 
London’s Jack the Ripper slayings of the late 1880’s and early 1890’s. Rance recounts 
suspicions that Jack the Ripper was a “medical maniac” (446) who carried a black bag 
(447). A “popular assumption was that Jack the Ripper was a doctor,” Rance writes 
(441). Another view was that Jack the Ripper was a “punitive moralist,” a “ritualistic 
slaughterman” crusading against prostitutes (443) and “atavistic womanhood” (447). Yet 
another supposition about Jack the Ripper was that he was a foreigner, like Van Helsing. 
“Evidently, at least the semblance of murderousness attaches not only to Dracula but to 
Van Helsing and his party,” Rance states (444). This is not to say that Van Helsing is a 
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villain, but that he occupies the problematic status of the early-modern executioner. The 
executioner’s official, ritualized violence was motivated by rhetoric in the reading of the 
sentence handed down by the court to punish and restore, and it became its own rhetoric 
in the enactment of the sentence. The executioner, however, was a paradox. He was a 
representative of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment and its forensic-deliberative 
world of legislation, prosecution, and execution. His main functions were to carry out 
judicial sentences, restore order, and admonish other would-be criminals. But these 
functions made him a figure of horror and loathing, a monstrosity who inflicted state-
sanctioned torture and dismemberment. His powers of healing derived from the necessity 
to prolong the torture of prisoners for investigative purposes and to preserve them for 
execution. The executioner was blessing and curse. On the one hand, he was the 
instrument of justice with the ability to heal the body. On the other hand, he was an 
unclean outcast who could not be touched for fear of corruption. “People ... harbored 
such a pervasive fear of the social contamination at the very touch of an executioner’s 
hand that respectable individuals jeopardized their very livelihoods by even casual 
contact,” Joel Harrington explains (16). Underscoring the bond between the executioner 
and the prisoner, Foucault explains: 
 
In his confrontation with the condemned man, the executioner was a little like the 
king’s champion. Yet he was an unacknowledgeable and unacknowledged 
champion ... The executioner may have been, in a sense, the king’s sword, but he 
shared the infamy of his adversary (Discipline and Punish 52-3). 
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Harrington writes that the executioner was “considered .... a type of amoral mercenary 
and thus excluded from ‘decent’ society in the same manner as vagrants, prostitutes, and 
thieves, as well as Gypsies and Jews” (16). 
Acknowledging the subtle yet far-reaching influence of Dracula’s epideictic leads 
to the practical question of how it achieves its effect. Part of the answer is that it has the 
same “bewitching power” (Lockwood 102) that Socrates identifies in Menexenus. Twice 
Socrates refers to oratory as a spell in Menexenus. Whether or not Socrates is being ironic 
is irrelevant, for Dracula is recognizable as a Faust figure seeking enlightenment and 
power through forbidden knowledge. As the vampire hunters unearth more of his history, 
they learn that he was not only a soldier but also a “statesman, and alchemist—which 
latter was the highest development of the science-knowledge of his time” (263). They 
also learn that he studied the black arts at a school frequented by the devil (212). 
Dracula’s ethos merges magic with the oratorical skills required of a great leader. The 
similarity to Faust seems more than coincidental. Goethe’s play was clearly an influence 
for Stoker. It was one of the most popular staged by the Lyceum, with Henry Irving 
starring as Mephistopheles in nearly 800 performances between 1885 and 1902. “The 
actor’s appearance in a flowing cloak has already been mentioned as providing 
inspiration for the figure of Dracula,” Haining writes (85). At the same time, Christopher 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus could not have been far from Stoker’s mind, considering the 
novel’s other early-modern echoes. And Marlowe’s Faustus—ripped apart by devils at 
the end of the B-Text—is one of the most notorious victims of disarticulation in English 
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literature. Dracula meets a fate similar to that of the “mangled” Faustus (Marlowe 
5.3.17).   
Another part of the answer to question of how Dracula’s epideictic operates is 
suggested by Michael F. Carter in his analysis of Menexenus. Readers must keep in mind, 
however, that on many points the effect of Dracula’s epideictic is inverted from that of 
Socrates: it produces fear rather than euphoria. Carter is concerned with the importance 
of epideictic “in ancient Greece as well as in contemporary Western culture” (210-1). 
Dracula offers a different perspective, one shaped by contact with the East and the occult. 
This inversion is clearly signaled in the early pages of Dracula. As Harker travels to 
Transylvania, he writes in his journal, “The impression I had was that we were leaving 
the West and entering the East …” (9).  Later, when Dracula cautions Harker about 
entering the locked areas of the castle, he says, “We are in Transylvania; and 
Transylvania is not England. Our ways are not your ways, and there shall be to you many 
strange things” (27). Carter focuses on the ritualistic significance of epideictic in ancient 
Greece, observing that ritual permeated Greek society in its prayers, sacrifices, oracles, 
festivals, and other occasions (211). He writes that epideictic has an epistemic value 
based on understanding rather than knowledge. Carter borrows from Urban T. Holmes in 
describing epideictic as “‘primordial,’” “‘primeval’” (qtd. in 214), and “‘preconscious’” 
(qtd. in 215); it is “‘at the expanding edge of our horizon of knowing. It is feeling and 
intuition, not common sense’” (qtd. in  213). Carter writes that epideictic connects 
“participants … to a transcendent principle”; that it creates a sense that the ordinary 
progression of time has been suspended; that it promotes a feeling of harmony by 
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unifying life’s contrarieties; and that it builds a perception of community among its 
members (214-5). All of these elements can be located in Dracula in one form or another, 
although they are inverted, ironic, grotesque, and frightening: Dracula, as a figure of 
epideictic, is a primeval creature whose origins are unclear and who defies time; the 
“transcendent principle” to which he connects characters is life after death; the 
contrarieties he draws together are life and death; and the community he fosters is an 
atavistic one bent on his annihilation.  
Dracula’s epideictic ultimately succeeds by making his English enemies more like 
himself, thereby interrogating Victorian normative standards.  It has a flawed parallel in 
the insane Renfield’s ultimately unsuccessful bid to gain release from Seward’s asylum. 
Renfield’s argument is that he is no different than the men who are keeping him locked 
up. Seward writes that Renfield “took it for granted that his reasons would prevail with 
others entirely sane” (215). Indeed, Renfield asks all of the men assembled with Seward 
to “‘sit in judgment on my case’” (215). In an Aristotelian analysis, Renfield’s argument 
for immediate release from the asylum rests entirely on ethos, not logos and pathos. His 
main point is that his origin and rank are equal to those of his audience. His rhetorical 
strategy relies almost entirely on burnishing his credentials as a member of this network. 
He tells Holmwood that he belonged to the same club as his father and once “had the 
honor of seconding” him. He expresses grief at the elder Holmwood’s passing, recalling 
that in his younger days he drank with him on “‘Derby night’” (215). Next, Renfield 
flatters Morris by praising his association with Texas and predicting a bright future for 
the state and the Union.  Renfield then lauds Van Hesling’s contributions to 
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“‘therapeutics’” and his discovery in the field of brain research. Renfield says: “‘You, 
gentleman, who by nationality, by heredity, or by the possession of natural gifts, are fitted 
to hold your respective places in the moving world, I take to witness that I am as sane as 
at least the majority of men who are in full possession of their liberties’” (215). He 
concludes by appealing to Seward and telling the doctor that he has a “‘moral duty’” to 
discharge his patient (215).  Seward reports that he and the others are “staggered” by 
Renfield’s argument. He says that despite Renfield’s “character and history,” he was 
convinced “that his reason had been restored” (216). Seward writes, “I felt under a strong 
impulse to tell him that I was satisfied as to his sanity, and would see about … his release 
in the morning” (216). Van Helsing also seems moved, for when he addresses Renfield 
later, he speaks to him as an “equal” (216). 
Although Renfield’s speech fails to persuade Van Helsing, it is yet another 
oratorical performance in a novel that uses rhetoric to constitute and destroy characters. 
This is the essence of disarticulation. Dracula and Van Helsing are the novel’s main 
orators, and their rhetorical performances bear traces of the influence of declamation and 
elocution, with their emphasis on theatricality and gesture. As a representative of the 
medico-juridico-scientific establishment, Van Helsing’s rhetoric is forensic and 
deliberative, concerned with developing knowledge, building consensus, and moving an 
audience. It is foregrounded and aims at its audience’s reason. As a supernatural being 
from the past whose origins are shrouded in mystery, Dracula’s rhetoric is epideictic, 
concerned with celebrating man’s primitive instincts.  It is sub-rational and registers with 
its audience at an emotional level. Central to both rhetorics is the body as proof. Van 
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Helsing uses the undead Lucy Westenra’s corrupted body as proof, leading to her 
dismemberment and the dismemberments of Dracula’s other female vampires. 
Transformed by Dracula, Lucy becomes a monstrosity; but her ritualistic execution also 
hints at the monstrous transformation that the heroic men of the novel undergo as they 
feel the influence of Dracula’s epideictic. In this way, rhetoric complicates readers’ 
understanding of the characters in the novel and exposes the moral relativism and 
coerciveness of proper society. The differences between Dracula and the men who seek 
to destroy him are reduced by the violence that all of them commit against bodies in the 
novel. In their use of rhetoric, their atavistic reaction to it, and their willingness to destroy 
transgressing bodies, all of the characters in Dracula are marked as monstrous. 
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CHAPTER V 
PENAL DISSECTION IN MOREAU AND JEKYLL AND HYDE 
 
 
When the good doctor Henry Jekyll first transforms himself into the monstrous 
Edward Hyde, he gazes into a mirror and beholds an “ugly idol” (51). It is easy to 
imagine that in 1860, Bishop of Oxford Samuel Wilberforce looked at the advance of the 
new science and saw the same idol: science enshrined as faith. As men like T.H. Huxley 
worked to professionalize science by ridding it of Christian metaphysics, Wilberforce 
feared that they were promoting “Darwin’s theory” as “essentially Darwinism, a set of 
metaphysical beliefs  in contradistinction to Christianity, masquerading as scientific fact” 
(Hesketh 101). According to Christopher Clausen, the displacement of religion by 
science resulted in atavism and engendered literary monstrosities. Clausen traces these 
monstrosities through numerous literary works, from the sublime in William 
Wordsworth’s The Prelude to the sinister in Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the 
Baskervilles, as he describes the frightening implications of science taken as a creed. 
Clausen writes, “Take nature as your moral guide, and before long you find yourself 
haunted by nightmares of monsters. The relation between cosmic nature and human 
ethical conduct was the most important intellectual problem of the nineteenth 
century”(239).
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As Clausen suggests, one consequence of science centered on nature rather than 
God is the casting off of ethics. And ethics were at the heart of one of the greatest 
controversies of the nineteenth century: human dissection. While Dracula reflects the 
rhetorical significance of dismemberment as a judicial punishment and a legal 
admonition in enforcing Victorian cultural norms, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson and The Island of Dr. Moreau by H.G. Wells reflect the 
cultural practice of penal dissection. Penal dissection was a utilitarian alternative to 
dismemberment in that criminal bodies were used to advance the cause of scientific 
knowledge. However, the horrifying reality was that criminal bodies were not the only 
ones subjected to dissection in nineteenth-century England: any bodies that could be 
obtained either before or after burial could end up as objects of study for medical schools 
eager to advance students’ knowledge of anatomy and surgical methods. Some of these 
bodies were obtained legally, but others were stolen from funeral homes and graveyards. 
Part of the horror inspired by dissection had to do with the question of what “dead” 
actually meant. Opponents of dissection feared that lecturers and their students were 
actually cutting up viable bodies, either unintentionally or intentionally. The true horror 
of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde, therefore, is not necessarily dissection, but vivisection. 
In Victorian England, the subjects of vivisection were usually animals. In both Moreau 
and Jekyll and Hyde, however, the boundaries separating human and animal dissolve in 
two distinct ways: humans become more like animals and animals become more like 
humans. Living beings inhabiting the obscure area of hybridization between human and 
beast are subjected to cutting and division. That area was of great concern to Victorians 
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as they learned more about human origins, their empire came into contact with new 
cultures and species, and they struggled with the exact location of the animal-human 
boundary. Many resisted the Darwinian notion that there was little separation between 
humans and animals—a claim partly supported by the appearance and behavior of 
“savages” in other parts of the world. However, this conflict is evident in the rhetorical 
moments presented in Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde. As in Dracula, there is a layering of 
forensic and deliberative rhetoric and epideictic in Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde, with 
epideictic proving to be the most influential and enduring. Declamation is present in 
various forms, but epideictic transforms characters. These rhetorics, combined with 
depictions of and references to the cutting of the body, constitute disarticulation in the 
novels. 
Vivisection in the Novels 
 Vivisection is part of the premise of Moreau, but it is more difficult to find in 
Jekyll and Hyde. Vivisection helps construct Moreau’s identity, which was based on the 
French physiologist Claude Bernard (Wells 197). After the main character, the 
shipwrecked Prendick, arrives on Moreau's island, he begins to remember details of 
Moreau’s past in England. A noted researcher, Moreau’s “horrors” in the vivisection of 
animals were exposed by an investigative journalist and by the escape of a flayed dog 
from Moreau’s lab (195). He is forced out of England. “The doctor was simply howled 
out of the country,” Prendick recalls (196). Nevertheless, Prendick—confused by his 
initial encounters with Moreau’s Beast People, the tortured cries he hears in his 
compound, and the sight of his bloody lab—is uncertain about the nature of the doctor’s 
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activities. His fearful assumption about Moreau’s project is that he is surgically 
transforming humans into animal hybrids. “I was convinced ... that Moreau had been 
vivisecting a human being,” says Prendick. “These creatures I had seen were the victims 
of some hideous experiment!” (208). Prendick fears that he will be next, that at Moreau’s 
hands he will meet “a fate more horrible than death, with torture, and after torture the 
most hideous degradation it was possible to conceive—to send me off, a lost soul, a 
beast, the rest of Comus’ rout” (208).  Prendick, of course, is incorrect; but his error is 
significant. Wells was a student of T.H. Huxley, Charles Darwin’s foremost defender. 
And, read alongside Darwin’s theories on primitive man’s place in nature and animal 
intelligence and emotions, Moreau obliterates the boundary between human and beast. 
Simply put, animals are humans and vice versa in Moreau. This notion is reflective of the 
animal welfare movement, which began during the Romantic era but culminated in 1876 
with the Cruelty to Animals Act.  Matt Cartmill writes that this concern for animals was 
the result of a “tender-minded Romantic view of animals” (138) and that it has been 
interpreted as “largely a symbolic expression of the fear and guilt that the people at the 
top of Victorian society felt toward those at the bottom” (141). Critics have also helped to 
build a bridge between animals and humans in Moreau, pointing out that Wells saw the 
“connections among” animals used in scientific research and  marginalized “women, 
workers, and non-whites“ as problematic “boundary figures” in Western scientific 
thought (Vint 91). 
 Almost a decade before Moreau, we find this sort of boundary figure in Edward 
Hyde. Like Moreau’s Beast People, Hyde is the product of vivisection, but the cutting 
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occurs at an elemental level unobservable by the naked eye. Jekyll’s project is dividing 
the good and evil—or the developed and primitive—aspects of his personality through 
the scalpel of chemistry. In Jekyll’s statement, which remains sealed until after his death, 
he writes that his inspiration for this project was the duality he recognized in himself at 
an early age and which caused him “an almost morbid sense of shame” (Stevenson, 
Strange Case 48). Jekyll writes that his studies lead him to the discovery that man is 
actually two beings in one and that they are continuously at “war” (48). He begins to 
“dwell ... on the thought of the separation of these elements” so that they each could live 
unburdened by the other (49). At his “laboratory table,” he also discovers that man’s 
“seemingly so solid body” is illusory: it is actually composed of a “trembling 
immateriality,” a “mist-like transience,” and an “aura and effulgence” (49).  He refers to 
his discovery of certain “agents” —presumably chemical—that could manipulate the 
flesh (49). As unscientific as this may seem, readers should remember that geneticists 
today use restriction enzymes to cut DNA, the molecules that store biological information 
determining an organisms’ appearance, development, function, and, some would say, 
behavioral tendencies. Eventually, Jekyll creates a drug that can draw out the “lower 
elements in my soul” and fashion a body for them (50). Jekyll is a chemist, but the text 
leaves open the possibility that he dabbles in anatomy. Gabriel John Utterson, the 
novella’s primary narrator, says Jekyll repurposed the theatre, “his own tastes being 
rather chemical than anatomical...” (27). It seems unlikely, however, that Jekyll could 
have made his crucial discoveries without examining corpses. The novella includes the 
revelation that Jekyll’s house has “old dissecting rooms” (25). Utterson says Jekyll 
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bought the house “from the heirs of a celebrated surgeon,” and that the structure has a 
“theatre, once crowded with eager students ….” (25). Utterson’s knowledge of what went 
on in the theatre perhaps accounts for the unease—the “distasteful sense of strangeness” 
(25)—that he feels as walks through Jekyll’s lab. It also foreshadows his own textual 
dissolution later in the novel. Jekyll thus has a link to a noted dissector. Utterson’s 
description of Jekyll’s lab as “now lying gaunt and silent” is suggestive of a corpse on a 
table (25). The old dissector seems even more of a presence when he is named in 
Lanyon’s narrative: Dr. Denman (43). 
 The reference to dissecting rooms at Jekyll’s home seems more than a trivial 
Gothic detail.  Indeed, further evidence of Stevenson’s concerns with vivisection can be 
found in his long-lost tale “The Scientific Ape.”  “The Scientific Ape” was not published 
until 2006. Although the date the tale was written is uncertain, it seems likely that it was 
composed around the time that Stevenson wrote Jekyll and Hyde. Like Jekyll and Hyde. 
“The Scientific Ape” has fabular qualities. In the tale, a vivisectionist similar to Moreau 
lives on a remote island near a colony of humanoid apes. An ape escapes from the 
vivisectionist, returns to the troop, and proclaims himself a doctor of vivisection. 
Unburdened by the religion that he claims hindered man’s advancement, the doctor’s 
project is to determine how long it took man to evolve, a question he proposes to answer 
by vivisecting humans.  The doctor’s first subject is to be the vivisectionist’s baby, whom 
he has kidnapped: “By vivisecting men, we find out how apes are made, and so we 
advance,” the doctor says (402). After a brief debate on the efficacy and humaneness of 
 
115 
 
vivisection, the apes force the doctor to return the baby. The meaning seems clear: 
animals are more rational and just than humans. 
Dissection and Vivisection 
 Coinciding with the publication of Jekyll and Hyde and later Moreau was a 
national debate over animal vivisection, which Darwin reluctantly defended in 1881 as a 
means of producing scientific and medical knowledge. Animal vivisection was part of a 
larger controversy over scientific methods, including human dissection earlier in the 
century.  Both practices sparked political debate and social unrest, with citizens 
sporadically protesting and rioting against anatomists and their henchmen, the grave-
robbers. Likewise, the controversy over animal vivisection simmered through much of 
the nineteenth century and boiled over in the Brown Dog riots of 1907 (Cartmill 142). 
When studying the rhetorical significance of violence to the body in nineteenth-century 
literature, it is important to know that animal welfare activists saw little separation 
between beast and human in popular sentiment. The merger was one that Darwin himself 
encouraged using a rhetorical strategy known as gradatio. 
 Although the dissection of humans is not integral to the plots of Moreau or Jekyll 
and Hyde, the practice is suggested and critiqued through the vivisection of animals in 
the novels. Moreover, the crimes of the characters raise questions of justice. In Moreau, 
clues point to the conclusion that Montgomery, Moreau’s dissolute assistant, fled 
England after committing some transgression.  Prendick recalls one of his earliest 
conversations with Montgomery, when the man talked of his past in London. “He spoke 
like a man who loved his life there,” Prendick says, “and had been suddenly and 
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irrevocably cut off from it” (184).  Exactly what Montgomery did is never explained. But 
it is clear that it was related to his alcoholism, and that he is in exile. He says of whisky, 
“‘It was that infernal stuff that led to my coming here. That and a foggy night. I thought 
myself in luck when Moreau offered to get me off’” (197). Later, Montgomery reveals he 
had been living the life of a destitute student of medicine when he committed “‘a 
blunder—I didn’t know any better—and hustled off to this beastly island. Ten years 
here!’” (250). It seems certain that Montgomery committed some crime, and it was 
serious enough that he left England to escape justice. Like Jekyll, Montgomery is 
transformed by an agent that results in bestlialization and loss of judgment. While 
Jekyll’s body is transformed, Montgomery is transported to a place where the line 
between human and animal dissolves. Both Montgomery and Hyde become fugitives 
from justice who are bestial and criminal. Montgomery fraternizes with animals, and 
Jekyll becomes one of them. 
 While Montgomery’s crime remains a mystery, Hyde’s is obvious: murder proves 
to be his undoing.  Hyde not only kills the defenseless Sir Danvers Carew without 
provocation, he beats him so savagely with a walking stick that “bones were audibly 
shattered and the body jumped on the roadway” (22).  Describing the overkill from 
Hyde’s point of view, Jekyll writes, “Instantly the spirit of hell awoke in me and raged. ... 
I mauled the unresisting body, tasting delight from every blow...” (56). According to the 
novella’s third-person narrator, Hyde then flees, leaving Carew’s body “incredibly 
mangled” (22). Jekyll recalls that once Hyde returned to his senses, “I saw my life to be a 
forfeit” (56). He destroys personal papers at his home, but leaves behind the key 
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evidence: half of the walking stick that he broke while thrashing Carew.  The other half 
was left with Carew’s body. “It was not only a crime, it had been a tragic folly,” Jekyll 
writes (57). And Jekyll wonders if Hyde will “die upon the scaffold” (62) if he is 
captured. “Hyde in danger of his life was a creature new to me,” Jekyll writes (59). One 
can imagine that Hyde’s executed body—half man, half ape—would have been of special 
interest to nineteenth-century anatomists seeking medical and scientific knowledge. Ruth 
Richardson writes that the bodies of “physiological freaks” were even more valuable to 
anatomists than the bodies of normal people (57). Often, these remains would end up in 
exhibitions, without the subjects’ consent. John Hunter in the late eighteenth century built 
an enormous collection of curiosities for the Royal College of Surgeons containing  
 
monstrous births (animal and human) in bottles, the skeletons of physical freaks, a 
cast of the brain cavity of Dean Swift’s skull, death masks, murderers’ skeletons 
and relics, and all sorts and conditions of medical prodigies—feet, heads, internal 
organs—pickled or dyed to show their peculiarities to better effect. (64)  
 
 
Underlying this freak show is, of course, norming and morbid curiosity. Medical science 
determined the specimens that were abnormal, while the legal establishment essentially 
condoned the practice of collecting—often by illicit means—and displaying what had 
been judged incongruous. Thus, somatic monstrosity inspired coerciveness and societal 
monstrosity, which defended its disturbing methods and ends by invoking the 
advancement of knowledge. The boundary between normal and abnormal thus bled away.  
 The idea that a convicted criminal could have his or her body mutilated and 
displayed after execution as a part of a legal sentence is inconceivable to modern Western 
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audiences. In most criminal justice systems, it is homicide victims who undergo that 
degradation in the form of forensic autopsies, which are documented in writing and 
photographs and, in most states in the United States, placed in files that are open to 
inspection under public records laws. But by the late nineteenth-century in England, 
morbid dissection had been a criminal punishment for several hundred years. The 
dissection of criminal corpses for medical research began in Europe after the Papal ban 
against it was lifted in the sixteenth century (Cheney 100). The practice eventually 
entered England and Scotland, where it fundamentally altered the spectacle of criminal 
execution. No longer would criminal bodies be destroyed simply for retribution and 
admonition. Executed bodies could instead be handed over to doctors to be methodically 
dismembered for the purposes of medical research and education.  Penal dissections are 
sometimes referred to as “public dissections.” However, this term is misleading. “Public” 
simply meant that the bodies for dissection were obtained from the government and not a 
private individual (Sawday 281).  People were not able to view penal dissections as they 
had been able to view judicial dismemberments of convicted felons. This was partly 
because anatomy theaters were not able to accommodate such large crowds. Those who 
were able to witness penal dissections were mostly medical students and dignitaries. So, 
penal dissection represented another step in the movement away from open executions 
and toward the figurative transformation of body to text. Simply put, people had to read 
about what they once had the opportunity to witness directly. 
The transformation of body to text was facilitated by public dissection, as 
anatomists studied executed criminal bodies as if they were books. It was a “‘dirty source 
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of knowledge,’” Richardson writes, quoting nineteenth-century surgeon William 
Lawrence (95). The dissection system transformed corpses into valuable objects of gaze 
and study for anatomists.  Jonathan Sawday defines “penal dissection” as the 
“codification by statute of a set of rules under which the corpse could be dismembered 
after death for the utilitarian investigation of the body’s internal structure” (54). 
Anatomies officially began in England in 1540, when Henry VIII united the companies of 
Barbers & Surgeons by Royal Charter and granted them the right to the bodies of four 
hanged felons each year. These grants made way for public dissection to be added to the 
sentences of convicted murderers.  Soon, colleges across England gained rights to the 
bodies of executed murderers and were requiring medical students to attend anatomies as 
part of their education (56). The “Murder Act” of 1752 helped increase the supply of 
criminal bodies available for anatomies by giving judges the discretion to substitute 
dissection for gibbeting in the death sentences for convicted murderers. Sawday explains 
that the Act was the authorities’ “response to a perceived breakdown in law and order”: 
“What was needed, it was felt, was a punishment so draconian, so appalling, that 
potential criminals would be terrified at the fate which awaited them in the event of their 
detection. Clearly, simply, execution was not enough” (54). Even though dissection 
would take place out of view of the mob, it was still intended to send a clear warning to a 
specific audience about the consequences of murder. Sawday writes that dissection 
seemed like a way to reintroduce dismemberment as practiced under the Elizabethans and 
Jacobeans (55).  It also offered the benefit of advancing medical knowledge and 
improving surgical techniques at a time when surgery was compared to “live butchery” 
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(Richardson 44). However, Richardson states that penal dissection proved to be even 
more unpopular in England than gibbeting, which involved displaying an executed corpse 
in a hanging metal frame to decompose and be eaten by birds. With gibbetting, the crowd 
could at least see the outcome of the sentence. Although dissected bodies were sometimes 
displayed for people to view, the process denied them the opportunity to witness the full 
sentence being enacted and therefore the emotional release that accompanied it. Since 
dissections were performed in the enclosed space of the anatomical theater, people were 
left to imagine what took place there. And the imagination was fertile ground for terror. 
Some worried that the corpses were sexually mistreated, while others feared that 
murderers who survived due to botched hangings were either killed by anatomists or 
vivisected (Richardson 95-6). 
The infamy of penal dissection is hinted at by the “Murder Act,” which made it a 
felony punishable by seven years’ transportation to try to take the body of an executed 
murderer to save it from dissection (Sawday 55). The Act also relieved anatomists from 
having to go to the scaffold to retrieve bodies and possibly be subjected to the violence of 
the mob. Instead, the bodies were to be delivered to anatomists by the sheriff or his 
deputies (54). Whether convicted murderers were sentenced to dissection or gibbeting, 
the law forbade them from receiving a proper burial and the eternal rest believed to go 
along with it (55). Dissection was therefore seen as a violation of religious customs as 
well as the ancient folklore surrounding the newly dead body. According to one 
superstition , there was a “period between death and burial in which the human being was 
regarded as ‘neither alive nor fully dead’” (Richardson 15). Belief in the resurrection of 
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the body also caused people to oppose dissection. While popular burial customs sought to 
preserve the body and its identity, dissection threatened to destroy them. “Dissection was 
a very final process,” Richardson writes. “It denied hope of survival—even the survival 
of identity after death. … Dissection represented a gross assault upon the integrity and 
identity of the body and upon the repose of the soul” (76). At the same time, the law left 
bodies in a liminal status in that they were not considered property. This made them 
vulnerable to exploitation by “resurrectionists,” another name for bodysnatchers:  
 
Although the only legal source for bodies for dissection was hanged murderers, 
exhumation was not technically a crime of theft; for although dead human bodies 
were in fact bought and sold, in the eyes of the law a body did not constitute real 
property, and therefore could neither be owned or stolen. (58).  
 
 
Such legal deficiencies set the stage for one of the most lurid periods in British history. 
And the cultural attitudes that they unintentionally fostered are reflected in nineteenth-
century horror fiction.  
The rampant grave-robbing that took place as a result of the limited legal supply 
of cadavers for anatomies made the age of dissection in Britain even more macabre. 
Although the “Murder Act” increased the supply of dissectible bodies, it was not enough 
to meet the demand. As a result, stolen human bodies became goods to be bought and 
sold in an underground economy that stripped them of their identity and left them in 
pieces. Stevenson’s interest in this black market is evident in his short story “The Body-
Snatcher.” Written in 1881 and published in 1884, the story is set in the 1820s when 
grave-robbing was rampant.  “The Body-Snatchers” focuses on two Resurrection Men, 
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the sinister and manipulative Wolfe “Toddy” Macfarlane and the conscience-plagued 
Fettes. Macfarlane becomes a respected London doctor, Fettes a washed-up alcoholic. 
The story is told by one of Fettes’ drinking mates at the out-the-way inn, where an older 
Fettes spends his evenings in “melancholy alcoholic saturation” (201). Fettes is an 
enigma in the village northeast of London where he settled years earlier, but he shares his 
story after a chance reunion with Macfarlane at the inn reawakens his guilt, trauma, and 
rage. As young men, both Macfarlane and Fettes were medical students who supplied 
their anatomy lecturer with stolen corpses. Both were lab assistants: Fettes’s job was to 
pay for the snatched bodies that were delivered by resurrectionists in the dead of night. 
The premise of the tale involves the horror of murder-for-dissection, as the two corpses 
identified in the story, Jane Galbraith and Gray, were most likely victims of foul play. On 
the surface, the conflict of the macabre story is between Fettes and Macfarlane. At a 
deeper level, however, the conflict is Fettes’s struggle to suppress his conscience as he is 
drawn deeper into the corpse trade by Macfarlane. Unlike Macfarlane, Fettes does not kill 
anyone, but he bears the burden of guilt and fear for what he does to the bodies he helps 
smuggle. Fettes falls into ruin because he clearly sees the absurdity and horror of a 
system that relies on unspeakable violence to living and dead bodies to train physicians.  
By the time of the setting depicted in Stevenson’s tale, grave-robbing had been 
going on in England and Scotland since the seventeenth century, with anatomists and 
their students stealing bodies for dissection (Richardson 54). As the black market grew, 
anatomists began hiring “entrepreneurs” to rob graves for them. “Anatomists, fearful of 
punishment, riot, prosecution, and damage to their reputation, offered money for corpses 
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rather than snatch them themselves,” Richardson explains (55). Richardson estimates that 
the trade in cadavers eventually grew to “several thousand bodies annually” (87).  “Every 
buried corpse in the country was vulnerable to the predations of the bodysnatchers…,” 
Richardson writes (xv).  So pervasive was the practice that when Fettes gets cold feet in 
“The Body-Snatcher,” Macfarlane tells him that if he is not a grave-robber, he will end 
up a victim on an anatomist’s table. Thus, Stevenson divides the world between those 
who dissect—or at least facilitate the practice by stealing corpses—and those who are 
dissected (215).   
Richardson writes that the period of 1675-1725 was most likely when “the human 
body began to be bought and sold like any other commodity, smuggled or otherwise” 
(55). At times, body-snatchers could bribe undertakers and steal corpses from coffins 
before they were even buried (65). Usually, however, the work was more labor intensive. 
Operating in gangs mostly at night, resurrectionists used techniques that, for the most 
part, allowed them to remove bodies from graves without leaving a trace of disturbance. 
An experienced gang could do the job in ten to twenty minutes (Knott 2). Richardson 
summarizes the inventive ways bodies were packaged for smuggling and delivery in this 
new economy:  
 
Human bodies were compressed into boxes, packed in sawdust, packed in hay, 
trussed up in sacks, roped up like hams, sewn in canvas, packed in cases, casks, 
barrels, crates, and hampers, salted, pickled or injected with preservatives. They 
were carried in carts and wagons, in barrows and steam-boats; manhandled, 
damaged in transit, and hidden under loads of vegetables. They were stored in 
cellars and on quays. (72) 
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Sometimes cadavers were also “dismembered and sold in pieces,” Richardson 
writes (72). Resurrection men would be paid well just for a corpse’s teeth, which dentists 
used to make dentures (67).  As stealthily as grave-robbers operated, they were 
sometimes caught. The problem facing the law was what to do with the resurrection men, 
since the law did not recognize a body as property that could be stolen. If the body-
snatchers stole clothing, jewelry, or any other items from a grave, they could be charged 
with felonies. However, if they took only bodies, they were usually charged with 
misdemeanors (Knott 2). They typically had more to fear from the outraged and vengeful 
mobs that confronted them after they were arrested (Richardson 78). As Stevenson 
writes, in “rustic neighborhoods” where grave-robbers felt safer operating, “love is more 
than commonly tenacious … and bonds of blood or fellowship unite the entire society of 
a parish” (“The Body-Snatcher” 217). Evidence of grave-robbing could cause 
communities to panic and rush to dig up local graveyards looking for their loved ones 
(88). Difficult to assess is their trauma when they discovered empty graves. Richardson 
speculates that 
 
the conception of their spouse or child dragged out of the coffin, shoved into a 
sack, manhandled in transit, stretched out on a slab, decapitated or dismembered, 
and cut about by (possibly irreverent) training anatomists, may in many cases 
have resulted in profound psychological disturbance. (78) 
 
 
Stevenson contemplates this anguish in “The Body Snatcher” when his narrator contrasts 
families’ expectations that their departed loved one would find eternal rest and the fate 
their bodies actually suffer after their graves are desecrated by “the Resurrection Man”:  
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To bodies that had been laid in earth, in joyful expectation of a far different 
awakening, there came that hasty, lamp-lit, terror-haunted resurrection of the 
spade and mattock. The coffin was forced, the cerements torn, and the melancholy 
relics, clad in sackcloth, after being rattled for hours on moonless byways, were at 
length exposed to uttermost indignities before a class of gaping boys. (217) 
 
 
The newly dead were not the only ones at risk: the living also had reason to fear 
the lurid trade of criminals and anatomists after it was revealed that people were being 
murdered and their bodies sold for dissection. The first high-profile case occurred in 
1828, when it was discovered that William Burke and William Hare had murdered 
sixteen people in Edinburgh and sold their bodies to anatomist Robert Knox. The Irish 
immigrants’ spree began after an old man died in the Hares’ boarding house owing them 
money, and Burke and Hare sold his body to Knox to cover the debt. Their primary 
method involved dulling victims with drink and then smothering them. At trial, Hare 
testified against Burke, who was convicted. After he was hanged, his body was publicly 
dissected at Edinburgh University before an enormous crowd. His skeleton is still on 
display at Edinburgh Medical School, and a book bound with his skin can be found in 
Surgeons’ Hall Museum in Edinburgh. One is reminded of the image of the “old yellow 
Book” which relates Franceschini’s crimes in Browning’s The Ring and the Book: 
“…crude fact / Secreted from a man’s life when hearts beat hard …” (I. 85-6). Knox 
escaped prosecution, as did the accomplices. 
 Two years after the sensational revelations of Burke and Hare’s crimes, a similar 
case was investigated in the Nova Scotia Gardens slum in London in 1831. While Burke 
and Hare had never robbed graves, John Bishop and Thomas Williams were part of a 
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gang of accomplished body-snatchers. Bishop estimated that over twelve years he had 
sold “between 500 to 1,000 disinterred corpses to London anatomy schools” (Richardson 
196). At some point, they branched out and began murdering victims to supply 
anatomists. They confessed to killing three people—including two boys—by drugging 
them and then hanging them upside down inside a well to die—a method that left no 
signs of murder (196).  Bishop, Williams, and a third man, John May, were convicted of 
murdering one of the boys. May was later pardoned by the king, while Bishop and 
Williams were hanged before cheering crowds and their bodies dissected and exhibited.  
The day before his execution, Williams allegedly confessed that he and Bishop had 
murdered about sixty other people and sold their bodies to anatomists (197). 
Murder-for-dissection is, of course, the real business of Stevenson’s “The Body-
Snatcher,” which features among its characters Robert Knox before the Burke and Hare 
scandal. He is referred to only as “Mr. K---.” Stevenson writes:   
 
His name was subsequently too well known. The man who bore it skulked 
through the streets of Edinburgh in disguise, while the mob that applauded at the 
execution of Burke called loudly for the blood of his employer. But Mr. K--- was 
then at the top of his vogue. (206)  
 
 
A promising student from Edinburgh, Fettes lives in Knox’s compound, under the 
same roof as the dissecting room, and is charged with keeping the theatre in order, 
overseeing students, and paying for the bodies that are brought in at night by the “unclean 
and desperate interlopers who supplied the table” (207). The narrator says that Fettes and 
Knox were always worried about having enough corpses, and they chose to overlook 
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evidence that murder was being committed to supply their students.  “There was no 
understanding that the subjects were provided by the crime of murder. Had that idea been 
broached to [Knox] in words, he would have recoiled in horror…,” the narrator says 
(208). Still, Knox is culpable for not taking the matter seriously, for insisting that Fettes 
ask no question of the “ruffians” who showed up at the dissecting room door with bodies 
and thereby encouraging his associates to engage in murder for dissection (208). And 
Fettes, who silences his conscience with alcohol and “blackguardly enjoyment,” goes 
along with Knox: “He understood his duty, in short, to have three branches: to take what 
was brought, to pay the price, and to avert the eye from any evidence of crime” (208). By 
the time Fettes begins to resist the trade, it is too late. Macfarlane tells him he has become 
too involved. Besides, Macfarlane says, almost all of their dissection “subjects have been 
murdered.” The best thing to do, he says, is to look the other way (210).  For Fettes, 
however, squelching the conscience is easier said than done. When a drunken Gray jokes 
that Macfarlane would stab him if he could, Fettes says, “‘We medicals have a better way 
than that,’” said Fettes. “‘When we dislike a dead friend of ours, we dissect him’” (211). 
By the time that Stevenson published “The Body-Snatcher,” efforts had been 
made to limit the black market in corpses.  A growing awareness of bodysnatching, the 
safeguards taken in cemeteries to try to stop it, the proliferation of medical schools, and 
the prosecutions of anatomists who received stolen bodies all increased pressure on the 
British government to increase the supply of cadavers legally available for dissection. 
The result was the Anatomy Act of 1832, a utilitarian plan that aimed to relieve the 
shortage by expanding the supply to include the unclaimed bodies of people who died in 
 
128 
 
workhouses, hospitals, and prisons. It was modeled on a French system that had worked 
well (Knott 3). The Anatomy Act stipulated that if no one claimed a body within seven 
days to give it a proper burial, it could be sent to a medical school for dissection. The Act 
also required anatomists to be licensed, bodies sent for dissection to be documented, an 
official fee to be paid for the bodies, and the cadavers to receive proper burials. The Act, 
however, offered little relief for the poor, who for years had been easy targets for body-
snatchers due to inexpensive burial practices.  Critics charged that the Act made poverty 
a crime. Mary Ellis Gibson writes, “This reform …simply effected a transfer of legal 
dissection from criminals to the poor, thereby suggesting a basic connection between 
poverty and crime” (79). John Knott argues that historians have long overlooked the 
trauma that the Anatomy Act and dissection had on Britain in the nineteenth century. 
Knott writes that the “poor and laboring population viewed the Anatomy Act with 
absolute horror.”  It was variously referred to among the people as “The Dead Body 
Bill,” the “Dissecting Bill,” and the “Blood-Stained Anatomy Act” (1). People were 
roused by conspiracy theories that the Anatomy Act and the New Poor Law were 
intended to work together to starve and murder people in prisons, workhouses, and 
hospitals and then butcher their bodies (2). “Were the two Acts not designed to work in 
harmony, grinding up the bodies of the poor?” Knott asks rhetorically, summing up the 
suspicions of the poor (1). 
Darwin’s Influence 
 An understanding of the rhetoric of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde is further aided 
by a knowledge of Darwin’s theories and their impact on Victorian culture: theories 
 
129 
 
which emphasized that humans—and their bodies—are part of nature. When discussing 
transgressing bodies, none were perhaps more objectionable to Victorians than the 
atavistic bodies of evolutionary anachronisms—like Hyde—who not only offended 
sensibilities but also broke laws and threatened social order. Montgomery, who socializes 
with the Beast People in Moreau, is another example. Darwin helped supply the traits of 
such characters. In works such as The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex 
and The Expressions of Emotions in Man and Animals, the divisions separating savages 
and animals largely disappear. Jeanne Fahnestock writes, “The ancient opposition 
between human and brute was seriously challenged in the nineteenth century when 
various theories of evolution, culminating in Darwin’s, were publically aired” (75). 
Drawing from the lexicon of nineteenth-century imperialism, Darwin frequently uses the 
term “savages” to refer to Africans, Native Americans, Asian Indians, and Aborigines. 
Aside from even the lowest human’s superior mental powers, Darwin saw little 
difference between savages and animals in the struggle for existence. In fact, he suggests 
that savages are intermediaries between humans and animals. They are throwbacks to 
civilized Europeans in an earlier state. These attitudes form the core of Darwin’s thought 
on many topics, including his opposition to inhumane treatment of animals. 
 Although Darwin published his theory of competitive fitness in 1859 in On the 
Origin of Species, he did not apply the theory to humans until 1871 in The Descent of 
Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. In arguing that humans are a product of evolution, 
he blurs the lines between humans and animals. “Savages” become animal-human 
hybrids in Darwin’s The Descent of Man. Darwin achieves this largely through the use of 
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gradatio. Fahnestock points out that Darwin makes effective use of gradatio in On the 
Origin of Species. One of his most famous uses of gradatio can be found in chapter two, 
in which he undermines the stability of the concept of species (113). However, Darwin’s 
use of gradatio in The Descent of Man is even more pronounced, as he searches for the 
line dividing human and animal. It is a search that informs Jekyll and Hyde and Moreau. 
Part of Darwin’s purpose in The Descent of Man is to erase the binary between human 
and animal by showing that they share numerous similarities. His project can be 
expressed in the following structural chiasmus: the bestializing of humans and the 
humanizing of beasts. It is a rhetorical figure that consolidates the Victorian period’s 
interest in primitive man, moral degeneracy, and animal welfare. The crisscross nature of 
the figure points toward an intersection based on shared characteristics, and that is what 
Darwin tries establish in The Descent of Man, and what readers can see Stevenson 
extending in Jekyll and Hyde, and Wells in Moreau. The picture that all three writers 
paint of man in nature is decidedly dark and disturbing, characterized by violence to the 
body. Impulses that all three texts share are the demonization and destruction of the 
hybrid, as represented by the “savages,” the Beast People, and Hyde. These monstrosities 
are partly constituted through others’ rhetoric, and they all face disarticulation. 
In The Descent of Man, Darwin clearly believes savages are intermediaries 
between civilized men and animals. He does not believe, as some scholars and clergy of 
his day, that man came into existence, then lapsed into savagery (143, 145).  He describes 
uncivilized people in some of the wickedest terms possible. They are immoral, 
superstitious, lacking in reason, intemperate, masochistic, sexist, domineering, violent, 
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warlike, bloodthirsty, cruel, sadistic, unsympathetic and inhumane. Many of these 
observations could be made of Edward Hyde. Almost a decade later, and in an enchanted 
island setting removed from London and reminiscent of Circe’s, Prospero’s, Comus’s, 
and the Houyhnhms’ domains, Wells feels freer to describe his Beast People’s savagery. 
In the Beast People, Prendick comments on many of the same characteristics that Darwin 
catalogues in primitive humans. Prendick also notes that Moreau has given the Beast 
People the Law, a religious code similar to the biblical Ten Commandments, to follow.  
They chant it. Their litany of the Law’s stipulations contribute to its rhetorical character.  
Describing primitive people, Darwin writes that they are unable to distinguish 
between subjective and objective impressions (94). In other words, they do not know the 
difference between reality and fantasy. He portrays the superstitions and religious rites of 
savages as particularly lurid, writing of human sacrifices, ordeals by fire and poison, and 
black magic (95). He writes, “These miserable and indirect consequences of our highest 
faculties may be compared with the incidental and occasional mistakes of the instincts of 
the lower animals” (96). Darwin dwells on savages’ cruelty. For example, North 
American Indians leave the weak to die, he writes, and Fijians bury their elderly parents 
alive (102). They have underdeveloped social instincts, and neighboring tribes are 
constantly at war (108). They lack altruism and benevolence (110-1). Crimes such as 
murder might be punished within tribes, but they are encouraged against other tribes. 
Some savages delight in the suffering of strangers (117), and women and children in 
certain North American Indian tribes aid in torturing captives, Darwin writes.  They can 
also take “horrid pleasure” in cruelty to animals. “... humanity is an unknown virtue,” 
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Darwin writes (118). Darwin attributes their “low morality” to a lack of sympathy, weak 
reasoning, and lack of self-control (119). If primitive people adopt some of the trappings 
of civilization, they might be only superficial. As Darwin says, “Apes are much given to 
imitation, as are the lowest savages ...” (129). He further develops this association 
between savages and lower animals with an ominous prediction: 
 
At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised 
races of man will almost certainly exterminate, and replace, the savage races 
throughout the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes ... will no 
doubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies will then be 
wider, for it will intervene between man in a more civilised state ... instead of as 
now between the negro or Australian and the gorilla (156). 
 
 
Darwin’s hybrids, therefore, face disarticulation the same as Wells’ and Stevenson’s. And 
just as these “savages” were constituted as monstrosities through rhetoric, their 
destruction would also be facilitated by rhetoric as imperialists justified their domination, 
conversion, and modernization.  It seems significant that the most visible example of 
colonialism in the late nineteenth century was the partitioning of Africa, as the European 
powers figuratively cut the continent into pieces and divided it among themselves.  
As Darwin tries to make primitive people seem less human in The Descent of 
Man, he tries to make animals seem more human. As William Irvine writes, “He 
(Darwin) may more readily be accused of making animals too human, than of making 
men too animal” (196). Darwin compares “lower animals” to humans on many points in 
chapters III and IV in The Descent of Man.  In chapter III, he writes, “My object ... is to 
shew that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in 
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their mental faculties” (66). Animals such as dogs, cats and apes experience emotions—a 
fact that Darwin says is so well established that he offers few specifics. They display 
suspicion, deceit, courage, timidity, anger and sulkiness. Higher animals are capable of 
such “complex emotions” as love, emulation, pride, shame, rage, humor and dread. They 
experience wonder, boredom and curiosity (71). Darwin writes at length about a series of 
human characteristics and abilities that he believes animals possess to some degree, 
offering numerous examples. They are imitation, attention, memory, imagination, reason, 
abstract thought, general conceptions, self-consciousness, mental individuality, language, 
a sense of beauty, and religion. James Rachels explains: 
 
Part of Darwin’s argument was that we find similar rational capacities in other 
animals; echoing the language of the Cartesians, he rejected the idea that animals 
are merely ‘animated machines.’ ... Darwin did not deny that human rational 
abilities far exceed those of other animals. But he insisted that the difference is 
only one of degree, not of kind. (132-3) 
 
 
The Descent of Man was not the only work in which Darwin explores the 
similarities between man and animals. He followed up with the well-received The 
Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872. Janet Browne describes the 
book’s success: “It turned out to be the most successful and readable book he had 
produced up to that point, selling some nine thousand copies in the first four months, 
many more than the Origin of Species had done in a similar span” (Charles Darwin 368). 
Browne writes that “Darwin regarded the book as a crucial part of his lifelong 
evolutionary project” (368). It resonated with nineteenth-century readers who were 
increasingly interested in animals’ inner lives, their intelligence and their emotions. 
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Browne explains: “The subject of expression brought his anthropological cycle to a 
conclusion, seeking to demonstrate a continuum between the mental life of human and 
animals” (368). Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde posit a similar continuum between human 
and animal bodies. 
Moreau’s Rhetoric 
 Darwin’s concern with the animal-human boundary informs the character of 
Moreau as declaimer and vivisectionist. Like Dracula, Moreau presents audiences with 
multiple strands of rhetoric. Moreau’s explanation and defense of his project constitute 
what is essentially a forensic oration, while Prendick’s transformation due to his contact 
with the Beast People suggests epideictic. Wells’ concern with rhetoric is signaled early 
in the novel when Prendick discovers “Latin and Greek classics” in Moreau’s compound 
(194). Moreover, after what he believes is his first successful use of vivisection in 
humanizing an ape, Moreau wants to write about the project for other scientists. He tells 
Prendick that he “was in a mind to write an account of the whole affair to wake up the 
English physiology” (227).  But the project, like all of Moreau’s others, fails when the 
gorilla he has vivisected reverts.  
Moreau’s role as declaimer becomes clear in Chapter XIV, in which he explains 
his project to Prendick. Even though Moreau does not fully convince Prendick of the 
practicality and benefit of his work, he does win Prendick’s uneasy acceptance that he is 
not experimenting on humans, only animals. This rhetorical performance occurs after 
Prendick has fled from Moreau’s compound , driven by his terror that doctor may be 
vivisecting humans. “Could it be possible, I thought, that such a thing as the vivisection 
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of men was possible?” Prendick wonders (208). He fears he will be next. After Moreau 
and Montgomery pursue Prendick through the jungle and onto the beach, Moreau 
convinces the suicidal Prendick to return to the compound only after gaining his trust by 
giving him two loaded pistols with which to protect himself. Although he is an aging 
man, Moreau is described as incredibly strong. As declaimer, he is imperious and larger 
than life. He reflects Debra Hawhee’s assessment that ancient Greek orators had to be 
prodigious men to deliver their speeches to large assemblies. When Moreau throws a 
curious Prendick out of his laboratory, the narrator says, “He lifted me as though I was a 
little child” (208). Prendick’s earlier descriptions of Moreau conveys the man’s presence. 
“He was a powerfully built man,” Prendick recalls, “with a fine forehead and rather 
heavy features” (189).  His aging skin was “drooping,” giving him “an expression of 
pugnacious resolution” about his mouth (189). Prendick also observes that Moreau is at 
last six feet tall (190).  His physical power is paralleled in his rhetorical power, as he 
rather quickly wins Prendick’s confidence, if not his acceptance. As a surgeon, Moreau’s 
project involves controlled violence to the bodies of animals. As a declaimer, he faces 
uncontrollable violence to his own body and disarticulation, similar to Cicero and to 
Dracula. Moreau’s death comes after the puma that he has been vivisecting escapes from 
his lab. Moreau pursues the animal into the jungle, where it partially dismembers him.  
Prendick finds Moreau’s body face down. His body is “mangled” (249).  “One hand was 
almost severed at the wrist, and his silvery hair was dabbled in blood,” Prendick recalls 
(249).  They drag his body back to the compound, where Montgomery fears he will have 
“his bones picked” by animals (250). Prendick contemplates the orator’s still, silent body: 
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“his massive face, calm even after his terrible death, and with his hard eyes open, staring 
at the dead white moon above” (251).  
In his presentation to Prendick, Moreau lays out his work and his rationale for it. 
Prendick says, “He was very simple and convincing” (222). Through Moreau’s 
explanation, Prendick also begins to see that he and Moreau have similar beliefs. 
“Presently I found myself hot with shame at our mutual positions,” Prendick says. 
Through his project, Moreau says that he has “humanized animals” and that they are 
“triumphs of vivisection” (222). “You forget all that a skilled vivisector can do with 
living things,” says Moreau, who discloses that some of his procedures involve grafting 
skin and bone (222). When Prendick calls the Beast People monsters, Moreau does not 
protest. “‘Yes,’” he says. “‘These creatures you have seen are animals carven and 
wrought into new shapes’” (222). Moreau says that his interest in the field began with 
blood transfusions and grew: 
 
You begin to see that it is a possible thing to transplant tissue from one part of the 
animal to another, or from one animal to another, to alter its chemical reactions 
and methods of growth, to modify the articulations of its limbs, and indeed to 
change its most intimate structure? (223) 
 
 
The difficulty with the assertion embedded in Moreau’s question is that he has not been 
entirely successful. Prendick observes that the creatures still bear many of the physical 
and behavioral traits of animals. They tend to have short legs and deformed hands. 
Moreau also suggests that he has used hypnotism as a sort of mental grafting: “‘Very 
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much … of what we call moral education is such an artificial modification and perversion 
of instinct.…’” (223). 
 Through surgery, Moreau is practicing a radical version of the artificial selection 
that Darwin uses as an analogy for natural selection in his On the Origin of Species, and 
he is doing so in a surgically invasive way. Moreau’s fallacy, however, is assuming that 
animals are evolving toward humanoid forms, and he is tries to accelerate evolution. 
“Neither Darwin nor Huxley, nor Wells after them … believed that progress was 
inevitable,” write Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie. “It was simply urgently desirable. And 
both Huxley and Wells were plagued by haunting doubts whether in fact it would occur” 
(56). Moreau’s failed experiments are proof of the unreliability of evolutionary progress. 
It is not surprising, then, that Moreau’s argument falters when he confesses to Prendick 
that he has no real reason for choosing the human form as a model for his creature, other 
than its aesthetic appeal to him (223). However, when Prendick challenges Moreau to 
justify the pain he inflicts during vivisection with some practical application, Moreau 
turns the tables on him and accuses him of being a “materialist” due to his obsession with 
pain. Prendick protests: “‘I am not a materialist!’ I began hotly” (224).  But Moreau 
continues: “‘ … I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely what an 
animal feels’” (224). Prendick believes Moreau’s argument is specious, but has no real 
response: “I gave an impatient shrug at such sophistry” (225). However, there is more 
truth in Moreau’s assessment that Prendick is an “‘animal’” than Prendick recognizes, 
and it becomes apparent upon analysis of the epideictic effects of the novel. 
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Continuing his declamation, Moreau turns to the effects of somatic change on the 
body. He says that pain—a basic animal-human response—is useless, and that many 
organisms do not experience it. He predicts that pain will eventually be “‘ground out of 
existence by evolution’” (225). Moreau also privileges his branch of science over 
Prendick’s, which he dismisses as “‘collecting butterflies’” (225). As Moreau’s discourse 
continues, he grows increasingly animated, speaking of his “‘intellectual passion’” and 
the “‘delight of these intellectual desires.’” In this state, Moreau says he does not see the 
“‘thing before’” him as “‘an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem’” to be solved. “‘I 
wanted  … to find the extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape,’” Moreau says (225). 
When Prendick utters his last protest, that Moreau’s work is an “‘abomination,’” Moreau 
responds, “‘To this day I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter. The study of 
Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature’” (225). Moreau’s rhetoric thus 
points toward a Darwinian theme in the novel: the bestializing of humans and the 
humanizing of beasts. This theme informs the epideictic, the sublime rhetoric of the 
novel, which is largely embodied in the forms of Moreau’s Beast People. 
Epideictic in Moreau: No “Islands of the Blessed”  
 The best place to begin this study of epideictic in Moreau is Plato’s Menexenus. 
In this dialogue, Socrates, either facetiously or earnestly, remarks on the power of 
Athens’s epideictic orators to alter his perception of self and place and transport him to 
the “Islands of the Blessed” (951).  Prendick does not find the “Islands of Blessed” on 
Moreau’s island, but on this distant shore he is definitely changed at an essential level. 
And in many ways, that is what epideictic is about, essentialism, the belief that people are 
 
139 
 
born with certain characteristics that shape their identity and culture. As Socrates 
suggests, epideictic identifies those traits and praises them. If we dive too deeply into 
humankind’s essence as expressed in late-Victorian horror fiction, however, we risk 
finding something inhuman and unrecognizable. This is the lesson of Prendick’s 
experience and Jekyll’s experience. 
 Studying epideictic in Moreau first requires readers to set aside any expectations 
of a formal speech like a funeral oration. We do not have a Pericles praising the Athenian 
war dead or a Dracula praising his own lineage. What we find instead is Prendick’s 
record of his animalization through the discourse embodied in Moreau’s Beast People. 
Three times readers are told that the Beast People had a “persuasion,” and it is clear that 
he uses the word to mean “influence” rather than a “belief.” Moreau tells Prendick that 
when he first modifies his animals, “they seem to be indisputably human beings. It’s 
afterwards, as I observe them, that the persuasion fades” (228). Prendick writes that as he 
observes the Beast People, he loses his ideas that their bodies are deformed and begins to 
feel that his own body is inadequate: “...at last I even fell in with their persuasion that my 
own long thighs were ungainly” (231).  Later, Prendick writes that he saw the human 
condition in the Beast People: “A strange persuasion came upon me, that, save for the 
grossness of the line, the grotesqueness of the forms, I had here before me the whole 
balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate in its 
simplest form” (241). 
 These suggestions that the Beast People embody some sort of discourse have a 
precedent in Cicero and his observation that bodies have their own language (Da Oratore 
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294). However, they would mean little if Prendick did not undergo such a profound 
change on Moreau’s island.  He is transformed from “a private gentleman” (174) to “an 
animal tormented” (268). At the same time, the Beast People lose all traces of the 
humanity forced on them by Moreau. Significantly, these beings produced by rhetoric 
and cutting also begin to lose the ability to walk upright and the power of speech in yet 
another instance of disarticulation. Prendick recalls their “growing coarseness of 
articulation”: “Can you imagine language, once clear-cut and exact, softening and 
guttering, losing shape and import, becoming mere lumps of sound again?” (262).  
 Even before Prendick’s first contact with the Beast People, his humanity is 
pressured. His story begins when the boat he is traveling on, the Lady Vain, collides at 
sea with another vessel and sinks. He escapes the shipwreck in a dingy with two other 
men. Here, the challenge to Prendick’s humanity begins, as starvation and thirst set in, 
and the men decide to resort to cannibalism in desperation. Prendick initially resists, but 
gives in. The plan ends when the two other men fight and fall overboard (176). Prendick 
drifts in the dingy for an “endless period” before he is rescued from the bloody boat and 
taken aboard the schooner Ipecacuanha. On board the ship, human and animal are housed 
together. There are dogs, a puma, a llama, and rabbits. “Is this an ocean menagerie?” 
Prendick asks (181). Prendick also encounters the first of the Beast People: a deformed 
man with a black face and animal-like features, including glowing eyes. “The thing came 
to me as stark inhumanity,” says Prendick, adding that the face recalled his “forgotten 
childhood horrors” (185-6).  
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Ironically, Prendick’s dehumanization is already under way, and the animal-
human antithesis begins to be erased. To aid in Prendick’s recovery, Montgomery, who is 
delivering the animals to the island, gives Prendick a “dose of scarlet stuff” to drink. “It 
tasted like blood, and made me feel better,” Prendick says (177). Montgomery also serves 
Prendick meat. “I was so excited by the appetizing smell of it,” Prendick says (179). Like 
most humans, Prendick is a carnivore, and he will soon learn the he is not much different 
than the Beast People on Moreau’s dangerous island. Prendick eventually learns that 
Moreau has vivisected one hundred and twenty animals. By the time Prendick arrives on 
the island, about sixty-seven of the experiments are still living in the jungle, their 
instincts somewhat checked by the Law they repeat and the litanies they chant, including 
“Are we not Men?” (215). They are the rhetorical descendants of the Victorian ape-man 
trope. They include an Ape Man, as well as a Hyena-Swine, a Leopard Man, an ape-goat 
Satyr, an Ox Board Man, Bull Men, Swine Folk, Wolf Folk, an Ocelot Man, a Bear-Bull, 
a Saint Bernard Dog Man, and a Vixen Bear Woman. That they embody some type of 
argument is evident when Prendick reflects on them and says, “A strange persuasion 
came upon me that … I had here before me the whole balance of human life in miniature, 
the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form” (241). 
Prendick’s changing attitudes toward the Beast People are markers of his 
dehumanization. At first, he is unnerved by them, a response seen in his reaction to the 
Beast man M’Ling on the schooner. After being driven out of Moreau’s enclosure by the 
Puma’s tortured cries and the “emotional appeal of those yells” (198), Prendick 
encounters the Leopard-Man in the jungle, a “grostesque half-bestial creature” (200). He 
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also describes a small group of Swine Folk that he spies on as “grotesque human figures” 
(201). “Never before had I seen such bestial-looking creatures,” Prendick says (201). He 
observes their behavior as if he is an anthropologist conducting an ethnographic study 
and they are primitive human beings engaged in their customs. They sway and “gibber in 
unison,” circle, wave their arms, and chant “‘Aloola’ or Balola,’ it sounded like” (201). 
He notes their features, including the “abnormal shortness of their legs and their lank 
clumsy feet” (201). Gradually, however, Prendick’s feelings toward the Beast People 
change. For most of the time he spends on the island, he is with them (260). Although he 
never completely loses his aversion for them, he begins to accept them. “At first I had a 
shivering horror of the brutes … but insensibly I became a little habituated to the idea of 
them…” (232). He says he was influenced by Montgomery, who “had been with them so 
long that he had come to regard them almost as normal human beings” (232). But 
Montgomery’s familiarity with the Beast People, and his decision to get drunk with them 
after Moreau’s death, prove fatal for him. Prendick observes that Montgomery is “half 
akin to these Beast Folk” (252). And, when Montgomery, wants to drink with them, 
Prendick says, “‘You’ve made a beast of yourself. To the beasts you may go’” (250). But 
Prendick also expresses sympathy for the Beast People, saying they were at one time 
normal animals but now they have “stumbled in the shackles of humanity” (241), leading 
a “mock-human existence” (242).  
At this point, Prendick has completely rejected the dead Moreau’s defense of his 
project, saying that “my fear of the Beast People went the way of my fear for Moreau” 
(242). After the deaths of Moreau and Montgomery and the destruction of their 
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compound, Prendick has little choice but to go and live among the Beast People in their 
huts. That they live in a ravine, a low point on the island, is symbolic of Prendick’s 
degeneracy. “In this way I became one among the Beast People in the Island of Dr. 
Moreau,” he says (258). Prendick says that this part of his experience is so unpleasant 
that he chooses not to chronicle the majority of it. In what is possibly a reference to 
sexual bestiality, Prendick says that he is horrified at the memory of the “quasi-human 
intimacy” he descended into out of “loneliness” (262). A concern about unrestrained 
sexuality is underscored in the same chapter when Prendick notes that as the Beast People 
lose the traces of humanity that Moreau grafted onto them, the female creatures “began to 
disregard the injunction of decency—deliberately for the most part,” and others 
“attempted public outrages upon the institution of monogamy” (262). 
Prendick is also bestialized when he is stalked like prey; but by the end of the 
novel, he has become a jungle predator and a prolific and remorseless killer of his fellow 
animals. Prendick encounters his first Beast People when he sees M’Ling on board the 
Ipecacuanha, followed by the Bull Men on the beach. But they are largely domesticated 
and under Moreau and Montgomery’s control. Prendick’s first encounter with one of the 
Beast People in the wild is when he meets the Leopard Man in the jungle: “…a man 
going on all fours, like a beast!” Prendick exclaims (199). The Leopard Man apparently 
has just killed an eaten a rabbit, giving in to his instinctual taste for blood and thereby 
breaking the law of Moreau’s jungle. The punishment for such as offense is a return trip 
to the doctor’s “House of Pain,” apparently for torture. Prendick tries unsuccessfully to 
communicate with the Leopard Man, but the monster runs away, only to return later to 
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stalk Prendick. He is in terror at the realization that he is being followed and watched, 
and that he is lost in the jungle. “I listened rigid, and heard nothing but the creep of the 
blood in my ears,” says Prendick (204). He saves himself from the Leopard Man’s final 
charge only by hitting him in the head with a rock. Later in the novel, Prendick flees from 
the enclosure once again, this time afraid that Moreau intends to vivisect him and turn 
him into one of the Beast People’s “Comus rout” (208). As Prendick flees through the 
jungle like an animal, Moreau and Montgomery track him with hounds. It is at this point 
that Prendick first enters the world of the Beast People in their forest settlement. He asks 
them for food. Thinking he has come to live with them, they try to teach him their Law.  
The harmony between Prendick and the Beast People is short-lived, as they 
eventually become his prey. Ironically, he kills his first monster, the Leopard Man, out of 
pity after cornering him and not wanting to see him returned to Moreau’s lab for torture 
(240-1). He has already heard Moreau refer to the Beast People as having “souls” (228). 
And Predick himself has observed that “They talk, build houses, cook. They were men” 
(221). But Prendick’s motives for killing change. The next monster he kills in the jungle 
in defense of himself and others (248). Later, on the beach, when Prendick fires his 
revolver at a group of retreating Beast People, he does so in “excitement” (253) and not 
in defense of himself or others, as Montogmery and M’Ling have already been killed or 
fatally wounded in a drunken riot. Prendick also seizes the moment to try to kill his 
nemesis the Hyena-Swine, but his shot misses (256). This killing in a state of excitement 
and heightened power forecasts Prendick’s stalking of the Hyena-Swine in his jungle lair 
(261). He believes one of them must die. “But I did not mean to die,” Prendick says 
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(263). In this way, Prendick embodies Huxley’s famous observation that “For his 
successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has largely been indebted to those 
qualities which he shares with the ape and the tiger…,” including “his ruthlessness and 
ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition” (“Evolution and 
Ethics” 314).  
Prendick finally has his chance to kill the Hyena-Swine after it attacks and begins 
devouring Prendick’s companion, the Saint Bernard Man. Coming upon the gruesome 
scene, Prendick describes the Hyena-Swine’s “glaring eyes,” “red-stained teeth,” and 
menacing growl. He says, “It was not afraid and not ashamed; the last vestige of the 
human taint had vanished … The brute made no sign of retreat” (264). Prendick could 
just as easily be describing a mirror image of himself. Like the Hyena-Swine, he has a 
figurative thirst for blood, no fear, and no intention of retreating. He describes matter-of-
factly advancing, drawing his pistol, and shooting the charging Hyena-Swine between the 
eyes, killing it in mid-leap (264). After living for months in the jungle and watching the 
Beast People recede from the image of humanity that Moreau forced upon them, Prendick 
has also devolved: “I must have undergone strange changes,” he says, describing the rags 
he wears, his weathered skin, and long, matted hair. He has also developed the eye of the 
beast that he first noticed on board the Ipecacuanha. “I am told that even now my eyes 
have a strange brightness …,” Prendick says (263). One is reminded here of Hawhee’s 
discussion of the flaming eyes of Greek vision and how rhetoric—and more specifically 
epideictic—has given Prendick “an altogether new body” (178). It is a body as hybridized 
as those Moreau created through vivisection and rationalized through rhetoric.  Upon 
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returning to civilization, Prendick learns that society can no more burn the beast out of 
him than Moreau could the animals he vivisected (228). Like Moreau, he learns that the 
old animal traits return, and he sees the “bestial mark” (267) in all of the human faces and 
shapes that surround him. His rhetorical vision thus reshapes their bodies. 
Rhetoric in Jekyll and Hyde 
Wells’s Beast People are the descendants of Stevenson’s Hyde in ways other than 
their hybridized forms. Like the Beast People that succeeded him, Hyde embodies a 
rhetorical discourse about humans’ place in nature and their duality as rational creatures 
and sensual brutes. As monster, Hyde is the locus of the epideictic. The characters who 
meet him are affected at an unconscious level and are unable to explain their disgust with 
him. With his simian characteristics, Hyde is readily identifiable as ape-man, a powerful 
cultural trope that captured the Victorian struggle between religion and science. What 
seems to be missing from Jekyll and Hyde, however, is anything resembling a formal 
oration. There is nothing like the creature appealing to Victor Frankenstein to create a 
mate for him, or Van Helsing trying to prove the existence of vampires, or Moreau 
defending vivisection . In its place is a fragmented discourse mainly interested in ethos, 
which Aristotle called the “personal character of the speaker.” He says that, for a speaker, 
“character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses” 
(2:2155). The discourse takes the form of a third-person narrative focusing on Gabriel 
John Utterson, attorney, and his efforts to determine the nature of the relationship 
between his client Jekyll and his disturbing protégé Hyde. Yet another of the novella’s 
rhetorical interests is the declamation of performative reading, as the mystery of Hyde is 
 
147 
 
ultimately solved by letters left by Jekyll and his rival scientist, Hastie Lanyon. Read by 
Utterson, these letters recreate the men’s presence and figuratively reconstitute their 
bodies, which have been destroyed largely as a result of their rhetorical confrontations 
over science. 
Set against the backdrop of nineteenth-century Darwinism, Jekyll and Hyde’s 
main narrative sets up Utterson as finder of facts, the arbiter of truth, in the matter, while 
it also pits Jekyll and Lanyon against one another as embodiments of the new and old 
science. Although Jekyll may not necessarily be an orator, it is important to remember 
that he is a member of the medico-juridico-scientific establishment and that rhetoric is of 
enormous importance to the members of this community. Moreover, Jekyll is scientist 
involved in a dispute with Lanyon, another scientist. Readers are not told the exact nature 
of the dispute, only that it is significant enough to have caused a rift between two men 
who had known one another for many years. Utterson says to Lanyon, “I suppose ... you 
and I must be the two oldest friends that Henry Jekyll has?” (14). Later, Utterson says to 
Lanyon, “‘We are three very old friends ... we shall not live to make others’” (29). On his 
side, Lanyon says that he had a falling out with Jekyll ten years earlier. He says that 
“‘Henry Jekyll became too fanciful for me. He began to go wrong, wrong in the mind.’” 
He condemns Jekyll’s work as “‘unscientific balderdash’” (14). For his part, Jekyll 
acknowledges that Lanyon is a “‘good fellow’” but calls him a “‘hide-bound pedant’” 
alarmed by what he believes are Jekyll’s “‘scientific heresies.’” He is “‘an ignorant, 
blatant pedant. I was never more disappointed in any man than Lanyon’” (20). Utterson 
believes that there is nothing personal in the dispute between Jekyll and Lanyon. He 
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thinks, “They have only differed on some point of science” (14). However, he regards 
himself as a man of “no scientific passions” (14), and he does not recognize the greater 
significance of the schism between Jekyll and Lanyon as a struggle between the new 
science and the old science. Viewed from this perspective, Hyde as monster is the 
offspring of the new science. He fulfills the prophecy of Adam Sedgwick, Darwin’s 
geology teacher at Cambridge, “who growled that the new sciences coupled in an 
‘unlawful marriage’ and spawned a hideous monster; it would be merciful to crush ‘the 
head of the filthy abortion, and put an end to its crawlings’” (qtd. in Hellman 82). 
Utterson also makes nothing of Lanyon’s remark that Jekyll had gone “‘wrong in the 
mind.’” This proves to be an important error, considering that Jekyll’s inability to 
reconcile his private character and public image contributes to the novella’s main 
conflict. Jekyll’s ethos is fractured even before he creates Hyde. His self is already 
divided. 
Jekyll’s bisected ethos looms large in a novella in which reputation is so valued. 
In the medico-juridico-scientific world depicted in the Jekyll and Hyde, ethos is 
everything. It is a world of homosocial bonds formed in boarding schools, colleges, 
medical facilities, law offices, courtrooms, charity functions, and dinner parties. So 
restrictive are these bonds that they entirely exclude women from the text. Like Moreau, 
Jekyll and Hyde has no major female characters. There are no girlfriends, fiancées, wives, 
mothers, daughters, aunts, or grandmothers to compete for the men’s interest and 
possibly compromise their professional identity and integrity. Indeed, Jekyll and Hyde 
seems deeply troubled by the idea that a man’s private character may be in opposition to 
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his public image. Hyde figures that idea. As Jane Rago argues, Hyde is threatening not 
because he is other, but because of his ties to Jekyll and by extension London’s 
homosocial world: “The professional medico-juridico-scientific world of the text is 
enmeshed in the gentlemanly rituals of authoritative discourse. It is precisely this 
discursive regime that Hyde threatens….” At stake are standards of “deviance and 
normativity” defined by the medico-juridico-scientific establishment (Rago n.pag.).  
Jekyll’s concern with ethos, it can be argued, gives birth to Hyde. He wishes to 
live as two different people, one good and the other bad, and he achieves this dissection 
of character through chemistry. Utterson—who upon Jekyll’s orders revised his will to 
leave all to Hyde—worries about the nature of the relationship between the two men, not 
discovering until the end of the novel that they are the same person. Like his “distant 
kinsman” (8) and walking companion Richard Enfield, Utterson at first believes that 
Hyde must be blackmailing Jekyll over a youthful indiscretion. “He was wild when he 
was young,” thinks Utterson (19). He does not consider the possibility that Hyde may be 
the result of a more recent transgression. After all, Jekyll is a solid member of the 
medico-juridico-scientific caste, with his credentials as a doctor of medicine, civil laws, 
and law. He is also a fellow of the Royal Society (13). Enfield notes that Jekyll is a man 
of “proprieties” (10). His “large handsome face” reflects benignity and virtue (20). And 
he is a popular party “guest and entertainer … known for charities” (29). After Hyde’s 
absconsion, Jekyll also finds religion (29). Jekyll’s ethos is such that when Utterson 
presses him to confirm the suspicion that Hyde is blackmailing him, Jekyll is able to turn 
the tables and get Utterson to promise to shepherd Hyde in the event of Jekyll’s death 
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(20-1). So convinced of Jekyll’s integrity is Utterson that after Hyde kills Carew and 
disappears, he covers up the link between Jekyll and Hyde. He continues to do so even 
when he strongly suspects that Jekyll has forged a letter for Hyde—a letter that lifts 
suspicion from Jekyll and redeems his reputation. “‘Henry Jekyll forge for a murderer!’” 
thinks Utterson (28). And on the final night of the narrative, having found Hyde dead 
from suicide in Jekyll’s home and Jekyll missing and possibly dead, Utterson still has the 
doctor’s servants wait two hours before summoning the police. “‘O, we must be 
careful,’” Utterson says. “‘I foresee that we may yet involve your master in some dire 
catastrophe’” (41). Care for reputation in Jekyll and Hyde apparently trumps personal 
safety and the law. 
Although there is no formal oration in Jekyll and Hyde, an element in the novella 
that suggests a concern for declamation is pedagogical reading. For the purposes of this 
study, pedagogical reading will take two basic forms: imitative reading, in which a 
student listens to and echoes a teacher or more skilled reader; and performative reading, 
in which a speaker reads a famous speech in the persona of the individual who originally 
delivered the speech. Pedagogical reading was central to elocutionist Thomas Sheridan’s 
program for controlling the body through its voice and expressions. The exercise was also 
believed to mold and shape students’ character. It trained students in socially acceptable 
speech and also taught them how to control their emotions, which Sheridan—like other 
rhetors before him—believed would “have powerful, long-term effects on the 
dispositions of students” (Harrington, “Remembering the Body” 80). Dana Harrington 
points out the classical origins of imitative reading in Plato, who praises the study of 
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poetry and the eulogies of great men as crucial to character development. On the other 
hand, Plato believed students should be discouraged from imitating bad men, women, and 
the insane (80-1). Through Socrates, Harrington writes, Plato expressed that imitative 
reading was a way to control the mind and body as well as speech. Socrates asks, “‘Or 
have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle into 
habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and thought?’” (qtd. in 81). Imitative 
reading was intended not only to help students identify with great characters but also to 
absorb their ethics. Harrington points out that Quintilian later presented reading as a 
process that “engaged the entire body,” teaching a student such lessons as when to breath, 
when to pause, how to inflect his voice, and when to speed up or slow down (82). 
Imitation in rhetoric was part of a pedagogical program that, Sharon Crowley explains, 
aimed for “most of Western history” to “produce a citizen-orator, the ‘good man speaking 
well’” who could serve his community when it faced difficult political or legal decisions 
or sing its praises to celebrate its “uniqueness” or boost its “morale.” The focus was to 
produce students who were “highly literate” and “aware of the power and responsibility” 
they held through their mastery of linguistic and discursive skills (318). They were 
expected to participate in their communities and “conduct their lives” well to give them 
an “authoritative voice” in debates over “legal and moral questions” (318-9). The intent, 
therefore, was not just to teach oratory but also to shape and control bodies and lives. 
Crowley repeats a commonplace when she says that this approach to education faded in 
the nineteenth century, when rhetoric as a “coherent discipline” disappeared from 
mainstream Western thought, displaced by the “scientific mode of thought” (320).  
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Pedagogical reading shapes the narrative of Jekyll and Hyde after Utterson comes 
into possession of two letters, one from Jekyll and the other from Lanyon. The letters 
promise to solve the mystery at the heart of the novella, but he is sworn to open and read 
the letters only after both men have died. Simply reading the letters, however, is not 
sufficient. He has to read them correctly. Therefore, he is instructed in Jekyll’s note to 
“‘first read the narrative which Lanyon warned me he was to place in your hands; and if 
you care to read more, turn to the confession’” of Jekyll (41). Moreover, Utterson does 
not read the letters in front of Jekyll’s servants. Instead, he goes to his office to read them 
alone, thereby perpetuating the secrecy so crucial to constructing and maintaining the 
ethos of his professional class. Utterson’s act of reading the letters shifts the novella from 
third-person to first-person. While multiple viewpoints are used in other novels included 
in this study, the shift in Jekyll and Hyde is especially meaningful considering the pattern 
of transformations in the novella. Both Lanyon and Jekyll undergo physical 
transformations that lead to death. Having lost control of his drug-induced 
transformations, Jekyll is trapped in the grotesque body of Hyde, where he dies by 
suicide. Likewise, readers never see Utterson again after his readings of Lanyon’s and 
Jekyll’s letters. The novella ends with Jekyll’s confession. It does not pivot back to the 
third-person narrator that shadowed Utterson for the first two-thirds of the book. Readers 
are not shown the aftermath of the case and its effects on Utterson. The act of reading in 
the novella is so profound that it wholly consumes Utterson’s character. He seemingly 
dissolves in the final instance of disarticulation in the text. And, just as Utterson recovers 
the textualized bodies of Lanyon and Hyde by reading their letters, the third-person 
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narrator recovers Utterson’s textualized body by the telling the tale.  The loss of the third-
person narrative makes Jekyll and Hyde similar to Frankenstein, which seems complete 
but is actually missing a crucial corner of its frame: Margaret Saville, Walton’s sister and 
the recipient of his letters containing not only Frankenstein’s fantastical and tragic story 
but also Walton’s account of meeting the creature. How does Saville react to the 
narrative? How does reading it affect her? Hers is perhaps the most significant absence in 
English literature.  
 What happens to Utterson one can only speculate. But it is clear that contact with 
Hyde is destructive to the body. It is disarticulating. Both Jekyll and Lanyon suffer 
physical decline leading up to their deaths. Lanyon is first described as a “hearty, healthy 
dapper, red-faced gentleman, with a shock of hair prematurely white, and a boisterous 
and decided manner” (13). He is “theatrical,” and he bounds out of his chair to greet 
Utterson (13). Lanyon is later described as having undergone “swift physical decay.” He 
is said to have his “death warrant written legibly upon his face. The rosy man had grown 
pale: his flesh had fallen away” (29). Lanyon’s body seems to be dissolving, and a week 
later he is dead (30). Likewise, Jekyll is described as “deathly sick” and greeting Utterson 
with a “cold hand” (25), whereas before it “was large, firm, white and comely” (54). The 
lawyer says he believes Jekyll is “seized with one of those maladies that both torture and 
deform the sufferer” (36). 
In reading Lanyon’s and Jekyll’s letters, Utterson assumes their personas. Most 
importantly, their written words reconstitute Jekyll’s body.  As Lanyon writes after 
witnessing Hyde’s transformation, “‘…there before my eyes—pale and shaken, and half 
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fainting, and groping before him with his hands, like a man restored from death—there 
stood Henry Jekyll!’” (47). Stevenson makes similar moves in “The Body-Snatcher.” At 
his surprise reunion with Macfarlane, Fettes is like a “man ... risen from the grave” (203). 
More frightening is the resurrection of Gray’s slain body after its mutilation. Like 
Lanyon, the body-snatchers Fettes and MacFarlane are shocked that the body that they 
have just stolen from a country graveyard turns out not to be the woman they thought but 
Gray, whom Macfarlane had presumably murdered and then sold to an anatomist to cover 
up the crime. Macfarlane even helps orchestrate the dissection of Gray’s body by his 
classmates, including cutting off the head and giving it to a student with a special interest. 
In life, Gray had been a monstrous character. He had played the tyrant, insulting and 
controlling his acquaintance Macfarlane. “He issued order like the Great Bashaw,” or 
Pasha, says the narrator (211). He was also a glutton and drunkard, “coarse, vulgar, and 
stupid” (211). After a night of dissipation, Fettes is astonished when Macfarlane brings in 
Gray’s transgressing body to the anatomist the following morning: “To see, fixed in the 
rigidity of death and naked … the man whom he had left well clad and full of meat and 
sin upon the threshold of a tavern, awoke … the terrors of conscience” (212-213). 
Another parallel between “The Body-Snatcher” and Jekyll and Hyde is that of a body 
undergoing a metaphysical transformation. When Fettes and Macfarlane snatch the body 
of the farmer’s wife from its dark grave near the end of the story, they are certain it is a 
woman, based on its size and contours within the sack that conceal it. But its size and 
shape change as they travel through the countryside: “… some nameless change had 
befallen the dead body…,” the narrator says. Silent and hidden in a sack, the body 
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nevertheless addresses them through its form: “A nameless dread was swathed, like a wet 
sheet, about the body … a fear that was meaningless, a horror of what could not be, kept 
mounting to his brain” (221). When Fettes and Macfarlane pull back the covering they 
find “the body of the dead and long-dissected Gray” (221). 
The transforming corpse in the denouement of “The Body-Snatcher” affects 
Fettes and Macfarlane in much the same way that Hyde affects the other characters in 
Jekyll and Hyde. The terror they inspire lies partly in their alteration from something 
knowable and familiar to something strange and inexplicable. In this way, the bodies 
“speak” without uttering a word. Hyde’s altered body figures prominently in the 
statements of both Lanyon and Jekyll. Lanyon’s greatest concern is controlling Hyde, 
who is a terrifying curiosity to him.  Reflecting on his meeting with Hyde, which Jekyll 
has arranged to obtain chemicals to create his potion, Lanyon notes his small size, 
disturbing visage, and his clothes of “‘rich and sober fabric’” that were “‘enormously too 
large for him’” (45). Hyde’s grotesque body and his more refined clothing and manner of 
speech are incongruous. Lanyon wonders about the “‘man’s nature and character’” as 
well as “‘his origins, his life, his fortune and status in the world’” (45). He describes 
Hyde’s impatient manner. “‘My visitor was … on fire with somber excitement,’” Lanyon 
notes, adding later that Hyde was “‘wrestling against … hysteria’” (45). When Hyde 
touches Lanyon on the arm to shake him, Lanyon feels an “‘icy pang’” and pushes him 
away. He also attempts to exercise control over Hyde by inviting him to sit down, and 
then showing him how to do it properly. Hyde’s excitement grows as he finally obtains 
the ingredients for the potion. Lanyon’s descriptions hint at Hyde’s lack of self-control: 
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“‘I could hear his teeth grate with the convulsive action of his jaws; and his face was so 
ghastly to see that I grew alarmed both for his life and reason.’” He urges Hyde to 
“Compose yourself” (46). Lanyon’s ultimate effort to control Hyde is to affect scientific 
detachment and observe the effects of his potion, which distorts and alters his body: 
“…his face became suddenly black and the features seemed to melt and alter…” (47). 
The horror of gazing on Hyde’s transformation not only disrupts the scientific pose 
Lanyon has assumed, but it also alters his own body. “My life has been shaken to its 
roots…” (47). Honoring Hyde’s request, Lanyon views the change from the standpoint of 
a medical professional. Therefore, he is oath-bound not to reveal what he sees (46). From 
Hyde’s perspective, Lanyon’s desire to gaze upon him is the result of “‘greed’” (46). 
Hyde warns Lanyon about the horror of what he will witness, saying it will “‘stagger the 
unbelief of Satan’” (46). But Hyde also promises Lanyon “‘a new knowledge and new 
avenues to fame and power’” (46) and an opportunity to liberate himself from his 
“‘narrow and material views’” through the “‘virtue of transcendental medicine’” (47). 
The rhetoric here is Faustian, with Hyde offering Lanyon—the highly regarded 
professional who has seemingly reached the pinnacle and limit of materialistic 
knowledge—the chance to enshrine the body through occult experience. However, 
Lanyon’s encounter with the monstrous Hyde’s embodied rhetoric is disarticulating, 
destroying his body and silencing his voice. Again we see an example of rhetorical vision 
creating a new body in what Hawhee calls “epideictic agonism” (177). She cites Martin 
Jay’s observation that Greek vision “entailed ‘…a potential intertwining of viewer and 
viewed’” (qtd. in 178).  
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Jekyll’s statement is also characterized by its numerous references to the body. 
Previously noted were his discoveries of the incorporeality of the body (49). However, 
these observations conflict with the physicality of his own body and Hyde’s. Jekyll 
begins his statement with his birth, the moment his body appears. His chief fault, he says, 
was the hidden pleasure he took in the flesh (47-8). Jekyll also describes the creation of 
Hyde’s body after he consumes his potion, which, Lanyon says in his narrative, has an 
ingredient which resembles blood (43). Jekyll’s transformation into Hyde is marked by 
the “‘most racking pangs’” and a “‘grinding in the bones, deadly nausea, and a horror … 
that cannot be exceeded at the hour of birth or death.’” But Jekyll is fascinated by the 
body the process creates: it is “‘younger, lighter, happier.’”; filled with “‘sensual 
images’”; “‘wicked’”; and smaller than his own (50). He undergoes the same torture to 
reverse the transformation (51). In Hyde’s body, Jekyll can enjoy “‘pleasures’” which are 
“‘undignified’” and eventually “‘monstrous’” (53). He notes that Hyde takes “‘pleasure 
with bestial avidity from any degree of torture to another.’” He is “‘relentless like a man 
of stone’” (53). Jekyll says he deals with Hyde’s acts by dissociating himself from his 
doppelgänger and by making amends where possible (53). This approach is no longer 
possible as Jekyll loses control of his transformations and becomes trapped in Hyde’s 
body: “…I was slowly losing control of my better self, and slowly incorporated with my 
second self” (55). Moreover, the two are never really separate entities, as indicated by 
Jekyll’s consistent use of the first-person in his statement. He and Hyde share a body and 
a consciousness that are simply reshaped into two identities. 
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Epideictic: “The Dark Influence of Hyde” 
 While the rhetorical concerns of ethos and imitative reading factor prominently in 
Jekyll and Hyde, the most intriguing is epideictic. The locus of the epideictic is the 
monster, Hyde, whose grotesque body causes a reaction deeper than fear in other 
characters. He also brings about their transformation, soul and body. Other details that 
point toward Hyde as epideictic are the sub-rational space he occupies in characters’ 
consciousness and his link to human origins in prehistory. As an ape-man, an 
evolutionary throwback, Hyde was a powerful symbol within Victorian culture as it 
struggled to understand human origins and their implications for social order. 
  As in Moreau, there is no ceremonial oration in Jekyll and Hyde that can be easily 
identified as epideictic. A “funeral oration” is mentioned, but the term is used in a 
figurative sense to describe the barking of newsboys as they try to sell papers bearing 
headlines of Carew’s bludgeoning death (27). Locating the epideictic in Jekyll and Hyde 
requires readers to look first for its effects and then trace them back to their source. And 
the source in the novella clearly is Edward Hyde. One of the early indications of Hyde as 
epideictic is his appearance in Utterson’s subconscious.  Utterson begins to dream about 
Hyde before he ever meets him, having been told about Hyde by Enfield.  Utterson is 
anxious over Hyde’s association with Jekyll, but also over descriptions of Hyde’s 
unsettling appearance and his amoral conduct in trampling a small child which Enfield 
witnessed. “‘… it was hellish to see,’” Enfield says (9). The report affects Utterson 
deeply, transforming him into a hunter who intrepidly stalks Hyde through London’s 
nocturnal streets. “If he could but once set eyes on him, he thought the mystery would 
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lighten and perhaps roll altogether away, as was the habit of mysterious things when well 
examined,” the narrator states (15). At this point, Hyde has invaded Utterson’s 
unconscious. Enfield’s words become “a scroll of lighted pictures” in Utterson’s dreams, 
where he see Hyde run over the child, stand menacingly by the bed of the sleeping Jekyll, 
and then “glide” through the city’s “sleeping houses” to “crush” other children (14-15). 
Prendick expresses a similar irrationality in Moreau when he says that glancing into the 
eyes of one of the Beast People “struck down all of my adult thoughts and feelings, and 
for a moment the forgotten horrors of childhood came back to my mind” (186).  
Like epideictic, Hyde is difficult to define. Characters struggle to describe his 
appearance. Words also fail them when they try to relate the feelings that Hyde inspires 
in them. Although Utterson prowls the streets of London after dark, there is no mention 
of fear in him until he finally meets Hyde. Hyde had already been described for Utterson 
as a deformed man who inspires fear and loathing in the people he meets. In one account, 
Hyde causes a doctor to “‘turn sick and white with the desire to kill him’” (9). Hyde has a 
“‘black, sneering coolness … really like Satan.’”  He is a “‘damnable man’” (10). 
However, witnesses have a difficult time explaining Hyde’s exact deformity and what 
seems so disturbing about him. Enfield says: 
 
He is not easy to describe. There is something wrong with his appearance; 
something displeasing, something downright detestable. I never saw a man I so 
disliked, and yet I scarce know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives 
the strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn’t specify the point. He is an 
extraordinary looking man. (11-2) 
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When Utterson finally meets Hyde, he startles him, and Hyde hisses at him like an 
animal. The narrator describes Hyde as “pale and dwarfish,” giving “an impression of 
deformity without any nameable malformation.” After parting with Hyde, Utterson says 
to himself, “‘God bless me, the man seems hardly human! Something troglodytic, shall 
we say? … or is it the mere radiance of a foul soul that thus transpires through, and 
transfigures its clay continent?’” Continuing, Utterson exclaims in an apostrophe to 
Jekyll, “‘…if I ever read Satan’s signature upon a face, it is on that of your friend’” (17). 
In his narrative, Lanyon describes Hyde as small, “‘with something abnormal and 
misbegotten in the very essence of the creature … something seizing, surprising, and 
revolting ….’” (45). Poole, Jekyll’s servant, says that glancing at Hyde’s face makes the 
hair stand up on his head (36), and when he sees Hyde leaping in the laboratory,  “‘it 
went down my spine like ice’” (37). Jekyll, in his final statement, attributes Hyde’s small 
stature to the idea that his evil side was less developed, having been held in check for 
years by “‘effort, virtue and control’” (51). He is also younger than Jekyll, and he has evil 
“‘written broadly and plainly on’” his “‘face.’” His body is marked by “‘deformity and 
decay’” (51).  
 Exactly why Hyde inspires such disgust is left open to speculation. Jekyll suggests 
one possibility when he says that Hyde is the only being who is “‘pure evil’” (51). The 
possibility that Hyde is a supernatural entity summoned by Jekyll is suggested by his 
confession that his “‘scientific studies’” tended more “‘towards the mystic and the 
transcendental’” (48). Yet another interpretation is that as a hybrid commingling human 
and ape characteristics, he is abhuman. Kelly Hurley writes that the abhuman is a 
 
161 
 
commonplace in fin-de-siècle Gothic fiction. She defines it as “a not-quite-human 
subject, characterized by its morphic variability, continually in danger of not-itself, 
becoming other” (3-4). Mikhail Bakhtin also recognizes this grotesque potential:  “…man 
receives the birth seeds of every form of life. He may choose the seed that will develop 
and bear fruit. He grows and forms it in himself. Man can become a plant or an animal, 
but he can also become an angel and a son of God” (364). Hurley writes that contact with 
the abhuman undermines human sense of self, leading to “anxiety often nauseating in its 
intensity” (4).  Hyde most certainly qualifies as abhuman. Thinking of Hyde’s face, 
Utterson experiences “a nausea and distaste of life” (18). Part of the horror of the novella 
is Jekyll’s awareness that he is transitioning fully into Hyde and can do nothing about it 
except end his life. Hyde, however, carries far greater meaning than many other 
abhumans in late-Victorian Gothic fiction in that he is a symbol of human evolution. Like 
Lanyon’s description of Hyde as a “‘creature,’” Utterson’s observation that Hyde 
resembles a caveman, a human ancestor, and Hyde’s later clubbing of Carew with a 
“heavy cane” (21) are all significant.  The inexpressible deformity that Hyde exudes and 
the disgust he inspires can be traced to the idea that he is a human-ape hybrid. He is man, 
devolved both physically and morally. Contrary to the comparisons to Satan, Hyde is no 
angel, not even a fallen one, for he was not created by God. Like man in the Darwinian 
universe, Hyde is the product of natural selection. He is “savage” intermediary with the 
potential to become fully human. In a nod to Victorian sensibilities, Stevenson does not 
disclose the atrocities Hyde commits during his nocturnal ramblings, but there is little 
doubt that he is immoral and animalistic. As a fugitive, Hyde is exposed: “Much of his 
 
162 
 
past was unearthed, indeed, and all disreputable: tales came out of the man’s cruelty, at 
once so callous and violent, of his vile life, of his strange associates, of the hatred that 
seemed to have surrounded his career” (28). It is not until Carew’s murder that Hyde is 
described as inhuman. Unprovoked, he attacks the defenseless Carew with “ape-like 
fury” (22). Poole, Jekyll’s butler, tells Utterson that Hyde is a “‘masked thing like a 
monkey’” (37). In his statement, Jekyll describes Hyde’s ape-like hands: They are “‘lean, 
corded, knuckly, of a dusky pallor and thickly shaded with a swarth growth of hair’” (54). 
Again, Jekyll says that Hyde’s hands are “‘corded and hairy’” (58). Considering Hyde’s 
unnatural birth, it is significant that he destroys a picture of Jekyll’s father and, 
symbolically, Jekyll’s parentage. He accuses Hyde of other “‘ape-like tricks,’” such as 
defacing his books and burning his letters (61). Jekyll describes Hyde as the “animal 
within me licking the chops of memory” (58). He also imagines the “‘inorganic’” Hyde’s 
spontaneous generation from the “‘slime of the pit’” to become “‘dust’” that 
“‘gesticulated and sinned’” (60). 
 Foregrounding Hyde’s simian aspects is crucial to understanding his epideictic and, 
indeed, his full rhetorical dimensions. These details about his appearance and behavior 
link him to the powerful Victorian symbol of the ape-man and the divisive debate it 
represented over man’s origins, the relationship of science and religion, and the body and 
spirit. As Victorian ape-man, Hyde is the progenitor of Wells’ Ape-Man, with whom 
Prendick feels an early connection. “I did not feel the same repugnance towards this 
creature that I had experienced in my encounters with the other Beast Men,” Prendick 
says (210). The Ape Man points out that they share basically the same hands: they both 
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have five fingers, whereas many of the other Beast People have “malformed hands” 
(210). Both Stevenson and Wells were influenced by the debate over evolution, and each 
man had his own special connection to it. A student in one of Huxley’s training schools 
for teachers before flunking out, Wells prided himself on his knowledge of science. He 
was stung by biologist Peter Chalmers Mitchell’s criticism in the pages of Saturday 
Review that the science of Moreau was unsound (Bergonzi 25).  Wells, who had studied 
science for a year under Huxley, replied to Mitchell many months later by writing a letter 
to the Saturday Review in which he cited a recent article in The British Medical Journal 
reporting on the successful grafting of nerve tissue from a rabbit to a man. Clearly, Wells 
took Mitchell’s review seriously, and the fact that Mitchell’s opinion was repeated in 
other publications made it even worse. He writes that Mitchell’s opinion “was to my 
discredit” and an “implication of headlong ignorance.” Wells questions the authority on 
which Mitchell based his opinion, stating “that he was making the rash assertion and not 
I.” He goes on to state that he was “unable to replace the stigma of ignorance” that 
Mitchell had given him until he found the evidence he needed, the published report in 
The British Medical Journal (Letter, 5 Nov. 1896).  
 Like Wells, Stevenson had more than a gentleman’s interest in science. In her 2006 
book Robert Louis Stevenson, Science, and the Fin de Siècle, Julia Reid writes that few 
scholars have fully recognized Stevenson’s scientific credentials nor the extent of his 
engagement with science, particularly in the 1880s when he wrote Jekyll and Hyde. Reid 
points out that Stevenson studied engineering at Edinburgh University, where his 
interests included the construction of lighthouses (4). In 1871, however, Stevenson gave 
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up engineering, partly due to his interest in evolutionary science and ethics. Years later, 
he would describe his 1887 essay “Pulvis et Umbra” as a “‘Darwinian Sermon’” (4). Reid 
writes that Stevenson had “lost his faith as a young man following his exposure to 
Herbert Spencer’s scientific naturalism” (4). Spencer, a philosopher, also developed a 
theory of evolution and used the expression “survival of the fittest” in 1852, years before 
Darwin (Altick 232). Stevenson’s interest grew in the 1880s, when he traveled in the 
South Pacific and frustrated his wife with his Darwin-inspired efforts to write 
scientifically about the natives and languages of the South Sea islanders (Reid 1-2). 
Fanny Stevenson felt her husband’s time would have been better spent writing adventure 
stories. Reid writes that Fanny Stevenson had more confidence in her husband’s literary 
genius and ridiculed his interest in science (2). Reid points out that Stevenson resisted the 
efforts of Huxley on the one hand and Matthew Arnold on the other to separate science 
and humanism (2). According to Reid, Stevenson is representative of  the idea 
popularized by Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
“that science is a product of culture rather than simply a transcription of nature …” (3). 
Reid writes that the nineteenth century is a particularly valuable period for the study of 
the discourse between science and literature (3). And, she argues, “Stevenson and the 
evolutionary scientists were engaged in a creative dialogue—one marked by dissonance 
as well as consonance” (6). 
As part of that dialogue, the Victorian ape-man trope achieved perhaps his highest 
profile in the great Oxford evolution debate. One point that must be made about this key 
moment in dialectic between science and religion was that it was not actually a “debate”: 
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it was a discussion period following a presentation at the thirtieth annual meeting of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science at Oxford University in June 1860. 
And the discussion period became an occasion for rhetorical performances by the men 
remembered as the primary antagonists: Samuel Wilberforce, the eloquent bishop of 
Oxford, and Huxley, Darwin’s “bulldog” and chief apologist. The enduring narrative of 
that debate has revolved around these two legendary orators dueling over the theory of 
evolution before a packed audience of about seven hundred. At some point in the debate, 
Wilberforce supposedly asked Huxley whether he was descended from apes on his 
mother or father’s side, implying that Huxely was part ape. By popular but perhaps 
apocryphal account, Huxley later stood to deliver his famous retort, that he would rather 
be descended from apes than from a man who used his god-given talents in the service of 
ignorance. 
One problem with this scene is that it probably did not happen quite that way. In 
the wake of a 1978 BBC series about Darwin that cast Wilberforce as the villain in a 
Victorian melodrama, several historians revisited the Oxford debate and came to similar 
conclusions: the story of the debate that has been handed down through the generations 
has been embellished to some degree, making Huxley seem the triumphant hero. In 
attempting to analyze the Oxford debate, one faces the challenge of scrutinizing a 
dialogue for which no transcript exists. No one knew that a debate would take place, and 
no one had the foresight to make an official recording of what was said at the meeting. 
Researchers must instead collect scattered, incomplete, and biased accounts to assemble 
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what seem to be plausible narratives, and then analyze those narratives with the 
qualification that they are most likely inaccurate.   
It is uncertain if Wilberforce and Huxely said exactly what has been attributed to 
them. One of the earliest sources for the popular legend of the debate declaring Huxley’s 
victory is a Macmillan’s Magazine article from 1898, thirty-eight years after the 
encounter (Lucas 313). Journalists were present at the debate, but their accounts are 
inconsistent. There was a single mention in The Press of Wilberforce’s “monkey” 
comments (166). As for Huxley, The Press simply reported that he took Wilberforce to 
task for making an inappropriate joke (168). Also missing from the accounts of two of the 
journalists who covered the proceedings for The Athenaeum and Jackson’s Oxford 
Journal is Huxley’s withering response to Wilberforce (315). 
If Wilberforce made some remark during the Oxford debate about the human-ape 
lineage, and it seems likely that he did, he would have been invoking a common but 
powerful tropological argument in the nineteenth-century debate surrounding evolution. 
Ian Hesketh writes, “Connecting Darwin’s theory of evolution with the image of simian 
ancestry was a widespread strategy among anti-Darwinians because it challenged the 
respectability of evolution itself” (96). As common as the trope was, it was still 
considered vulgar and out of place in a genteel setting like the Oxford meeting. If 
Wilberforce crossed the line of gentility and used the trope in connection with Huxley’s 
grandmother, it would help explain the tumult that some observers described in the 
audience that day.  According to a number of observers, a lady fainted in the audience 
during the famous exchange between Wilberforce and Huxley. Lucas refers to 
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Wilberforce’s fallacy as an “ad feminam” (329). Hesketh cites Frederic William Farrar, 
Bishop of Durham, who recalled that while he believed the scientific issue at the heart of 
the debate had been a draw, Huxley scored a victory of “‘good manners.’” Wilberforce, 
Farrar said, “‘had forgotten to behave like a gentleman’” (qtd. in 84). Writing to Huxley’s 
son and biographer, Leonard Huxley, Farrar said, “‘You must remember that the whole 
audience was made up of gentlefolk, who were not prepared to endorse anything vulgar’” 
(qtd. in 96). By questioning if Huxley was descended from apes through his grandmother, 
Wilberforce was suggesting that Huxley’s grandmother had sex with an ape. Speaking to 
the general use of the ape-man trope in Victorian discourse, Hesketh writes that they may 
have been humorous, but they were considered “vulgar.” Not only did it appear to 
“debase humanity itself,” but it also implied that such a creature was not produced via 
evolution but via sexual relations between humans and apes” (96). Hesketh cites a 
“sexualized cartoon” in an 1873 issue of Punch. In the cartoon, two gentlemen are 
discussing evolution when one cracks a joke about the other’s great-grandmother having 
sex with an ape. In her article “Darwin in Caricature: A Study in the Popular 
Dissemination of Evolution,” Janet Browne also explores how “Darwin’s work became 
part of the richly varied world of nineteenth-century popular culture” (497). Namely, she 
studies cartoons depicting Darwin as an ape and reflecting the general influence of his 
work.6 Significantly, one of these cartoons appeared the month before the Oxford debate. 
A May 1860 issue of Punch featured a drawing of a gorilla and the caption “Am I a Man 
                                                          
6 See figure 2. 
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and a Brother?” (Browne, “Darwin in Caricature” 500). Aside from its inspiration in On 
the Origin of Species, the cartoon would have been a gibe at Darwin on another level: He 
was an ardent abolitionist, and the same question appeared on a famous medallion that 
Darwin’s uncle, Josiah Wedgwood, created in the 1830s with a depiction of an 
importuning African slave with raised hands.  In a cartoon from 1861 that seems even 
more of a precedent for Hyde, a gorilla in a tuxedo presents himself for entry into a 
dinner party. The servant who greets him is so horrified that his hair stands up on his 
head. The servant announces the newly-arrived guest as, “Mr. G-G-G-O-O-O-RILLA!”7 
Commenting on these cartoons, Browne writes that they drew “on age-old themes of 
metamorphosis and the beast that invariably resides in mankind” and “created a 
genuinely alternative way of commenting on the implications of Darwin’s theory” (501). 
The same could be said of Jekyll and Hyde and Moreau.   
It is interesting to read both Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde alongside the popular 
account of the Oxford meeting and speculate that the same cultural forces were at work in 
shaping all three narratives. In this analysis, the Oxford “debate” is a literary production 
that can be analyzed as a work of historical fiction with elements of a fin-de-siècle horror 
story. It incorporates rhetorical themes, including a shocking animal-human hybrid whose 
very existence questions human origins; it aggravates the antagonism between science 
and religion; and it strains the relationship of body and spirit. Among the scattered 
accounts of the meeting, one can even find evidence of disarticulation. Supposedly, as 
                                                          
7 See figure 3. 
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Wilberforce was about to yield the floor, he said he expected that Huxley would soon rise 
and “tear” him “to pieces” (Jensen 176). The presence of these elements in a semi-
apocryphal narrative of the Oxford meeting lends support to Vincent Bevilacqua’s 
proposal that “historically there has been a wider and more pervasive reliance on the 
verbal and conceptual idiom of rhetoric” in the arts, including literature (343). The locus 
of the epideictic in the Oxford narrative is the figure of the ape-man, which registered at a 
deeper level with audiences than the rational for-and-against arguments that were made 
that day not just by Wilberforce and Huxley but by other speakers as well. The semi-
mythical version of the meeting as a debate between Wilberforce and Huxley has 
persisted, resisting the efforts of historians to introduce factual complexity into the 
narrative. If students are introduced to the Oxford story at all, they are most likely 
presented with the semi-apocryphal version and then, perhaps, the historical. Therefore, 
an awareness develops that what is being displayed in the popular narrative is not entirely 
accurate. This sets up the twin strands of discourse and metadiscourse described by 
Richard Lockwood as characterizing the epideictic. At the center of this relationship is 
the reader—not an “objective historical reader” but a reader constructed by the reflexive 
epideictic text. The “epideictic … pays much attention to reflecting on its own speaking,” 
Lockwood writes (25). The reader’s role is not to choose between the two discourses, but 
to be altered by them. “It is because being offered that choice transforms the reader,” 
Lockwood writes. The “reader’s position must be seen as itself dynamic, unstable, 
transformed, and transforming by the utterance, and not simply by mutation into two 
separate stable poles” (27). In this reading, the apocryphal Oxford debate is tolerated 
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because it meets some emotional and rhetorical need of the audience. As an example, 
Lockwood cites the “tremendous investment adults have in developing and preserving the 
idyllic illusion” of Santa Claus. It is obvious that the “illusion exists not for the children 
alone, but for” the parents “as well” (28). The apocryphal Oxford debate emerged 
because it eliminated the gray areas in a complex dialectic. It spares students from the 
inconvenient facts of churchmen like Wilberforce, an amateur ornithologist who 
challenged Darwinism on its own terms (Lucas 317), practicing science; and Huxley and 
his followers waging class warfare against elitist universities that they believed had 
excluded them due to their social origins (Jensen 175). The “history” of the debate did 
not begin to take shape for a generation or two after it ended. One of the first times it 
appeared was in a Macmillan’s Magazine article from 1898, thirty-eight years after the 
encounter (Lucas 313). By that time, however, Huxley and his allies had prevailed in the 
larger cultural war ignited by Darwin’s theories. The epideictic of the semi-apocryphal 
narrative they promoted celebrated their triumph. 
This study does not seek to overturn theories that present science’s displacement 
of religion as the root cause of literary monstrosities in nineteenth-century horror fiction, 
as some critics argue. Instead, the focus is on the use of common rhetorical patterns to 
fashion literary monstrosities and how those monstrosities are linked to greater cultural 
concerns about the objectification of the body as symbol, resource, and medium. This 
chapter has aimed to advance readers understanding of these claims in a number of ways. 
Although Jekyll and Hyde was published first, I have examined Moreau first in the hopes 
that the books’ shared themes could be studied in greater relief in the earlier, more 
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obscure text. The central rhetorical performance in Moreau is Moreau’s declamation to 
Prendick explaining and defending his animal vivisection project. Less clear is the 
presence of epideictic, which emanates from Moreau’s monstrous Beast People and 
transforms Prendick.  He regresses to man at an earlier stage of evolution. Disarticulation 
occurs in the novel with the death of Moreau, who is killed by one of his monstrosities, 
partially dismembered, and silenced. Although Jekyll and Hyde seems fragmented 
compared to Moreau, it incorporates many of the same rhetorical elements. First, Jekyll 
and Hyde focuses on a male professional class whose members are formed and promoted 
by rhetorical education and performance. They owe their existence and status to rhetoric. 
Their foremost concern is for ethos, or reputation. Second, the text depicts a rhetorical 
struggle taking place in the field of science between Jekyll and Lanyon, which mirrors 
the struggle taking place between old and new science in the late Victorian period. Third, 
epideictic also plays a significant role in Jekyll and Hyde, and it centers on the 
monstrous, hybridized body of Edward Hyde. The character most deeply affected by 
Hyde’s epideictic is Utterson, who is primitivized into a nocturnal hunter bent on 
defending his medico-juridico-scientific clan by tracking and exposing Hyde. 
Disarticulation occurs in the novel with the dissolution of Utterson’s character and the 
loss of his voice in the shift from third-person to first-person narration. This leads to 
novella’s main rhetorical performance: Jekyll’s posthumous confession, which must be 
brought to life through the declamatory exercise of performative reading. In this way, 
Jekyll’s transgressing body is reconstituted after its ruin. The overarching concern of both 
books is dissection and vivisection, activities which sought to enlarge medical science but 
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whose coercive methods inspired horror and controversy throughout the nineteenth-
century. While vivisection is clearly part of the premise of Moreau, it must be inferred in 
Jekyll and Hyde. It occurs when Jekyll vivisects himself not with a blade, but with 
chemicals. The animal-human boundary is depicted in both books, but it is largely erased 
through Darwinian gradatio and the figure of the ape-man, a familiar trope which 
reduced the complexities of evolutionary theory ad absurdum. Although Stevenson and 
Wells were not scientists, they both had backgrounds and avid interests in science. 
Ultimately, their achievements in Jekyll and Hyde and Moreau were as popularizers of 
science who linked debates about humanity’s origins and divided nature to cultural 
concerns about dissection and vivisection through rhetorical patterns common to other 
works of horror fiction in the late nineteenth century.  
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Figure 2. 1871 Editorial Cartoon Showing Darwin as Ape (“File: Editorial Cartoon 
Depicting”). 
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Figure 3. “Mr. Gorilla” Goes to a Party in 1861 Cartoon (“The Lion”).
 
175 
 
CHAPTER VI 
THE AESTHETICIZATION OF THE CORPSE IN DORIAN GRAY 
 
 
Oscar Wilde wrote his last book from beyond the grave. As absurd as this 
statement seems, it was the subject of serious debate in 1924 in the pages of Occult 
Review journal between Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who argued for the legitimacy of a 
spiritualist’s claim to have used “automatic writing” to channel Wilde’s ghost into the 
book Oscar Wilde from Purgatory: Psychic Messages, and C.W. Soal, who argued that 
the book was a hoax (Gomel, “Oscar Wilde” 74). Soal was almost certainly correct; but 
Doyle’s willingness to believe that Wilde continued writing after his death in 1900 is 
perhaps understandable considering the nature of the monstrosity constructed in his novel 
The Picture of Dorian Gray: the living corpse.  
While Dorian Gray may seem intrinsically different than the other works 
examined in this study, it traffics in the same themes. Indeed, Wilde’s novel may contain 
the finest expression of disarticulation in late-Victorian horror fiction, based on its 
concern with the manipulative nature of rhetoric and the destruction of the body. One 
could even argue that, in Dorian, Wilde handed his fellow Irishman, longtime friend, and 
rival Bram Stoker a virtual blueprint for the character of Dracula as living corpse. Like 
Dracula, both Dorian Gray and “The Canterville Ghost” have clear rhetorical and bodily 
concerns, and, along with Wilde’s drama Salome, they reflect long-practiced legal
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 traditions related to disciplining, dismembering and vivisecting transgressing bodies. But 
the significance of Wilde’s work—what sets it apart from the other literature examined in 
this study—is its depiction of the aestheticization of corrupt bodies. Like the other 
monstrosities considered in this study, Dorian is a hybrid clearly fashioned by rhetoric—
not a hybrid of human and animal but a hybrid of human and art. He is a Paterian 
monstrosity: undead and immoral, with no purpose other than pleasure. Although, as 
monster, Dorian is also involved in an epideictic performance that transforms other 
characters; however, the primary rhetorician in the novel is Sir Henry Wotton. The 
rhetoric of both characters is quite clearly Platonic, with Henry’s metaphorized as 
vivisection and Dorian’s involving an actual blade.  The cutting of the body is a 
fundamental image in The Picture of Dorian Gray as well as Salome and “The 
Canterville Ghost.” The main interest here, though, is the aestheticization of the body in 
Wilde’s writing—a pattern also detectable in Salome and “The Canterville Ghost.” An 
aestheticized body is one that is used as a model for art or one that is used as a medium of 
art. As an intervention in nature, aestheticization attempts to resurface and conceal the 
grotesque body and its corruption. This aestheticization links Wilde’s narratives to larger 
cultural concerns about the uses of the human body for artistic and funerary purposes. 
This study has drawn heavily on Plato’s Menexenus in establishing rhetoric as one 
of the points in a triangulation that also includes monstrosity and dismemberment. These 
three elements effect disarticulation, or the destruction of the human form and the 
faculties of speech and reason invested in it. Wilde seems even more indebted to Plato 
and his negative attitude toward rhetoric in Dorian Gray than the other writers included 
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in this study. The relationship between conduct and the soul is one of the novel’s themes. 
Although it is possible to read Wilde’s frequent references to the soul as generic, the 
novel’s Hellenism and the author’s classical education point to Plato’s Gorgias, with its 
scrutiny of rhetoric and its interest in justice and the welfare of the soul. 
Wilde was deeply engaged with the classics. In 1878, he graduated from 
Magdalene College, Oxford, with a double first in classical moderations and literae 
humaniores, also known as the “Greats” or the classics (Edwards). The honors tests 
required not only a rote knowledge of ancient texts such as Plato, Aristotle, and 
Heraclitus, but also the ability to apply them speculatively (Shuter 259). At Oxford, 
Wilde was inspired by two great classicists, Walter Pater and John Ruskin: 
 
Pater and Ruskin shaped Wilde’s thought and its expression: they did not 
originate it. Initially he brought their ideas and his glosses into the market place in 
lectures on aesthetics in the UK and the USA. Thereafter he embedded them, 
begirt in his own wit and charm, in fictions such as The Happy Prince and Other 
Tales and The Picture of Dorian Gray. To Wilde ideas had to assert themselves 
dramatically.... (Edwards) 
 
 
Shuter points out that Wilde also projected the Greats into his critical prose, most notably 
“The Critic as Artist” and “The Decay of Lying.” Wilde directly addresses dialogue as 
“that wonderful literary form” and says that “creative critics … have always employed” 
it, including Plato. Shuter explains that dialogues allow writers to both “‘reveal and 
conceal’” themselves and examine issues from many points of view. “‘Dialogues always 
fascinate me,’” Wilde writes (qtd. in Shuter 263). 
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Study of Plato’s dialogues was “central to the Greats school” at Oxford (Shuter 
263). The influence of the dialogues on Wilde’s writing was noted by Pater in his review 
of Dorian Gray in 1891 (264). Perhaps the most significant of Plato’s dialogues in an 
examination of the novel is Gorgias, which suggests a relationship between rhetoric and 
the preservation of the soul. One of Plato’s targets in Gorgias is Sophists. According to 
Bizzell and Herzburg: “Plato viewed the Sophists as moral relativists who … had no 
reason not to be manipulative, deceitful, or downright corruptive in their use of 
discourse” (81). In the dialogue, Socrates interrogates Gorgias, a celebrated rhetorician, 
and two of his admirers, Polus and Callicles. They agree that rhetoric and dialectic are 
different: one is display, and the other discussion. Through his questioning, Socrates also 
establishes that rhetoric, unlike other disciplines, has no subject of its own, and that it 
achieves its ends through speech, which is “ambiguous” (90). When Gorgias explains that 
his definition of rhetoric includes the ability of speech to persuade judges, statesmen, 
legislators, and general audiences, Socrates says, “I think now…you have come very near 
to showing us the art of rhetoric” as “a producer of persuasion,” which is “its whole 
business and main consummation” (90).  Gorgias acknowledges that the power of 
rhetoric can be abused, and later in the dialogue Socrates asserts that rhetoric may have 
nothing to do with truth: 
 
…there is no need to know the truth of actual matters, but one merely needs to be 
discovered some device or persuasion … he does not know what is really good or 
bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with 
these matters so as to appear to those who know who, like himself, do not know 
better than he who know. (95) 
 
179 
 
Socrates argues that rhetoric could be used for unjust ends, and that it can be reduced to 
“producing … gratification,” placing it in the same branch of “art” as “cookery” (97). He 
goes on to argue that rhetoric is not really an art, but a “habitude” or “knack” of “clever 
dealing with mankind” (97) in the pursuit of power. In this way, “orators” can become 
indistinguishable from “despots” (100).  Polus finds Socrates’ ideas “shocking, nay, 
monstrous…” (99). 
In Dorian Gray, Henry epitomizes Plato’s low opinion of the Sophists and the 
danger of their rhetoric. And at least some of his words are supplied by the principal 
figure in the Aesthetic movement, which held that art had no purpose other than 
producing pleasure. Examining the link between aestheticism and horror, John Paul 
Riquelme acknowledges Wilde’s use of Pater’s words in Henry’s dialogue—a feature 
that Pater notes and objects to in his otherwise positive review of Dorian Gray (611). 
However, Riquelme writes that Pater’s review is misleading, as a muted debate was 
taking place between the two men through their writings. He writes that by the time 
Wilde wrote Dorian Gray he had shifted from an “enthusiastic, admiring response to 
Pater’s writing and to aestheticism at Oxford toward his later, more critical stance...” 
(612). Dorian, therefore, can be seen as the monstrous fulfillment of the Aesthetic creed: 
he exists for no other purpose but to give pleasure. Pater, however, sees Dorian as a 
“‘beautiful creation’” but a “‘quite unsuccessful experiment ... in life as a fine art’” (qtd. 
in Riquelme 613). Riquelme says that “Pater could not have missed the novel’s challenge 
to his own attitudes” but that he chose not to consider the meaning of Wilde’s story in 
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relation to his art criticism: “Pater does not want to admit the bearing that Wilde’s Gothic 
rendering has on his own ideals” (612). 
 When Henry says that all influence is “immoral” because “to influence a person is 
to give him one’s soul” (21), Wilde establishes one of the book’s most significant 
themes: the transformative power of rhetoric. Indeed, the entire novel seems a cautionary 
tale about the dangers of manipulation and its risks to the soul. Henry fits a profile 
previously established in this study. Like Frankenstein, Dracula, Jekyll, and Moreau, he 
is the rhetorical monster that engenders monstrosity. Riquelme writes, “As a detached 
experimenter with human lives, Wotton ... produces an ugly, destructive double of 
himself” (616). And monstrosity in fin-de-siècle horror fiction seduces and transforms its 
audience through epideictic. Henry’s seduction of Dorian begins during their first 
meeting. He sets out intentionally to corrupt Dorian, despite Basil’s admonitions. Central 
to Henry’s rhetoric is the body. As an orator, Henry is physically attractive to Dorian. 
“He could not help liking the tall, graceful young man…,” the narrator says, penetrating 
Dorian’s thoughts. “His romantic olive-colored face and worn expression interested him. 
There was something in his low, languid voice that was absolutely fascinating” (24). His 
voice is “musical” (22), which enhances its appeal to Dorian, a pianist. However, it is 
Henry’s words that enthrall him: “Words! Mere words! How terrible they were! How 
clear and vivid, and cruel! One could not escape them. And yet what a subtle magic there 
was in them!” (23). Through his words, Henry flatters Dorian, remarking on his “‘red-
rose youth and…rose-white boyhood’” (22). He says, “‘Yes, Mr. Gray, the gods have 
been good to you’” (25). But what causes Dorian to wish away his soul is Henry’s 
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warning that his youth and beauty are passing: “‘What the gods give they quickly take 
away. You have only a few years to live really, perfectly, and fully’” (25).  Henry 
continues: 
 
When your youth goes, your beauty will go with it, and then you will suddenly 
discover that there are no triumphs left for you … Every month as it wanes it 
brings you nearer to something dreadful. Time is jealous of you, and wars against 
your lilies and roses … Youth! Youth! There is absolutely nothing in the word but 
youth! (25-26) 
 
 
Dorian cannot resist Henry’s epideictic. He listens “open-eyed and wondering” (26) and 
is transformed. Gazing at his competed portrait, Dorian says, “‘How sad it is! I shall grow 
old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will remain always young … If it were 
only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture was to grow 
old! … I would give my soul for that!’” (29). A distraught Dorian threatens to kill 
himself if he grows old, and he says that he resents all things that do not age. Dorian’s 
wish marks the moment in the novel when he becomes a living corpse.  Later in the 
novel, Dorian will remind Basil of the wish he made before the portrait. It is one of the 
last things Dorian says to Basil before he kills him. “Long before the book’s final 
chapter, Dorian has become undead, still living but not alive as a human being,” 
Riquelme writes (627). In the studio, Basil’s reaction to Dorian’s distress marks the 
change that Henry’s rhetoric has effected on the young man: “‘This is your doing, Harry,’ 
said the painter, bitterly” (30). It is a role that Basil will play again, when he criticizes 
Dorian’s callousness after Sybil Vane’s suicide, and when he confronts directly Dorian 
about his scandalous behavior. 
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That Henry sets out to seduce Dorian to his hedonistic philosophy is made plain in 
the text. Like an accomplished orator, Henry knows when to be quiet and let his words do 
their work: “With his subtle smile, Lord Henry watched him. He knew the precise 
psychological moment when to say nothing. He felt intensely interested. He was amazed 
at the sudden impression that his words had produced …” (23).  Later, Henry thinks to 
himself that he will “dominate” Dorian, “had, already indeed half done so. He would 
make that wonderful spirit his own” (40).  As he converses at a luncheon before an 
“audience,” Henry becomes aware that Dorian is watching him: “He felt that the eyes of 
Dorian Gray were fixed on him ...” (44). In his mind, Henry reflects on his performance: 
“He was brilliant fantastic, irresponsible. He charmed his listeners out of themselves, and 
they followed his pipe laughing” (44). His epideictic is irresistible to most listeners, 
including Dorian, who does not want it to end. As they leave lunch to go to the park 
together, Dorian says, “‘And you will promise to talk to me all the time? No one talks so 
wonderfully as you do’” (46). 
 A disturbing aspect of Henry’s rhetoric—and the one that makes it not only 
declamatory but also sophistic in character—is that he cares little for the consequences of 
his words, beyond the immediate gratification they give him and his audiences. Repeating 
aphorisms, he exudes moral relativism and ambivalence. “‘I never approve or disapprove 
of anything,’” Henry says (76).  Accused of being insincere, he does not deny it. 
Responding to Henry’s cynical comments on his marriage, Basil says he believes Henry 
is actually a good husband but is just embarrassed for people to know the truth. “‘You 
never say a moral thing, and you never do a wrong thing,’” Basil says. “‘Your cynicism 
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is simply a pose.’” Henry does not dispute this. He only says, “Being natural is a pose, 
and the most irritating pose I know” (8). When Henry says that he hopes Dorian will love 
and leave Sybil Vane, Basil says, “‘You don’t mean a single word of all that, Harry. You 
know you don’t. If Dorian Gray’s life were spoiled, no one would be sorrier than 
yourself’” (76). Even Dorian says Henry talks “‘nonsense’” (81). The novel, therefore, 
equivocates the meaning of posing with both bodily posing and rhetorical posing. Bodily 
posing involves sitting for a portrait. In this sense—and in the context a discussion 
related to the concept of the living corpse—it also evokes the cultural oddity of Victorian 
corpse photography. These pictures sought to create the allusion that the recently 
deceased were still alive—often by posing them in lifelike positions and sometimes with 
living family members. This custom has been sensationalized in many online articles. “In 
this dark era, people didn’t call for the coroner after a loved one died,” one article 
exaggerates. “They called for the photographer first” (“People in the 1800s”). On the 
other hand, rhetorical posing involves assuming a stance that may or may not be 
hypothetical. In Wilde’s novel, Dorian poses like a model, and Henry poses like a 
declaimer. 
 Henry is involved in declamation in that he orates from an assumed posture. From 
a Socratic standpoint, however, the most insidious aspect of Henry’s rhetoric is not 
necessarily his insincerity but his dissuasion of Dorian from seeking the justice that Plato 
believes is necessary for the purification of the soul. The link between agency and soul is 
one that Henry deeply considers: 
 
 
184 
 
Soul and body, body and soul—how mysterious they were! There was animalism 
in the soul, and the body had its moments of spirituality. The senses could refine, 
the intellect could degrade. Who could say where the fleshly impulse ceased, or 
the physical impulse began? How shallow were the arbitrary definitions of 
ordinary psychologists! (61) 
 
 
The meditation reads like an apology for Henry’s sensualist philosophy, which he 
espouses to anyone who will listen. During his first meeting with Dorian, he theorizes 
that man may return to the “‘Hellenic ideal’” of “‘something finer, richer, that the 
Hellenic ideal’” by setting aside “self-denial” and living an unrestrained life (22). His 
notion that “‘sin’” as an “‘action is a mode of purification’” (22) is a distortion of 
Socrates’ idea that justice purifies the soul. Henry’s concern is the body, not the soul: 
“‘The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible,’” he says (25). He later 
remarks, “‘To get back one’s youth, one merely has to repeat one’s follies’” (43). Dorian 
adopts Henry’s sensualist philosophy, but questions it after he has killed Basil: “To cure 
the soul by means of the senses, and the senses by means of the soul.’ How the words 
rang in his ears. His soul, certainly, was sick to death. Was it true that the senses could 
cure it? Innocent blood had been split” (182). 
In Gorgias, Socrates asserts that rhetoric can mislead audiences and subvert 
justice. This interest in justice runs throughout much of the dialogue and stems from its 
concern about the potential abuse of rhetoric in the courtroom. It is particularly relevant 
to Dorian Gray, for Socrates advances the idea that rhetoric is “base” and that it uses 
“flattery” to make the worst of two alternatives appear the better. This “sort of thing is a 
disgrace … because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best…,” Socrates says (98). 
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He uses bodily analogies to make this point. The best known is “cookery” passing for 
“medicine” because “boys … or men and foolish as boys” can be easily persuaded that 
foods that taste good are better for the body than “sound and noxious foods” (98). The 
other analogy, and the one most relevant to Dorian Gray, is that “self-adornment” can 
pass for “gymnastic.” In other words, the body can be made to appear fit even though it is 
not. Socrates says: 
 
self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and 
illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress, so as to 
make them, in the effort of assuming extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort 
that comes through gymnastic. (98). 
 
 
Dorian, with his unnaturally preserved body and handsome appearance, emblematizes 
Socrates’ argument. He is not what he seems. Flattery makes him attractive but not 
virtuous.  He looks good, but he is not good. More importantly, however, Dorian’s 
portrayal is informed by Socrates’ argument in Gorgias that justice cures a wrongdoer’s 
soul. In this view, a person is better off to be caught for or to confess to committing a 
crime and pay a penalty than to escape justice and persist with a guilty, “sick” soul.  
Socrates says, “… the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as 
medicine for wickedness” (107). Later, he says, “… to do wrong and not pay the penalty 
… takes the first place among all evils” (108).  Again, Socrates says, “… pleading in 
defense of injustice … rhetoric is no use to us at all.…” He continues by asserting that 
“instead of concealing an iniquity” a man ought to “bring it to light in order that he may 
pay the penalty and be made healthy” (108-9). Polus is dubious: “What a strange 
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doctrine, Socrates, you are trying to maintain!” (103). It is a “strange doctrine,” but it is 
one readers see dramatized in Dorian Gray as Dorian destroys others’ lives and agonizes 
over the condition of his soul, which is reflected in his cursed portrait. 
 This care for the soul is exhibited the day after Dorian berates his fiancée Sybil 
for her poor acting performance and breaks off their engagement. It is a point in the text 
at which Dorian has begun a debauched lifestyle but still retains a measure of innocence. 
He feels regret for his treatment of Sybil and writes a letter of apology, unaware that she 
has killed herself.  It is his first effort at reformation, and he hopes this portrait will be his 
guide. “‘I want to be good,’” he tells Henry. “‘I can’t bear the idea of my soul being 
hideous’” (97).  Dorian intends to follow through with his engagement to Sybil, and he 
tries to preempt the cynical objections of Henry’s rhetoric. “‘Harry, I know what you are 
going to say, something dreadful about marriage. Don’t say it. Don’t ever say dreadful 
things of that kind to me again,’” Dorian says (98). It is Henry who breaks the news of 
Sybil’s death, and then casually invites him to the opera. It seems significant that Henry 
wants Dorian to avoid the inquest, which might produce some justice by at least exposing 
Dorian’s identity and his harsh treatment of Sybil (98). Dorian, on the other hand, frets 
that he has “‘murdered Sybil Vane’” and fears for his soul: “‘You don’t know the danger 
I am in, and there is nothing to keep me straight. She would have done that for me’” 
(100). Henry consoles Dorian by telling him that Sybil was his social inferior, that the 
marriage would have failed, and reminding him that “‘Good resolutions are useless 
attempts to interfere with scientific laws’” (100). Henry’s words have the immediate 
effect of numbing Dorian’s conscience. He says he “‘cannot feel this tragedy’” fully 
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(101). Dorian compares Sybil’s death to a Greek tragedy—a comparison to drama that 
Henry exploits, finding an “exquisite pleasure in playing on the lad’s unconscious 
egotism” (101). Henry carries Dorian’s comparison to a conclusion by convincing him 
that Sybil, like a Shakespearean character, did not truly exist: “‘Mourn for Ophelia, if you 
like. Put ashes on your head because Cordelia was strangled. Cry out against Heaven 
because the daughter of Brabantio died. But don’t waste your tears over Sybil Vane. She 
was less real than they are’” (103-4). Henry’s rhetoric leads Dorian to a moment of 
decision. Instead of seeking atonement, he chooses sensation: “He felt that the time had 
really come for making his choice … Eternal youth, infinite passion, pleasures subtle and 
secret, wild joys and wilder sins—he was to have all these things. The portrait was to 
bear the burden of his shame…” (105). 
Cleary, Henry is monstrous in his use of rhetoric as vivisection. And his rhetoric 
transforms Dorian into a monstrosity. Monstrosity engendering monstrosity through word 
and deed is a pattern already outlined in the other novels included in this study. Riquelme 
describes this pattern as a “symptom of a darkness within both culture and the mind,” and 
he locates it not only within Dorian Gray but also Jekyll and Hyde and Dracula (611). 
Linking Henry to the other monstrous orators examined in this study is his cutting of the 
body. However, unlike Dracula, Van Helsing, Harker, Moreau, Jekyll, and Macfarlane, 
Henry cuts with words, with rhetoric. Through Henry, Wilde expresses perhaps more 
clearly than any other writer the concept of disarticulation. One of Henry’s noteworthy 
characteristics is his longstanding fascination with “natural science,” which he links to 
vivisection. Henry recalls that “he had begun by vivisecting himself” and “ended by 
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vivisecting others. Human life—that appeared to him to him the one thing worth 
investigating. Compared to it there was nothing else of any value” (60). Henry considers 
Dorian an interesting subject for such a study (60).  By requesting Dorian’s portrait from 
Basil, which becomes his double, Wotton is symbolically claiming Gray as an anatomical 
subject. He says, “‘You had much better let me have it, Basil. This silly boy doesn’t 
really want it, and I really do’” (31). Through Henry’s rhetoric, the painting becomes 
Dorian. It is a transformation that is finalized in Henry and Basil’s banter near the end of 
Chapter 2 when they playfully confuse Dorian with his double, the portrait. Figurative 
dissection is foreshadowed earlier in the chapter when Basil determines to destroy the 
painting with his artist’s palette knife because it has upset Dorian. Dorian stops him: 
“‘Don’t, Basil, don’t!’ he cried. ‘It would be murder!’” (30). It is a “murder” that Dorian 
will ultimately carry out at the end of the novel, using a knife similar to the palette knife 
that Basil is going to use the slash the portrait in Chapter 2, and which Dorian uses to slay 
Basil in Chapter 14. The description of the palette knife makes it seem more like a 
surgical instrument or weapon than an artist’s tool: it has a “thin blade of lithe steel” (30). 
Wilde did not invent the intersection of art and vivisection/dissection. It had been 
established earlier in the century by critics who disparaged the paintings of the Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood.  Ironically, for many audiences, these paintings have become 
representative of Victorian art, but at the time of their creation they were generally 
considered ugly and offensive. The critics’ chief complaint was that the bodies in the 
paintings looked too real compared to the “conventional norms of beauty and grace 
mirrored in art” (Casteras 13). Writing in 1852, David Masson restated critics’ censure of 
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the Pre-Raphaelites, saying that artists appeared to take delight in the grotesque, in 
“figures with heads phrenologically clumsy, faces strongly marked and irregular, and 
very pronounced ankles and knuckles’” (qtd. in Casteras 13). Indeed, the feet of subjects 
in some subjects in Pre-Raphaelite paintings look dirty, their hands look calloused, and 
their arms sinewy. Some subjects are also painted in irreverent and undignified poses, 
such as the nun digging a grave in The Vale of Rest by John Everett Millais. A second 
nun stares unnervingly out of the painting at viewers, as if reminding them of the final 
destination of all lives. Susan P. Casteras writes that Pre-Raphaelite paintings “reveal 
underlying concerns with disease and deformity, ugliness and vulgarity, conformity and 
nonconformity” (14).  
An anonymous reviewer in 1850 attacked Pre-Raphaelite paintings as the “‘mere 
handmaiden to morbid anatomy’” and, as such, “‘it is no longer Art, but an administrator 
to science’” (qtd. in 16). The reviewer wrote that the figure of Joseph in Millais’s 
painting Christ in the House of his Parents looked as if it had come from a “‘dissecting 
room’” (17). Other critics made the same connection between deformity, disease, 
dissection, monstrosity, and Pre-Raphaelite art. Casteras writes: “The barely concealed 
subtext was that of the critical reception of the painting was that it depicted 
unmentionable symptoms in such graphic detail that the work was cumulatively too 
intense and revolting for many critics and spectators” (17). A reviewer for Punch mocked 
Millais’s Christ in the House of his Parents as a study of pathology, writing that the 
subjects—with their “‘emaciated bodies, their shrunken legs, and tumid ankles’”—
display “‘well known characteristics of that morbid state of system’” (qtd. in 17). The 
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reviewer also comments that the bowl-bearing child8 depicted in the painting looks like 
he has rickets, and the figure of the boy Christ in the center appears to have postmortem 
mottling of the flesh in his face (17). The reviewer also states that bodies look unwashed 
(18), and that the “‘drawing of the figures evinces minute study in the demonstration 
room’” (qtd. in 17). Among the harsh critics of the painting was Charles Dickens, who 
wrote that the figure of Mary was a “‘Monster’” that would stand out even in the “vilest 
cabaret in France or the lowest gin shop in England” (qtd. in 18). Overall Dickens wrote 
that the subjects looked like derelicts, “an irreligious assembly of under-fed low-life 
types such as ‘might be undressed in any hospital where dirty drunkards, in a high state 
of varicose veins are received’” (qtd. in 18). 
Similar criticisms of Pre-Raphaelite art continued into the 1880s, when Wilde was 
socializing not only with Millais, but also with Edward Burne-Jones, another 
Brotherhood painter. Considering these connections, it is interesting to view Basil’s 
portrait of Dorian as degenerating from the idealized art that Millais, Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti, and William Holman Hunt rebelled against under Sir Joshua Reynolds at the 
Royal Academy in the 1840s into a realistic Pre-Raphaelite work displaying all of the 
incongruities, uncleanliness, and pathological grotesqueries attacked by critics.  As a 
monstrosity, Dorian is related to the others already analyzed in this study: he is abhuman. 
However, he is not a human-animal hybrid: he is a human-art hybrid.  Dorian’s tragic 
parentage—rooted in his mother’s elopement with a man of lower social status who is 
                                                          
8 The child with the bowl in Millais’s Christ in the House of His Parents is John the 
Baptist. 
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later skewered in a duel plotted by his disapproving father-in-law (36)—allows his 
identity to be revised throughout the novel. He is transformed into a monstrosity 
ironically referred to as “Prince Charming,” whose attractive exterior belies the 
putrefaction of his soul. In addition to being repeatedly referred to as “Prince Charming” 
(57, 64, 87, 187), Gray is called “‘Adonis,’” “‘Narcissus’” (7), and “‘Apollo’” (212), 
before becoming the “‘type of … the age’” (213). Dorian’s unstable identity also makes 
him vulnerable not only to Basil but also to Henry, who sees him as a body to be “posed” 
(39). These are not the only markers of disarticulation. One of Dorian’s monstrous 
characteristics becomes his detachment, his suppression of human feeling. His 
emotionless response toward Sybil Vane’s suicide causes Basil to exclaim, “‘Why, man, 
there are horrors in store for that little white body of hers!’” (107). Exactly what Basil 
means is unclear. However, under the Anatomy Act of 1832, which was still in force in 
the 1890s, Sybil’s body could be dissected if her mother, also a poor actor, does not have 
the money to bury her. Even if Basil is not referring to dissection, Sybil’s body will still 
be violated by an “‘inquest’” (98, 110), and later by the grave. Dorian’s cruelty toward 
Sybil is the first indication of a monstrous nature that is fully realized when he murders 
Basil. 
Through rhetoric, Dorian’s body becomes an object of art that is morally decadent 
but resistant to age and physical corruption, like an embalmed and beautified corpse. This 
is the source of his epideictic: the audience’s awareness that he is art on the surface and 
decomposing human body underneath. The decay is simply projected onto his portrait 
and hidden from the world. He embodies the changing notions toward the body as 
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nineteenth-century anatomists achieved greater detachment and their procedures lost 
much of their transcendental significance. Nevertheless, corpses remained central to 
certain modes of artistic expression. Quite literally, bodies were transformed into visual 
art. Among those competing with anatomists for snatched bodies in the dissection era 
were artists and sculptors (Richardson 58). They were seeking models or raw material. 
In this regard, Dorian Gray reflects a synthesis of art and anatomy with a long 
history in Europe. Many artists were no doubt inspired by Leonardo da Vinci, whose 
anatomical drawings were not revealed until the late eighteenth century (32). At the time 
of his death in 1519, Da Vinci was planning a comprehensive work on human anatomy. 
He had performed about thirty dissections, produced 240 drawings, and written 13,000 
words of notes.9 Another artist who studied anatomy was Rembrandt (Coddon 74). And 
Mikhail Bakhtin writes that Rabelais performed a public dissection of a hanged man in 
1537 (360).  It was a time in Europe when medicine was the center of natural sciences 
and the humanities (359). Had Da Vinci published his treatise, he would have rivaled if 
not surpassed the younger Andreas Vesalius, who is credited with revolutionizing 
anatomy in Renaissance Europe (Sooke). In both Vesalius and Da Vinci, body, rhetoric, 
and art merge. Richardson writes, “Each of these men’s work represents a unique fusion 
of anatomical knowledge and artistic genius” (32). The best starting point for 
understanding this synthesis and the new aesthetics it created is 1528, the year 
translations of Galen’s medical treatises began appearing in Europe. In 1543, Vesalius, a 
                                                          
9 See figure 4 
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professor of anatomy at the University of Padua, published his De Humani Corporis 
Fabrica, a tome that would revolutionize the conduct of dissections. Vesalius’s text 
challenged Galen’s authority and eventually helped displace him. Vesalius had a grand 
vision of anatomy that incorporated but transcended the physical bodies of the dissector 
and his subjects. This vision included the merger of anatomy and art that suggests the 
living corpse. In so many of Da Vinci’s drawings and Vesalius’ illustrations, cadavers in 
various stages of dissection appear to be animated, capable of motion and speech.10 These 
drawings reflected a supernaturalism that Vesalius encouraged by mythologizing 
anatomy, linking it to Apollo and his son Asclepius, the god of medicine and healing. 
Apollo delivered Asclepius by Caesarian birth from the womb of his dead mother, the 
nymph Corinus. In this way, Vesalius expresses his hopes of founding a “new, heroic 
empire of anatomy” based on what he called a “‘reborn art of dissection’” (Park 243). 
Park writes: 
 
Vesalius’ new approach will replace the old, degenerate medical order of earlier 
centuries, riddled with errors and misconceptions regarding the human body that 
had arisen as physicians increasingly distanced themselves from the world of 
matter and the body and by delegating manual operation, especially surgery, to 
lower practitioners and retreating to the world of disputation and books. (244) 
 
 
It is important to note here that Vesalius—a twenty-nine-year-old upstart with limited 
experience dealing with live patients—had more in mind than promoting anatomy: he 
was also promoting himself as physician to Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, a 
                                                          
10 See figure 5. 
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position he obtained in 1543 after dedicating his De Fabrica to Charles (239). Vesalius’s 
work, therefore, had a rhetorical purpose beyond promoting the new anatomy. 
The bodily rhetoric associated with dismemberment and dissection was further 
developed by the methods of Vesalius and his followers and the surgical theaters in 
which they operated. Before Vesalius, Galen was still recognized as the authority on 
anatomy throughout Europe (Fleck 300), and Medieval and early Renaissance anatomists 
largely lectured from his work while students and other underlings carried out the actual 
dissections. But Galen’s work was limited, partly because he had to extrapolate human 
anatomy from that of animals (303). Vesalius challenged Galen’s teachings by 
emphasizing the “empirical study of the human body” (300). Rather than teaching from a 
podium, Vesalius lectured to his students while performing anatomies, explained his 
findings, and pointed out Galen’s errors (300).  He “wrested his knowledge from the 
matter itself,” Park explains (218). And he was “equally adept at manipulating the scalpel 
and the pen” (252). In this way, flesh became word, and body became text: It is an 
ancient conceit that Browning adopts in the 1863 poem “Apparent Failure” when 
“gazers” in a Paris morgue view the bodies of three suicide victims as “the sermon’s text” 
(ll. 19-21). Vesalius and his successors stressed the importance of what they saw with 
their own eyes during their investigations of the human body rather as opposed to what 
had been printed in an ancient text. “De Fabrica revolutionized Western perceptions of 
human anatomy, replacing the inaccurate medieval rote descriptions with careful 
observations from real dissections of the body,” Richardson writes (32). Through the 
efforts of Vesalius and his successors, the reformed study of anatomy spread throughout 
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Europe, gaining acceptance and importance. Aiding in this transformation was Vesalius’ 
book, which was illustrated with images created from woodcuts.  Park writes that it is 
clear that “the Fabrica was the production of an intimate collaboration the anatomist and 
various artists, both draftsmen and woodblock cutters, and that Vesalius was involved at 
every stage in the preparation of the woodcuts for which the book is famous” (211). 
Although Vesalius built his reputation on the objective study of the human body, 
his De Fabrica is marked by the subjectivity of certain of its elements. It is a work of art 
which, at the time of its creation, was seeking a genre. The famous illustrations, for 
example, show scenes that are clearly emblematized. Perhaps the most familiar 
illustration is the front piece showing Vesalius conducting an anatomy on the body of a 
woman who had been hanged. In the image, Vesalius stands lecturing beside the opened 
body in a tiered theater filled with spectators.11 Park writes that as part of Vesalius’s 
campaign to become Charles’s physician, he manipulated the scene to reassign the 
traditional roles of the dissector and the criminal body. In Christian iconography  and 
lore, cadavers had long been associated with Christ or saints. Indeed, churches often 
hosted anatomies on a temporary basis. And, in Italy, members of the San Giovanni 
Evagelista della Morte confraternity ministered to condemned prisoners before execution, 
encouraging them to identify with Jesus and the Christian martyrs and accept divine 
justice (212).  In the illustration from Vesalius’s front piece, however, he identifies the 
dissector with the saint (234). The significance of the scene goes beyond Vesalius’ self-
                                                          
11 See figure 6. 
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representation as religious icon. Seated among the spectators is a skeleton, clearly 
intended as a memento mori.  Among the many other faces is one that resembles Dante. 
“Clearly, this is not a representation of an actual anatomy lesson taking place,” Sawday 
writes (69). The effect of Vesalius’s iconography is to bridge the gulf between life and 
death and to encourage viewers to contemplate the brevity of existence as well as man’s 
place in the universe. Sawday writes that the Renaissance anatomist’s goal was not 
scientific detachment but meaning and understanding on multiple levels. The link to art 
here is quite strong. “Anatomies were performed … as ritualistic expressions of often 
contradictory layers of meaning, rather than as scientific investigations in any modern 
sense,” Sawday writes (63). In other words, there was a certain amount of drama 
involved in public dissections. This drama derived in part from the confrontation between 
three authorities: the ancient text, heritage, the cadaver, and the anatomist.  As time 
passed and the Galenic heritage faded, the confrontation between the body and the 
anatomist became more direct (64-5). The drama of dissection was coded into Europe’s 
anatomy theaters. For example, the anatomy theater constructed after 1589 at Leiden 
University in the Netherlands, modelled on the Paduan theater, featured “moralizing 
(Latin) inscriptions familiar to a Renaissance reader”: “Know thyself.”; “We are dust and 
shadows.”; and “We are born to die” (72).  In London, an anatomy theater for the Barber-
Surgeons was designed in 1636 by Inigo Jones, also known for his collaborations with 
Ben Jonson on numerous royal masques. Jones also used the Paduan theater as a model of 
the London venue, following continental  theories that “stressed … the human frame as 
the basis for architecture” (76). The theater was ornamented with iconography similar to 
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the theater in Padua, with human male and female skins representing Adam and Eve, a 
flayed male corpse, and numerous skeletons (76).  “The Renaissance anatomical theatre 
combined elements from a number of different sources … to produce an event which was 
visually spectacular,” Sawday writes (64). The anatomical theater was also a space where 
authorities sought to reassert “the order of creation, the harmony of the universe, and the 
wisdom of God” after the “carnivalesque” and riotous scenes at the gallows (62). 
Closer to Wilde’s era, artists also found ways to use bodies in their creations, as 
media and as models. Carol Christ recalls how in 1801 Pierre Giraud, a French architect 
and revolutionary, described a procedure from a seventeenth-century German inventor to 
cremate corpses and turn them into a durable glass that could be used to make memorial 
objects of the deceased. The glass was not “fluid” enough to create busts of the deceased, 
so Giraud instead opted for medallions. He estimated that one body could produce two 
medallions, one for mourners to keep and the other to display at the cemetery (Christ 
391). In 1776, William Hunter, professor of anatomy at the Royal Academy of Arts, was 
so impressed with the musculature of a hanged man that he used the criminal’s body to 
create a cast rather than dissecting it (Reisz). The man’s body was first posed and allowed 
to stiffen. Hunter and his students then flayed the corpse to expose its muscles and used it 
as a mold. The cast is still on display at the Royal Academy as the “flayed hanged man 
from Tyburn Tree” (Richardson 37). Hunter’s students nicknamed the man 
“Smugglerius,” impressed by the classical pose and assuming that the dead man had been 
a smuggler (Reisz). 
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However, the most common artistic productions involving corpses were also the 
most commercial: funerals. Like artists and sculptors, tradesmen in the seventeenth 
century also wanted access to cadavers on which to practice undertaking. These included 
butchers, tailors, and waxchandlers, all of who “seem to have had a more than passing 
interest in obtaining bodies to develop the (lucrative) skills of embalming” (Sawday 57). 
Paul Fritz writes that embalming began to be practiced more frequently in the early 
eighteenth century, but it was controversial because it was unclear who should practice it: 
surgeons or undertakers (245).  By the late nineteenth century, to fulfill middle-class 
demands for more elaborate funerals, undertakers were not only using embalming but 
also “artifice, theatrical makeup, and clothing” to create the appearance of life in a 
corpse. They were essentially reconstructing bodies, in an odd parallel to the work of 
Victor Frankenstein. “Undertakers injected dyes into embalming fluid to create a 
‘healthy’ glow to the cheeks,” Jani Scandura explains. “They stuffed cotton into sunken 
eye sockets and cheeks; sewed jaws shut, false teeth in place; and jerked joints … into 
appropriate ‘natural’ poses” (15). Scandura writes that undertakers exploited middle class 
desires to maintain social boundaries, even in death, and assert their “superior morality.” 
“Death itself became a performance and Victorian funeral grand theater,” she asserts (3).  
Tensions between death and art over the human body can be located in Dorian 
Gray and its unnaturally preserved title character. He is the human-art hybrid comically 
forecast in “The Canterville Ghost,” which substitutes artist’s paints for human blood 
(15). But among Wilde’s works, Salome is the one that seems so obsessive in 
aestheticizing the body, largely through use of the blazon. Salome is similarly hybridized, 
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as she is conflated with the moon and its changing appearance marks her mood shifts. 
The Young Syrian says in the first line of the play, “How beautiful is the Princess Salome 
tonight!” In the next lines, the Page of Herodias observes the moon and interjects death 
and corruption into the blazon, saying, “She is like a woman rising from a tomb. She is 
like a dead woman. One might fancy she was looking for dead things” (3). When the 
infatuated Young Syrian replies, he is presumably describing the moon, but his words 
could be applied to Salome as object of art, considering his references to the “veil” and 
“dancing.”  “She is like a little princess who wears a yellow veil, and whose feet are of 
silver. She is like a princess who has little white doves for feet. One might fancy she was 
dancing” (3). Later, the Young Syrian says that Salome has “little white hands … 
fluttering like doves … they are like white butterflies” (7). As Iokanaan is brought to the 
curious Salome, the Page of Herodias again comments on the moon, saying that it is 
“Like the hand of a dead woman who is seeking to cover herself with a shroud.” The 
Young Syrian adds, “She is like a little princess , whose eyes are eyes of amber. Through 
the clouds of muslin she is smiling like a little princess” (13).  Love and death, therefore, 
hang eerily over Salome, and merge in the character of Salome, whose affections kill. Her 
first victim is the Young Syrian, to whom she has promised her attention, if not affection, 
in exchange for fetching Iokanaan from his prison (12-13). The Young Syrian, whom 
Salome calls Narraboth, kills himself as he witnesses Salome’s efforts to seduce 
Iokanaan. Salome’s identification with moon is consummated when the Page of Herodias 
says, “I knew the moon was seeking a dead thing, but I knew not it was he whom she 
sought” (13).  Salome hybridizes Iokanaan with art in similar ways, saying, “He is like a 
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thin ivory statue. He is like an image of silver. … His flesh must be very cold, cold as 
ivory” (14). She continues aestheticizing his body, comparing him to “lilies”; “snows that 
lie on the mountains” and “roses.” “There is nothing in the world so white as thy body,” 
she says (16), adding later, “Thy mouth is like a band of scarlet on a tower of ivory” (17). 
Salome’s rhetoric mortifies Iokanaan’s body: “It is like whited sepulcher,” she says. (16). 
Her blazoning of that body—including the hair (16-17)—conveys passion and 
foreshadows dismemberment. Salome achieves both when she demands Iokanaan’s 
decapitation as her reward for dancing for Herod and then kisses Iokanaan’s the mouth of 
his severed head (45). 
Salome’s dalliance with Iokanaan’s head is reminiscent of Fulvia’s legendary 
mutilation of Cicero’s head in the rhetorical tradition discussed in the previous chapter. 
Like Fulvia, Salome focuses her attention on the mouth of her victim. While Salome 
kisses Iokanaan’s mouth, Fulvia shoves pins in Cicero’s tongue. Both victims are desired 
and punished for their rhetorical performance, which helps constitute their characters.  
Salome says to Iokanaan, “Thy voice is as music to my ear” (15). But both Iokanaan and 
Cicero are monstrous. Although Iokanaan is said to be “gentle” (6), he is also a savage 
from the “desert” who eats “locusts and wild honey” and wears “camel’s hair” (7). “He 
was very terrible to look upon,” says the First Soldier (7). He later tells Salome that some 
believe Iokanaan is a reincarnation (10). For Herod, Iokanaan’s ethos is also built on 
reports that he has “seen God” (24) and that he is a prophet associated with a “Man” who 
can raise the dead. But Iokanaan’s most terrifying feature is his speech, which is filled 
with monstrosities and composes its own epideictic. “Sometimes he says things that 
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affright one…,” the First Soldier says. Iokanaan speaks of monsters—a “dragon” (6); 
“centaurs” (9); a “basilisk” (11); “abominations” (13, 14); and the “angel of death” (18). 
Cicero, on the other hand, is a different type of monstrosity, a character similar to Herod 
in Wilde’s play. Although the “Death of Cicero Tradition” springs from his execution and 
the hands of his political enemies, he earlier played the tyrant as Roman consul and 
ordered the executions of five conspirators without trial after the Second Cantilinarian 
Conspiracy. Critics such as Anthony Trollope were also disturbed by the duplicity of 
Cicero and other orators displayed in their ability to argue convincingly without regard 
for truth or consequences. Trollope writes in his 1880 biography of Cicero, 
 
The mind rejects the idea that it be the part of a perfect man to make another 
believe that which he believes to be false … [Cicero] had not acquired that 
theoretic aversion to a lie which is the first feeling in the bosom of a modern 
gentleman…. (qtd. in Rosner 171) 
 
 
Salome would seem to agree when she condemns all Romans, saying, “Ah! How I loathe 
the Romans! They are rough and common, and they give themselves the airs of noble 
lords” (9). So brutal are the Romans that the Cappodocian in Salome says that they drove 
the gods from his country and possibly caused their deaths (5). The greatest monstrosity 
in Salome, however, is Salome herself.  It is her perverse sexual appetite for Iokanaan 
that drives the play. He calls her “Daughter of Sodom” (15) and “daughter of Babylon” 
and speaks to her as if she is the devil of the New Testament, saying, “Get thee behind 
me!” (16). Throughout the play, Salome is also treated as something not to be gazed upon 
at the risk of misfortune, like Medusa. The Page of Herodias warns the Young Syrian 
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several times not to look at Salome. “Something terrible may happen,” he says (4). 
Herodias also tells Herod not to look at Salome (30).  
Salome’s lovemaking to Iokanaan’s severed head12 is so “monstrous” (44) that 
Herod orders her immediate crushing (45). It is just one of the moments in Wilde’s 
writings that reflect the European tradition of torture and execution. Indeed, upon further 
examination, one is struck by the variety of punishments that Wilde included in his 
works. These moments are suggested in Plato’s Gorgias, when Polus describes the 
torture, mutilation, and execution of a criminal through the rack, castration, eye-gouging, 
crucifixion, and burning in pitch. “You are trying to make my flesh creep…,” Socrates 
responds (104). Salome’s form of execution, crushing, corresponds to pressing, was 
actually a form of torture under English Common Law intended to force a plea, although 
it sometimes resulted in death (Thompson n.pag.). According to Irene Thompson, a plea 
was necessary before a trial could be held, “so it was common for those arrested to be 
‘pressed to plea.’” Thompson writes that the procedure involved tying down the prisoner 
and then piling “heavy iron, stone or lead weights” on the chest.  Prisoners who 
                                                          
12 In Salome, Wilde can be seen as drawing not only on the erotic “Song of 
Solomon” from the Old Testament but also the long tradition of the severed head as 
object of sexual fetish in Western literature and history.  Earlier in the century, 
Washington Irving used it in his story “The Adventure of the German Student.” Keats 
tapped into the tradition in his poem Isabella, or The Pot of Basil, based on a tale from 
Boccaccio’s Decameron. Sir Walter Raleigh’s widow was said to have preserved his 
severed head and kept it until her death twenty-years later (Thompson, “Beheading”). In 
The Revenger’s Tragedy, Vindice broods over the skull of his murdered Gloriana and 
uses it in a plot against her killer, the Duke, luring him to his death through his own 
sexual hunger.  One could also argue that the tradition is also at work in Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight, since one beheading and the threat of another set the stage for 
Gawain’s flirtation with Lady Bertilak. 
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confessed were “hanged, which in those days was a lingering and painful death.” The 
prisoners faced death either way, but if they were pressed to death “they would die 
unconvicted, thereby saving their families from penury.” Thompson presents the example 
of Giles Corey, an accused witch in Salem who chose pressing so that his “wealth would 
not be taken by the colony but passed on to his heirs” (n.pag.). Iokanaan’s beheading—a 
form of execution typically reserved for the privileged (Thompson n.pag.)—is familiar to 
audiences from the New Testament.  But Wilde’s story transfers responsibility for the 
prophet’s beheading from Salome’s mother to Salome. Salome’s actions are made even 
more disturbing since, as Thompson points out, the head lived on for a short period after 
its separation from the body. Simon Webb writes that in 1906 a French surgeon named 
Dr. Ronald Marcoux performed an experiment on the severed head of a murderer and 
found that it responded to his voice and was able to open and close its eyes “for at least 
fifteen or twenty seconds after it had been cut from the body.” Marcoux had received 
official permission to study guillotined criminals; but the authorities were so unhappy 
with Marcoux’s findings that they forbade him from conducting anymore experiments 
(Webb, Execution ch. 1).  
Wilde depicts another form of execution in “The Canterville Ghost” by having Sir 
Simon de Canterville sealed up in a secret room by his in-laws for having murdered his 
wife. Thompson refers to this method of punishment as walling in, saying it was a 
“variation on burying alive” that was performed mainly in Germany of Switzerland. 
Thompson writes that one of the most notorious victims of walling in was Erzcebet 
Báthory (n.pag.). Báthory was the Early Modern Hungarian countess who killed more 
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than six hundred women, allegedly to use their blood to achieve immortality and eternal 
youth and beauty. Of course, murder, signified by fake blood, is what leads to Sir 
Simon’s immortality. However, his immortality is a punishment associated with his 
imprisonment through living entombment. 
The destruction of Basil’s body is the most lurid detail in the plot of Dorian Gray, 
and it suggests additional forms of execution. After the crime, Dorian pleads with an 
acquaintance, a scientist named Alan Campbell, to destroy the evidence. “‘Alan, you are 
scientific,’” Dorian says. “‘You know about chemistry, and things of that kind. You have 
made experiments. What you have got to do is to destroy the thing that is upstairs—to 
destroy it so that not a vestige of it will be left’” (166). His appeal to Campbell includes 
references to human dissection as a scientific practice productive of medical knowledge.  
He asks Campbell to approach the deed as a scientific experiment and consider the 
detachment he has in the presence of the dead. “‘You go to hospitals and dead-houses, 
and the horrors that you do there do not affect you,’” Dorian says. “‘If in some hideous 
dissecting room or fetid laboratory you found this man lying on a leaden table … you 
would simply look at him as an admirable subject’” (167). He says that “‘to destroy a 
body must be far less horrible than what you are accustomed to work at’” (168). The text 
makes clear that Dorian and Campbell have been estranged for some time, and when 
Campbell refuses to destroy Basil’s body and save Dorian from detection, Dorian 
blackmails him. Faced with exposure for some offense that it is not divulged in the story, 
Campbell destroys Basil’s body in Dorian’s home through a combination of burning with 
fire and acid. The process takes about five hours. Exactly what Campbell does to the 
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body is not revealed. But readers are told that the body is gone and the “horrible smell of 
nitric acid in the room” (172).  The destruction of the transgressing body through 
corrosion and burning  is a process Wilde revisits  in The Ballad of Reading Goal, in 
which the corpse of a hanged murderer is covered with lime and buried: 
 
And all the while the burning lime 
  Eats flesh and bone away, 
It eats the brittle bone by night 
  And the soft flesh by day, 
It eats the flesh and bone by turns, 
  But it eats the heart away. (ll. 463-8)  
 
 
Near the end of the poem, Wilde says that this same “wretched man” has been “Eaten by 
the teeth of flame” and that he lies “In a burning winding sheet” (ll. 39-40). 
This disintegration of bodies in Dorian Gray and Reading Gaol suggests two 
legal punishments: burning and boiling.13 Irene Thompson writes that societies have used 
burning since the “dawn of civilization” to destroy their enemies and criminals.  In 
antiquity, it was practiced by Babylonians, Hebrews, and Romans. It was a common 
sentence for people found guilty of heresy during the Inquisitions. Burning was used 
because it avoided the shedding of blood, which was banned under Roman Catholic 
doctrine. The Inquisitions also practiced auto-da-fé, which was the mass burning of 
heretics. “Bloody Mary” had almost three hundred Protestant men, women, and children 
burned as a result of her Counterreformation during her short reign as queen of England.  
                                                          
13 Among the historical Dracula’s alleged misdeeds were mass executions involving the 
boiling of six hundred men and the burning of 400 boys in 1458 (Goldberg and Itzkowitz 
90). 
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In addition to heresy, treason was also punishable in England by burning alive. Burnings 
in London ended in 1790 due to the objections of businesses and residents. When burning 
was practiced by religious authorities, it often carried the significance of the purification 
of its victims.  In the context of late-nineteenth century Victorianism, Basil’s 
transgression is his homoerotic desire for Dorian, which Basil expresses clearly in the 
1890 edition of the text. Sharing his secret, Basil says to Dorian, “I quite admit that I 
adored you madly, extravagantly, absurdly” (228). Basil’s homoeroticisim was toned 
down and largely encrypted in the 1891 edition, where instead of love for Dorian he 
expresses love for the idea that Dorian represents for him. “I worshipped you,” Basil says 
(228). So, idolatry replaces homosexuality as an offense punishable by burning.  
Closely related to the punishment of burning is boiling, which Thompson writes 
was “a legal punishment … right up until the eighteenth century” (n.pag.). Like burning, 
boiling was also practiced in antiquity and it is mentioned in the Old Testament story of 
the Maccabees. Like burning, boiling could be used as a torture and punishment for 
religious offenses. Thompson points out that Christians in Roman times “were often 
boiled to death for their beliefs.” In the Middle East, oil was substituted when there was a 
shortage of water, “which made the suffering even more intolerable as oil has a much 
higher boiling point” (Thomspon n.pag.). Boiling prisoners became a legal option for 
punishment in England under King Henry VIII in 1531, when a cook was boiled to death 
for poisoning seventeen people, killing two of them (Thompson n.pag.). And boiling 
alive is the fate suffered by the villainous Barabas in Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of 
Malta. A possible objection to this reading of Dorian Gray is that Basil is already dead 
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when his body is destroyed; but as Joel Harrington points out in The Faithful 
Executioner, “alive” was a relative term: executioners sometimes had the option to kill a 
prisoner—by strangulation, for example—as an act of compassion before beginning the 
destruction of the body.  In fact, Harrington opens his book with the story of a 
counterfeiter who was sentenced to be burned. Although the executioner had planned to 
strangle him in secret before the burning, the strangulation was botched and the man was 
roasted alive as he screamed to heaven for help (xix). Moreover, even after Basil has 
been killed, his body remains seated in a chair by a table as if he is alive: “Had it not been 
for the red jagged tear in the neck, and the clotted black pool that was slowly widening on 
the table, one would have said that the man was simply asleep” (157).   
Basil’s murder is perhaps the most disturbing of the cutting deaths depicted in 
Wilde’s writings. Audiences are better prepared for Iokanaan’s beheading in Salome: 
Wilde is revising a story from the New Testament, though responsibility for Iokanaan’s 
execution is transferred to Salome in Wilde’s play. Salome’s mother simply approves 
when Salome repeatedly asks for Iokanaan’s head. When Herod finally agrees, Salome 
grows impatient with the executioner. She complains that he is afraid of Iokanaan. When 
the executioner enters with Iokanaan’s head on a platter, “Salome seizes it” (43). Her 
mockery makes it clear that she was motivated not only by her lust and scorn but also by 
Iokanaan’s rhetoric. “Thou rejectedst me,” she says “Thou didst speak evil words to me” 
(43). While no acts of cutting are depicted in “The Canterville Ghost,” Sir Simon 
regularly carries a “rusty dagger” (8), which he brandishes “in the midnight air” (9). And 
one of his performances involves him stabbing “himself three times in the throat” (8). His 
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murder of his wife involves the spilling of her blood (3). This is the act that has damned 
him, and he confesses to it; but, ironically, little is said of it. On the other hand, Basil’s 
stabbing death sets the stage for Dorian’s epideictic performance.  The slaying occurs 
after Basil, preparing to visit Paris to sequester himself and work on painting for six 
months, seeks out Dorian to confront him with the “dreadful things” that people are 
saying about him (147). He tells Dorian that he has defended him, but he wonders if he 
really knows Dorian at all. “Before I could answer that, I should have to see your soul,” 
Basil says (150). The comment inspires Dorian to invite Basil to look at his “‘soul,’” 
claiming it is the artist who made it (150). “‘Come: it is your own handiwork,’” Dorian 
says (151). Basil is killed moments after he views the painting. He is appalled and 
bewildered by the transformations that have taken place and is barely able to recognize 
his work. 
 Basil’s reaction leads to the novel’s clearest expression of the epideictic, which 
springs from Dorian as living corpse, a monster the painter is implicated in creating. The 
narrator states: 
 
An exclamation of horror broke from the painter’s lips as he saw in the dim light 
the hideous face of the on the canvas grinning at him. There was something in its 
expression that filled him with disgust and loathing. … it was Dorian Gray’s own 
face that he was looking at! The horror, whatever it was, had not yet entirely 
spoiled that marvelous beauty. … He seemed to recognize his own brush-work, 
and the frame was his own design. The idea was monstrous, yet he felt afraid. 
(154) 
 
 
His reaction is similar to what Sophia Andres says “Victorian spectators” experienced 
when they first saw Pre-Raphaelite art work: they “were often repulsed, perplexed, and 
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unsettled by the fears and anxieties the unorthodox Pre-Raphaelite vision disclosed.” The 
paintings confused categories in a disorienting way: “conventional beauty in 
unconventional ugliness, feminine fragility in masculinity, and masculine strength in 
conventional femininity” (n.pag.). Dorian’s painting confuses yet another category: living 
and dead. As Basil struggles to find meaning in the decaying painting, Dorian reminds 
him of how he and Henry “‘flattered’” him when he was a “‘boy’” and taught him vanity 
and the “‘wonder of beauty.’” Dorian recalls wishing in Basil’s studio that he could give 
his soul to stay young to stay young while painting aged. Basil recalls the moment but 
rejects it as “‘impossible,’” seeking instead an explanation in “‘mildew’” or “‘poison’” 
paints (154). Basil also rejects Dorian’s suggestion that he meant to create a monstrosity 
in the portrait, stating, “‘There was nothing evil in it, nothing shameful. You were to me 
such an ideal as I shall never meet again.’” Basil’s figuration of Dorian as monstrosity 
includes his statement that the portrait has “‘the face of a satyr’” and “‘the eyes of a 
devil.’” He notes that the surface of the painting is “undisturbed” and that the “foulness 
and horror had come” from “within.” He seems to recognize the nature of Dorian’s 
monstrousness when he says, “‘The rotting of a corpse in a watery grave was not so 
fearful’” (155). In terms of unnatural preservation, Dorian is similar to Lucy Westenra in 
Dracula. The bodies of both are preserved by supernatural agency rather than by an 
undertaker’s hand. 
Basil’s realization of the horror in Dorian’s portrait—a portrait he created but can 
longer recognize as his own—is another allusion to Pater, Riquelme writes (625-6). In his 
essay “Leonardo da Vinci,” Pater writes that there is “something sinister” (Pater 70) in 
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the painter’s Mona Lisa, or La Gioconda, with its  beauty and “unfathomable smile” (69). 
Hers is a “beauty, into which the soul with all of its maladies has passed.” She is 
expressive of Greece and Rome, and the “return of the Pagan world …” Pater writes, 
“She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead 
many times, and learned the secrets of the grave” (70).  The vampire analogy is fitting, 
for Pater’s Gothicized art does not reflect life: it drains and replaces it with a monstrous 
copy resistant to age and scrutiny. Edgar Allan Poe perhaps best expresses this concept in 
“The Oval Portrait,” the tale of a young woman who dies while her mad artist husband 
paints her picture. The wounded narrator finds the head-and-shoulders portrait after 
seeking shelter in the couple’s abandoned chateau. He is captivated yet “appalled” (298) 
by its “absolute life-likeness” (569), and at one point wakes up staring at the portrait and 
believing it to be “the head … of a living person” (569). The woman in “The Oval 
Portrait” is therefore similar to Mona Lisa, which Riquelme relates to the “Medusa of the 
Uffizii” (626), a sixteenth-century painting in the style of the Renaissance Italian painter 
Caravaggio but perhaps based on a lost original by Da Vinci. Pater writes that Da Vinci 
“alone realizes” that Medusa’s head is the “head of a corpse, exercising its powers 
through all the circumstances of death” (60). Riquleme writes that Dorian Gray is 
informed by Pater’s aestheticism and its “potential for dark doubling and reversal” (609). 
One of the novel’s most significant reversals occurs between Dorian and his double, his 
portrait, as he becomes living art and living corpse and his portrait becomes a “rotting … 
corpse” (Wilde 155). This realization accounts for at least part of the terror Basil 
experiences as he gazes upon Dorian’s “accursed” image in the portrait (155). 
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 Despite Basil’s harsh words, Dorian does not kill him until he pleads with Dorian 
to ask for God’s forgiveness. With a sudden and “uncontrollable feeling of hatred for 
Basil Hallward” and an inhuman loathing, Dorian picks up a knife and attacks the seated 
painter, stabbing him repeatedly in the neck. “He … dug the knife into the great vein that 
is behind the ear, crushing the man’s head down on the table, and stabbing him again and 
again,” the narrator says (156). The representation of violence here rivals anything in 
Dracula, and the violence dehumanizes Basil from artist to medium. In Dorian’s eyes, he 
no longer flesh and blood but a “dreadful wax image” (158). Paint and wax are 
significant in the novel, for they are among the supplies of the undertaker. They amplify 
the novel’s concern with the aestheticization of the body. Basil’s wounding in the neck 
also seems meaningful,  for as Scandura writes, arterial embalming through the carotid 
artery at the base of the neck “became widespread in England during the 1890s” (9). As 
previously stated, Scandura is concerned with embalming practices as they are suggested 
in Dracula, but her ideas are just as applicable to Dorian Gray. Scandura points out that 
Dracula does not just drain the blood of his victims, he replaces it with “toxins” (9). One 
is reminded of Basil’s suggestion that the oils he used in painting Dorian’s portrait 
contained “poison” (154). Scandura writes that enbalmers promoted their services by 
playing on “Victorian fears of decomposing corpses and unsanitary graveyards …” (11). 
However, their success at preserving bodies created a certain anxiety among Victorians, 
whose doctors sometimes had difficulty determining when a person had actually died and 
become a corpse.  This difficulty led to anxieties about premature burial, or vivisepulture. 
So concerned were Londoners about premature burial—and the possibility that it might 
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lead to vivisection—that they formed an association in 1896 to raise awareness (Behlmer 
207). And the counterpart of the live burial is the living corpse. “After all,” writes George 
K. Behlmer, “the notion of the corpse that is not yet a corpse conjures up an image of the 
world as grotesque” (207). This is the essence of the dread captured in Dorian Gray. 
Simply put, decay was good in that it indicated that the deceased was truly dead. 
Intervention in the process was confusing and frightening. “The sign that was prized,” 
Sacandura writes, “was the deteriorating body—the body in the process of falling apart. 
The embalmed body was frightening because it was whole and undisintegrated, because 
it looked too life-like, because it would not properly disintegrate into dust” (14-15). It 
was one of the few times when an intrusion of the grotesque was welcome. Bakhtin 
writes that in the “system of grotesque imagery…death is not a negation of life … but 
part of life as a whole—its indispensable component, the condition of its constant 
renewal and rejuvenation.” He continues, “…the grave is related to the earth’s life-giving 
womb” (50). However, the nineteenth century was also the period in England when urban 
planners and architects began to reform graveyards from the fields of putrescence and 
contamination into the park-like spaces we know today.14 
Dorian’s career as living corpse comes to a violent end when he stabs his portrait 
in the novel’s ultimate example of disarticulation. When servants later find Dorian’s 
body, the knife he earlier used to kill Basil is stuck in his heart, and the process of decay 
that had been suspended by rhetoric and art has resumed. In fact, Dorian’s unstable, 
                                                          
14 See Walvin, James. “Dust to Dust: Celebrations of Death in Victorian England.” 
Historical Reflections 9.3 (Fall 1982): 353-71. Print. 
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transgressing body is so deformed by age, sin, and corruption that the servants recognize 
him only by his rings. “He was withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of visage,” the narrator 
says. The Dorian in the portrait “in all the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty,” on 
the other hand, has been restored (220). It is no longer a “loathsome” object (218). 
Dorian’s growing disillusionment with his life of excess leads to his suicide. Dorian 
makes a final effort at reform; but, once again, Henry tries to dissuade him, through 
flattery: “‘There is no use your telling me you are going to be good,’ cried Lord Henry … 
‘You are quite perfect. Pray, don’t change’” (206). Experience, however, has made 
Dorian resistant to Henry’s rhetoric. He says he has already embarked on his new life of 
“‘good actions’” (206). When Henry suggests that Dorian is simply seeking pleasure in a 
new way, Dorian is adamant: “‘I don’t care what you say to me. … Don’t let us talk 
about it anymore, and don’t try to persuade me that the first good action I have done in 
years … is really a sort of sin’” (207). Later, in response to one of Henry’s hyperbolic 
flatteries, Dorian says, “‘ … you must not say these extravagant things to me’” (213). The 
change in Dorian is registered in his rhetoric, and it perhaps parallels Wilde’s parting 
with Pater. Whereas Dorian had previously listened passively and was influenced by 
Henry’s rhetoric, he now engages Henry in dialectic, or disputation, and exceeds him. He 
has also become Platonic, saying to Henry, “‘The soul is a terrible reality. It can be 
bought and sold, and bartered away. It can be poisoned, or made perfect. There is a soul 
in each of us. I know it’” (211). When Dorian hypothetically confesses to murdering Bail, 
Henry does not believe him. He sees Dorian instead as assuming an ill-fitting persona, of 
declaiming: “‘I would say that … you were posing for a character that does not suit 
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you,’” Henry says (209). He has, perhaps, forgotten Dorian’s earlier words: “‘I cannot 
help telling you things. You have a curious influence over me. If I ever did a crime, I 
would come and confess it to you’” (55).  
Like Basil, Henry fails to comprehend the full monstrosity they have created 
through their separate arts: images and words. In an example of one of the many ironic 
statements about Dorian’s “‘fine’” nature (79) and “beautiful soul” (61), Henry says, 
“‘You are the type of what the type of what the age is searching for, and what it is afraid 
it has found’” (213). Henry’s persistence in praising Dorian’s goodness and beauty 
suggests that a reversal has taken place in the course of the novel. While Henry begins as 
the Platonic epideictic speaker, flattering Dorian and altering his sense of self and reality, 
Dorian’s monstrosity has assumed that role by the end of the book. Readers see Henry 
under the spell of Dorian’s epideictic, unable to see his friend for what he truly is: a 
soulless living corpse whose body is preserved by rhetoric and art. Only Dorian 
recognizes his own monstrousness when he gazes on the portrait. He knows that he has 
gotten away with murder; he wants a “new life” (217).  However, he is shocked to find 
that his portrait looks as grotesque as ever, if not more grotesque, even after his decision 
to reform and his first good deed. He wonders: “Does it mean he should confess?”  He 
shudders at the consequences, including execution. “Yet it was his duty to confess, to 
suffer public shame, and to make atonement” (218). Here, echoes of Gorgias seem 
especially clear. Realizing that the portrait has “been like conscience to him” (219), he 
decides to destroy it.  He attacks it with the same knife he used to kill Basil: “It would kill 
this monstrous soul-life, and without its hideous warnings, he would be at peace” (219). 
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In Dorian’s contemplated destruction of his portrait and its epideictic power, Wilde 
expresses the idea of monstrosity as an admonitory display involving the body. 
Disarticulation ends the performance. 
The rapid aging that Dorian experiences at his death is similar to Dracula’s 
demise about five years later in Stoker’s novel. It is just one point on which Stoker seems 
to have been influenced by Wilde’s aesthetics and their recipe of rhetoric and bodily 
destruction. Dorian, for example, leads a vampire-like existence, socializing— 
and lurking—at dark and sleeping late into the day.  His trip to an opium den in one of 
London’s mean districts in Chapter 16 is one example. Undertaken at night, the trip leads 
Dorian not only to Adrian, an old acquaintance ruined by their dissipation, but also to a 
prostitute akin to Stoker’s vampire women. Like Dracula, Dorian spurns the woman, 
shoving money at her and saying, “‘Don’t ever talk to me again’” (186). “Two red sparks 
flashed for a moment from the woman’s sodden eyes …” says the narrator (187), who 
also alludes to the “rebel” Satan (188).  Henry has given Dorian a philosophy of women 
that can be read into the interaction between Dracula and his castle. “‘I am afraid that 
women appreciate cruelty, downright cruelty.…’” Henry says. “They have wonderfully 
primitive instincts. … They love being dominated” (103). The prostitute—who says that 
Dorian “‘made me what I am’” (190), calls him “the devil’s bargain” and mocks him by 
his pseudonym of “‘Prince Charming’” (187), revealing him to Sybil Vane’s brother, 
James. Their confrontation in the street reminds readers of another similarity between 
Dorian and Dracula: Dorian does not age. His youthful appearance confuses the pistol-
wielding James Vane, for it does not seem possible that Dorian could have been the same 
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man who drove his sister to suicide eighteen years earlier. “He seemed little more than a 
lad of twenty summers,” the narrator says (189). Yet another way Dorian and Dracula are 
similar is in how they choose to use the idle moments of their eternity. Both are students. 
Dorian, however, is motivated by mere “curiosity” (127) to study religion, mysticism, 
evolution, perfumes, music, and jewels (131-135). Dracula, in contrast, studies English 
culture in preparation for conquest. 
Dorian’s nocturnal existence, his abuse of women, his preternatural youth, and 
quest for knowledge all suggest that he was a model for Dracula. However, Dorian is not 
the only inspiration for Dracula to be found in Wilde. Samuel Lyndon Gladden notes the 
national, educational, and personal ties between the writers before moving on to their 
literary similarities. Both were Irish, studied at Trinity College, and courted the same 
woman, Florence Balcombe. Even after Balcombe married Stoker, the men remained 
friends. They lived in the same London neighborhood and, with their wives, entertained 
together. Gladden’s study focuses on the similarities between Wilde’s popular play, The 
Importance of Being Earnest, which debuted in 1895, and Stoker’s Dracula, which was 
published in 1897 about a month after Wilde was released from prison after serving a 
sentence for gross indecency. Gladden’s theory is that Stoker tried to “demonize” Wilde 
in Dracula, and he tries to support it with a study of the number of times Stoker uses the 
words “wild,”  “earnest,” and their variations. Talia Schaffer, in her article “‘A Wilde 
Desire Took Me’: The Homoerotic History of Dracula,” makes a similar argument about 
Stoker and Wilde. One of Schaffer’s claims is that while Stoker tried to efface his rival 
Wilde from his life, Stoker wrote Wilde into his fiction. Focused on manifestations of 
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Wilde in Dracula, Schaffer strains even harder than Gladden to make connections. Her 
main area of concern is Jonathan Harker’s imprisonment in Dracula’s castle, which she 
equates with Wilde’s imprisonment for gross indecency. “Harker’s imprisonment follows 
Wilde’s model,” Schaffer writes (405). 
What Gladden and Schaffer overlook are the many connections between “The 
Canterville Ghost,” which Wilde published in 1887 around the time he and his wife were 
socializing with the Stokers in London, and Dracula. These connections offer even more 
material on which to base speculation about Stoker and Wilde’s personal relationship. 
But, more importantly, they show how much Stoker was influenced by Wilde’s aesthetics 
of the body and rhetoric, and how much he was able to import from Wilde’s fiction. The 
interest here is that Stoker apparently was so deeply impressed by Wilde’s depiction of a 
supernatural figure using declamation and self-fashioning in the creation of monstrosity 
that he borrowed from it, either consciously or unconsciously.  Sir Simon can be 
considered a prototype of Dracula in a number of ways. Some of the similarities are 
obvious. They are close in age: Simon, readers are told, is about three hundred years old. 
And, if the historical Dracula’s birth year of 1431 is accepted, the literary Dracula is 
about 466 at the time of the events depicted in the novel. Both proudly live in ancestral 
lands. Simon has the “brave old Canterville spirit” (10), while Dracula traces his family 
lineage back to Attila the Hun (34). Simon roams his ancestral home at night; he listens 
for the “cock crew,” and he sleeps in a “coffin” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 11). 
Dracula has similar habits. Some of the dialogue in Wilde’s story even seems to be 
echoed in Dracula. For example, the housekeeper Mrs. Umney’s greeting of the Otises 
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with the statement “‘I bid you welcome to Canterville Chase’” (3) sounds very similar to 
Dracula’s greeting of Jonathan Harker. “‘I am Dracula; and I bid you welcome.…’” 
(Stoker, Dracula 22). Moreover, Simon’s statement about the difficulty in procuring 
blood in modern times seems revised and repeated by Dracula. Confronted by Virginia 
for stealing her paints and using them to replenish the notorious “blood” of Canterville 
Chase, Simon defends himself, saying, “‘It is a very difficult thing to get real blood 
nowadays.…’” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 16). In a similar vein, Dracula laments 
the scarcity of blood, saying, “‘Blood is too precious a thing in these days of 
dishonourable peace …’” (Stoker, Dracula 35).  
While interesting, these similarities are superficial. “The Canterville Ghost” and 
Dracula are linked by deeper concerns. First, Simon and Dracula are the same type of 
monstrosity: the living corpse. Some may object that they are essentially different: Simon 
is a ghost and Dracula is a vampire. But, like Dracula, Simon has a body that 
occasionally dissipates. On one occasion, the Canterville ghost escapes from the Otis 
twins by “hastily adopting the Fourth Dimension of Space … he vanished through the 
wainscoting” (Wilde 5). He changes to “mist” and slips through the Otises as the father 
holds him at gunpoint (7). Fleeing from the twins on another outing, “he vanished into 
the great iron stove, which, fortunately for him, was not lit …” (13). At other times, 
Simon has a body is material, clumsy and vulnerable to injury and pain. Like Dracula, 
Simon has a fearsome appearance firmly linked to his identity. When Hiram Otis sees 
Simon in a moonlit corridor for the first time, the ghost is “an old man of terrible aspect. 
His eyes were as a red as burning coals; long grey hair fell over his shoulders in matted 
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coils, his garments, which were of antique cut, were soiled and ragged …” (5). Compare 
this description to Jonathan Harker’s description of an enraged Dracula: “His eyes were 
positively blazing. The red light in them was lurid, as if the flames of hell-fire blazed 
behind them. His face was deathly pale, and the lines of it were hard like drawn wires; 
the thick eyebrows that met over the nose now seemed like a heaving bar of white-hot 
metal” (Stoker Dracula 43). In bodily form, Simon has misadventures. He bangs his knee 
on a suit of armor, and he experiences “acute agony” (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 7). 
He falls “on his winding sheet” while fleeing the dummy ghost the twins set up to mock 
him (11).  He trips in the dark over strings the twins have pulled across the hallway. He 
experiences a “severe fall” by “treading on a butter-slide” the twins set out for him and 
falls down stairs (12). They also perch a water jug above a door, which soaks him “to the 
skin” when he enters the room (12). He also gets “weak and tired” (11) and becomes 
almost an “invalid” (14). 
Another similarity between Dracula and Simon is their ability to refashion their 
bodies. Simon changes himself into “a large black dog” to frightening effect (8). 
Likewise, Dracula takes the form of an “immense dog” to leap from the schooner 
Demeter after it is driven ashore in England by a violent storm (Stoker Dracula 78). It is 
also clear that when Simon assumes his favorite personas to frighten mortals, the roles 
involve more than the costuming and makeup he mentions: he removes his head (Wilde, 
“The Canterville Ghost” 13) and grotesquely distorts his unstable body to become 
characters such as “Dumb Daniel, or the Suicide’s Skeleton” (9), who scuttles around the 
room as a pile of bones with a dangling eyeball; or “Jonas the Graveless, or the Corpse 
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Snatcher of Chertsey Barn, one of his most remarkable impersonations” (13).  Like 
Dracula’s rhetoric, Simon’s rhetoric is largely embodied. The sense readers get that 
Dracula—a detailed planner as far as his relocation to London is concerned—is engaged 
in careful self-presentation and a certain amount of theatricality is made plain about 
Simon in “The Canterville Ghost.” The story’s third-person narrator reveals Simon’s 
thoughts, his self-consciousness, his preparation for the roles he plays, and his memories 
of how well his past performances succeeded in frightening audiences. This observation 
leads to yet another similarity between Simon and Dracula: their cruelty. Simon’s cruelty 
is displayed in his reminiscences of haunting his descendants at Canterville Chase, along 
with their servants and acquaintances, and destroying their health, sanity, and lives.  
Dracula’s depraved cruelty is displayed when he feeds a living child to his vampire 
women (Stoker, Dracula 43). Although Simon terrifies male and female, some of the 
more tragic stories involve attractive women, such as Lady Stutfield, who drowned 
herself (Wilde, “The Canterville Ghost” 6); and Lady Barbara Modish, who “died of a 
broken heart” after her lover was shot in a duel linked back to her fear of Simon and her 
refusal to marry into the Canterville clan (12). Lydia Reineck Wilburn makes a case for 
an even more sinister possibility, that Simon sexually initiates Virginia after they 
disappear into the spirit realm. She writes, “Wilde handles the sexual goings-on between 
the Ghost and Virginia so discreetly that they have remained hidden from audiences 
within the story as well as most readers of the story” (n.pag.). Wilburn argues that 
numerous details supporting this reading are coded into the story, the most significant 
being Virginia’s refusal to talk about her ghostly experience with her new husband, the 
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duke. Simon’s victimization of women is a behavior repeated by Dracula, who targets 
Lucy Westenra and then Mina Murray Harker. “The Canterville Ghost” and Dracula also 
end with similar scenes of harmony between the sexes. In “The Canterville Ghost,” the 
duke muses about the children that he and Virginia will have together as man and wife. 
And in Dracula, Jonathan and Mina Harker take a pleasure trip to Transylvania with their 
child. 
There are additional connections between “The Canterville Ghost” and Dracula 
through Dorian Gray. Two of Simon’s most successful personas were vampires. One of 
them was “Gaunt Gibeon, the Blood Sucker of Bexley Moor” (Wilde, “The Canterville 
Ghost” 6). And, playing the part of “The Vampire Monk, or the Bloodless Benedictine,” 
Simon frightened “Lady Startup” to death in 1764 (14). Indeed, in terms of the fear, 
suffering, and tragedy they inflict on the living, Simon and Dracula are roughly equal. 
However, Simon’s epideictic fails for his nineteenth-century audience, making his story a 
comedy, while Dracula’s succeeds, making his story a horror tale. The vampire hunters—
led by Van Helsing—in Dracula take the count seriously and seek to inconvenience, 
fight, and destroy him. The Otises do not dread Simon, as Basil learns to dread Dorian 
just before Dorian stabs him to death. At least part of the answer as to why Simon’s 
epideictic fails lies with his audience. Dracula and the vampire hunters—excepting 
Quincy Morris—at least have a common Old World heritage. Despite America’s roots in 
the Old World, Simon and his audience are estranged. Wilburn notes this same 
disconnect between Simon and his audience, writing, “Unlike their English neighbors, the 
upstart Americans refuse to take the Ghost seriously; instead, they satirize and parody his 
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stunts and horrors. This response eventually depresses the Canterville Ghost” (n.pag.) 
Simon, therefore, recalls what Bakhtin refers to as the “funny monstrosity” of the early 
Renaissance. He argues that this concept of “laughter … in macabre images … ” was 
almost completely lost by the nineteenth century. He writes, “The bourgeois nineteenth 
century respected only satirical laughter, which was not actually laughter but rhetoric” 
(51). Simon reveals his attitude toward the Otises when, in trying to compliment Virginia, 
he says that is unlike the rest of her “‘horrid, rude, vulgar, dishonest family’” (Wilde, 
“The Canterville Ghost” 15). This is why “The Canterville Ghost” can be read as a study 
in the contrasts between American and British cultures. While the British are depicted as 
mired in issues of tradition, ancestry, inheritance, class, pessimism, and decadence, the 
Americans are depicted as iconoclastic, upwardly mobile, egalitarian, optimistic, and 
wholly invested in the industrial-commercial system that Englishmen like John Ruskin 
found inimical to Northern European history. Wilde ironically remarks on the differences 
between the two cultures when he writes that upon moving to England, Lucretia Otis 
does not affect the “European refinement” of “chronic ill health. Instead, “she was quite 
English, and was an excellent example of the fact that we have everything in common 
with America nowadays, except, of course, language” (2). Language, however, is key to 
epideictic, and epideictic is about its audience. Socrates says in Menexenus that epideictic 
is all about flattery: “ … when you’re performing before the people you are praising, 
being thought to speak well is no great feat” (952). Lockwood writes that “At heart, 
epideictic oratory is simply a form of flattery.” He cites Artisotle’s belief that “The 
speaker may flatter the listeners and obtain their approval by including them … as the 
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objects of praise” (Lockwood 101). Simon’s vexation with the Otises’ modernity in the 
form of their household products—Pinkerton’s Champion Stain Remover, Paragon 
Detergent, and Tammany Rising Sun Lubricator—is one of the comic indicators of his 
lack of common ground with his audience. Dracula shares the same vexation with 
modernity in the form of mirrors, shorthand, and phonographs, but his response is much 
different than Simon’s: the count destroys these technologies. Simon, on the other hand, 
mocks the Otises’ products before he grudgingly adopts the lubricator to oil his chains. 
He is “a little humiliated … but afterwards was sensible enough to see that there was a 
great deal to be said for the invention, and … it served its purpose” (Wilde, “The 
Canterville Ghost” 12). The reaction Simon inspires in his new audience is not terror but 
sympathy and pity. It is an emotional response, but not the one he had hoped for. Hiram 
Otis indicates his willingness to share the house with the ghost, whom he acknowledges 
has been there longer, but says they will have to take his chains if he refuses to oil them. 
He also warns the twins that it is impolite to harass the ghost (7). Meeting the ghost, 
Virginia says, “‘I am sorry for you....’” Hearing that the ghost was starved to death, 
Virginia offers him a sandwich. And when he says he has not slept in three hundred 
years, Virginia looks into “his old withered face,” and says, “‘Poor, poor Ghost’” (16). 
Simon is able to gain the family’s sympathy and Virginia’s agreement to plead for him 
before the Angel of Death despite the terrible crime he has committed in murdering his 
wife. Simon does not even say he is sorry for killing her. In fact, he sounds as if he 
believes he was justified in killing her because she was a bad housekeeper and cook. He 
says that “‘it was a purely family matter’” (15). However, Virginia’s sympathy for Simon 
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is strong enough for her to overlook his transgressions and to face her own fear of death.  
The discovery of Simon’s bones in his secret prison and his proper burial signals that 
nature has been restored. As Scandura states, it is the “sign that was prized” among 
Victorians (14). Simon’s deteriorated body—like Dorian’s rotting flesh and Dracula’s 
disintegration into dust—signals that the natural cycle of life and death has been restored. 
The destroyed body marks the end of Simon’s rhetorical performance, as it does the 
performances of Dorian and Dracula. The terrors of the living corpse and live burial have 
been dispelled. 
This chapter began with the observation that while Dorian Gray may seem 
intrinsically different from the other novels examined in this study due to its lack of a 
classical monster like Frankenstein’s creature, Dracula, Edward Hyde, or Moreau’s Beast 
People, it is actually quite similar. Dorian’s monstrosity is more refined. Like the other 
monsters, Dorian is a hybrid, but he is a hybrid of human and art, not a hybrid of human 
and animal. The application of art to the human body creates a monstrosity referred to as 
the living corpse. Equally terrifying to Victorians was the living corpse’s counterpart, the 
live burial. Dorian is constituted as monster through rhetoric. The novel’s main orator is 
the sophistic Henry Wotton, whose epideictic on youth and beauty—coupled with Basil 
Hallward’s creation in art of Dorian’s double —transforms Dorian into a living corpse 
that embodies its own epideictic. Although Plato’s Menexenus is applicable to Dorian 
Gray, the most significant dialogue is Gorgias and its concern with the relationship 
between rhetoric and the soul. Gorgias also raises the issue of execution in its critique of 
sophistic rhetoric, and Wilde incorporates disarticulation in Dorian Gray through 
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images—some of them coded—of torture and execution, and vivisection and dissection. 
Disarticulation can also be found in at least two of his other works: Salome and “The 
Canterville Ghost.” The most significant element connecting Dorian Gray, Salome, and 
“The Canterville Ghost” is the hybridization of the body, which involves a figurative 
cutting of the body to create a new form. Pointing toward this figurative cutting in all 
three works are instances of the cutting of the body—or at least its suggestion—within 
their plots. The concept of the human body as work of art connects Wilde’s writings to 
the growing Victorian interest in funeral science and the use of corpses as an artistic 
models and media. The terror of corpses being used as artistic media is evident in critics’ 
attacks on Pre-Raphaelite art and its anatomical realism, beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Underlying these concerns is the idea, suggested by Edgar Allan Poe and later 
by Walter Pater, that art is a vampiric force that drains and replaces its subjects with 
monstrous imitations. This anxiety coincided with the Victorian dread of the dead body 
that showed no signs of decay as something unnatural and monstrous. All of these 
cultural interests, concerns, and fears converge in Dorian Gray and point toward 
Dracula. 
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Figure 4. Sketches from Leonardo Da Vinci’s Anatomical Studies  (“Leonardo da Vinci 
Anatomical Drawings”).  
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Figure 5. Drawing from Andreas Vesalius’s De Humani Corporis Fabrica  (“File: 
Vesalius Fabrica”). 
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Figure 6. Emblematic Frontspiece of Vesalius’s De Humani Corporis Fabrica  (“De 
Humani”).
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: RHETORIC, MONSTERS, AND RENEWAL 
 
 
As I was writing the last pages of this study, the literary world was awaiting the 
publication of “Romantic Outlaws”: The Extraordinary Lives of Mary Wollstonecraft 
and Her Daughter Mary Shelley. Asked about readers’ “enduring fascination with 
Frankenstein,” the author of the forthcoming dual biography, Charlotte Gordon, mentions 
“the dangers science and technology” but traces the monstrosity of the book to “a world 
without mothers.” Gordon elaborates, “All the chaos and the violence in that book ensues 
(sic) because there’s no nurturing, there’s no mom, there’s no maternal love” (Russell 
D6). Much the same could be said of every novel examined in this study, with their lack 
of significant female characters, with the possible exception of Dracula. Exactly how 
much scholarship Gordon would devote to a thesis about the absence of mothers as 
inspiration for Victor Frankenstein’s creature was uncertain. However, her comments 
point toward the powerful impulse among critics of nineteenth-century British horror 
fiction to speculate about the origins of its monstrosities, as if defining them gives us 
some mastery over them. Many such interpretations have been advanced over the years 
along a spectrum that extends from biography and history to culture and science. 
Marshall Brown, for instance, sees Frankenstein as an expression of the “unhappy 
yearnings” of Mary Shelley’s childhood (145), while Denise Gigante interprets John
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Keats’s Lamia as a reaction against Newtonian physics and materialism (433-5). 
Meanwhile, Sherryl Vint’s feminist reading of The Island of Dr. Moreau critiques male-
dominated scientific ethos through the lens of animal vivisection. And Stephen D. Arata 
argues that Dracula and other fin-de-siècle horror and science fiction can be read as 
expressions of anxiety over imperial decline and reverse colonization (623). These 
thought-provoking analyses and countless others are illuminating and offer readers new 
ways to understand and appreciate the texts they examine. In my study, I have not sought 
to counter any of these origin theories. Instead, I have tried to add to the dialogue by 
offering a reading of the creation and destruction of nineteenth-century literary 
monstrosities that focuses on a largely overlooked source: rhetoric. 
Reading Monsters Rhetorically  
I began my study by challenging claims that rhetoric perished in nineteenth-
century England. On the contrary, it can be found alive and well—or at least undead and 
unwell—in an unexpected place: late-Victorian horror fiction. The primary claim here is 
that the writers of four well-known works of fin-de-siècle horror fiction used classical 
rhetorical forms and patterns transmitted by the elocutionary movement in formulating 
characters and plots. Rhetoric is used here in the sense of oratory, and this study 
considers Franksenstein by Mary Shelley as a foundational work in the examination of 
rhetoric in nineteenth-century horror fiction due to its depiction of a monster declaiming. 
The main works analyzed in this study have been Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson, The Picture of Dorian Gray by Oscar Wilde, The 
Island of Dr. Moreau by H.G. Wells, and Dracula by Bram Stoker. 
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All of these works were produced in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, when Victorian notions of a stable, proper human form had largely faded and 
capital punishment as a corrective for transgressing bodies had been removed from the 
public arena, replaced by news accounts and readers’ imaginations. By the time 
Stevenson published Jekyll and Hyde, England was less than a generation removed from 
public executions.  And Hyde, we recall, is very much concerned about hanging from the 
gallows. Such spectacles would have still been vivid in the collective memory of Britons, 
for whom public executions served as cathartic form of entertainment that strengthened 
community bonds while at the same time assuring them that the law still had force. This 
opportunity for closure and the psychic relief it offered was largely denied the people 
when the spectacle was taken away. The French went through a similar withdrawal one 
hundred years earlier. Foucault explains that when the guillotine was instituted in France 
in 1792 as a more humane and democratic form of execution, people complained that the 
new technology obscured their view of executions. They wanted their gallows back: “The 
right to be witnesses was one that they possessed and claimed,” Michel Foucault writes 
(Discipline and Punish 58). My claim is that late-Victorian horror fiction is basically 
nostalgic, expressing a longing for the spectacle of public execution by refracting and 
incorporating some of its primary elements, namely its rhetorical pronouncements, its 
destruction of monstrosities to avenge the state and admonish witnesses, and the 
awareness that sanctioned violence could spill into audiences and draw them into the 
performance at the scaffold. 
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Late-Victorian horror fiction’s development in the wake of this loss of capital 
punishment as a spectacle helps explain the literature’s distinctive fin-de-siècle quality. 
Audiences at that time would have brought a different set of historical circumstances to 
their reading of the literature. They would have interpreted it differently and seen more of 
themselves in the pages. Writers must have understood this awareness, even if on an 
intuitive level. Their urge to satisfy readers’ deep-seated need to witness the destruction 
of the monstrous in a ritual incorporating rhetorical and dramatic elements contributed to 
the formation of an aesthetics of that depicted the sundering of bodies—bodies that are 
figured as corrupt, like criminal bodies, in need of regulation, coercion, or destruction. A 
pattern running through all four fin-de-siècle works examined in this study is the cutting 
of the body in relation to declamation, to rhetorical performance or display. The monsters 
in these texts are depicted as being fashioned or self-fashioned through rhetoric, and as 
using rhetoric. The medical term this study borrows to define the configuration of oratory 
and bodily destruction is disarticulation. In a medical sense, disarticulation refers to 
amputation. In a literary sense, it is a trope that figures rhetoric as a coercive form of 
discipline seeking to normalize and control corrupt bodies. Its methods include execution, 
torture, and dismemberment, which were examined in chapter four on Dracula; morbid 
dissection, which are central to the scientific romances of Moreau and Jekyll and Hyde; 
and the aestheticization of the body, which factors heavily into Dorian Gray. 
Disarticulation, however, does not fully explain the fear produced by late-
Victorian horror fiction. Another concept that this study has considered has been 
epideictic. One of Aristotle’s three branches of rhetoric, epideictic is ceremonial speech. 
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The famous example is the funeral oration, which praises the dead and, through the 
orator, allows the dead to speak to the living. In Plato’s Menexenus, Socrates speaks of 
the skill of Athenian funeral orators in praising the war dead and how they are able to 
transform the souls of their audiences and send them into a state of euphoria. In these 
moments, epideictic appeals to audiences’ notions of their essential, common identity, 
encourages patriotism, and creates social cohesion. Socrates even rhapsodizes in the 
dialogue that epideictic can physically alter audience members. He is speaking 
figuratively, but his words take on new meaning in the context of late-Victorian horror 
fiction, with its monstrous hybrids. And epideictic has its dark side. Aristotle writes that 
just as it can be used to praise, it can also be used to place blame. Therefore, it can effect 
division and dread. When this happens, the shared essentialism between speaker and 
audience is lost, identities are obscured, and community breaks down. Although 
epideictic can be located in Frankenstein, I have examined it primarily as a fin-de-siècle 
phenomenon centered on the monstrosities depicted in the four novels. It is directly 
associated with Dracula, who delivers a Socratic epideictic oration, but it is also present 
in characters’ confused reactions to Moreau’s Beast People, Edward Hyde, and Dorian 
Gray. 
Epideictic’s censorious potential was well-suited to late-Victorian horror fiction. 
Even though the public enactment of capital punishment had been abolished, there was 
not a consensus among Britons that they were safer at home and that their empire at large 
was moral, thriving and ascendant. Indeed, the fin-de-siècle period is often defined by its 
doubt, pessimism, and obsession with degeneracy. These attitudes have helped label the 
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fin de siècle as decadent, an aesthetic term from the Latin de cadere, which means 
“falling away.” A decadent society is one that had “decayed, falling from a state of health 
and prosperity to one of physical and ethical ruin” (Denisoff  33).  Arata points out that 
1897, the year Dracula was published, was Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. However, 
it was a year “marked by considerably more introspection and less self-congratulation 
than the celebration a decade earlier” (622). Contributing to the perception that Britain’s 
position was eroding were its loss of overseas markets, the rise of the United States and 
Germany was world powers, unrest in the colonies, and growing uncertainties about the 
morality of imperialism. All of these factors worked to undermine “Victorian confidence 
in the inevitability of British progress and hegemony” (622). These anxieties bled into the 
fiction of the fin-de-siècle. Arata writes, “Late-Victorian fiction ... is saturated with the 
sense that the entire nation—as a race of people, as a political and imperial force, as a 
social and cultural power—was in irretrievable decline” (622). These attitudes, however, 
did not characterize the entire fin de siècle. Co-existing with fears of decline was 
optimism about new the “limitless generative power of the British nation” in the areas of 
imperialism, women’s rights, journalism, science, and technology (Ledger and Luckhurst 
xiii).  Much about society was old and in decline, but much was new and promising. A 
new millennium was imminent. Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst point out that “the fin 
de siècle has come to be identified as the moment of emergence” for new cultural trends 
(xiv). 
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Dismemberment and Renewal 
The reconsideration of the fin de siècle as a time of optimism and renewal linked 
to social and scientific progress over pessimism and decay linked to imperial and human 
decline recalls the opening paragraphs of this study and Don Paul Abbott’s summary of 
elocutionist Thomas Sheridan’s beliefs that oratorical instruction based on Greek and 
Roman precedents held forth the promise of England’s national, cultural and religious 
renewal (117).  As I pointed out in my introduction, though, Abbott leaves open the 
question of exactly how Sheridan believed oratory would reinvigorate literature. My 
argument has been that the rhetorically-constructed monstrosities of late-Victorian horror 
fiction—so deeply informed by elocutionary pedagogy—can be seen as participating in 
Sheridan’s project. Reading them this way, however, forces us to read these monstrosities 
as more than boogey-men, and it gives them far more depth and meaning than they may 
initially appear to have. They become archetypal figures functioning within fin-de-siècle 
myths of quest, death, and rebirth. Jerusha McCormack identifies Dorian Gray as just 
such a character. McCormack argues that Wilde’s intentions in writing his novel were not 
strictly literary but also mythic. His purpose was to “retell a story whose end is known; a 
story as old as that of the dying gods, Dionysius and Christ, or of those who sought 
themselves to appropriate their power, Adam and Faust” (111). 
McCormack’s observations about Dorian could be applied to the other literary 
monstrosities examined in this study. Their mythical significance is clarified through 
archetypes of the grotesque body and their links to the cyclical creation, destruction, and 
renewal of the world as defined by Mikhail Bakhtin in his analyses of Rabelais’s writing. 
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Bakhtin argues, “The entire field of realistic literature of the last three centuries is strewn 
with the fragments of grotesque realism, which at times are not mere remnants of the past 
but manifest a renewed vitality” (24). His remarks cover the nineteenth century, which he 
asserts was frightened by the concept of the grotesque body that could be altered through 
experience and consumption, even though its functions in the Middle Ages were festive 
and comedic. Beginning with the Neoclassicists and Romanitcs, Bakhtin claims, the 
grotesque “ceased to be a joyful and triumphant hilarity. Its positive regenerating power 
was reduced to a minimum” (38). The links between fin-de-siècle monstrosities and the 
grotesque are numerous. One of the first is what Bakhtin calls the “double body,” or the 
body that encompasses death and life in the act of creation (318). It parallels the pregnant 
body, although it is not limited to the female and the birth of a child (308). The double 
body looms large in late-Victorian fiction. In Dracula, the undead count’s interests 
include fashioning for himself a new, English body, out of his undead body. In Moreau, 
the doctor’s animals are surgically altered and given new bodies that are later abandoned 
by their creator and aborted by nature. In Jekyll and Hyde, the doppelgängers share a 
consciousness but have distinct bodies, until Jekyll irreversibly transforms into Hyde. In 
Dorian Gray, Dorian is given a second body in his portrait, which suffers the effects of 
sin and aging. And in Frankenstein, the creature’s desire is the formation out of dead 
matter a second body to become his mate. 
A second link between fin-de-siècle monstrosity and grotesque is Bakhtin’s 
observation that grotesque figures are defined by their degradation, or the reversal of their 
upper stratum and lower stratum (309). Simply put, degraded characters become their 
 
237 
 
bowels and genitals, the body parts involved in digestion and procreation. All of the fin-
de-siècle monsters are sexualized to varying degrees. Foremost among them is Dracula, 
whose attacks on Lucy and Mina are connoted rapes. Hyde’s nocturnal activities are 
hidden until rumors begin circulating after Carew’s slaying. Two years after the 
publication of Stevenson’s novella, Victorians quickly linked the fictional Hyde to Jack 
the Ripper, who can be seen as another sexualized Victorian monster constructed by the 
sensational media through disarticulation (Joyce 502). Among Moreau’s Beast People is 
the doctor’s final project, the puma woman, whose treatment has been likened to sexual 
bondage and torture (Vint 91-2). And a drug-addicted prostitute in an opium den accuses 
Dorian—the avatar of the bisexual in fin-de-siècle literature—of having caused her ruin 
(190). This sexualization also can be found earlier in Frankenstein, as the creature gazes 
on the sleeping Justine Moritz before effecting her ruin and destruction, and then kills 
Victor’s new bride Elizabeth in her bed after he is denied his own mate. 
By far, the most significant link between fin-de-siècle monstrosities and the 
grotesque for this study is bodily dismemberment. Bakhtin identifies dismemberment as 
one of the motifs of grotesque realism, along with “copulation, pregnancy, birth, growth, 
old age, [and] disintegration” (25). Dismemberment takes two basic forms in Bakhtin. 
The first type is punishment carried out by the “diablerie” of medieval mystery plays who 
burn, mutilate, and tear apart heretics in hell. “We have here a grotesque dismemberment, 
an anatomization,” Bakhtin states (347). The more crucial form of dismemberment, 
however, has to do with the sundering of giants within myths of creation. These myths 
relate how the parts of dismembered giants were used to form the landscape. “Most local 
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legends,” Bakhtin explains, “connect such natural phenomenon as mountains, rivers, 
rocks, and islands with the bodies of giants ...” (328). Later, Bakhtin contends that these 
features inspire “cosmic terror, the fear of the immeasurable, the infinitely power.” It is 
“the fear of that which is materially huge and cannot be overcome by force” (335). Thus, 
it is akin to the sublime as well as epideictic in fin-de-siècle horror fiction, which fills 
characters with confusion and dread.  In addition to giants, other mythical figures also 
seed the earth and renew creation. Bakhtin points out that Abel is the first man to die in 
the Bible, and in Pantagruel Abel’s blood renews the “earth’s fertility” (327). Human 
myths are filled with such stories of the sacrifices of such characters and the renewal 
these slayings bring to the earth. Among them are the Egyptian Osiris, whose 
dismemberment ensures the fertility of the land, and the Greek Orpheus, whose lyre and 
severed head continued singing the songs that soothed nature. Likewise, the New 
Testament Gospels contain all of the elements of disarticulation, as well as those of the 
living Outside of the context of religion, raising the dead is monstrous. Wilde’s Herod 
reminds us of this when he says, “It would be terrible if the dead came back” (Salome 
28). 
The claim that some connection can be found between the monstrosities of late-
Victorian horror fiction and myths of the earth’s creation and renewal finds more support 
in the sympathy they are able to elicit from readers. At times, these characters are 
pathetic excuses for monsters, and their deaths become tragedies rather than triumphs. 
Dracula, for example, has to do his own cooking and cleaning at home in his castle in 
Transylvania. His reading material is dry and dull, made up of the British parliamentary 
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reports, almanacs, and the train schedules he consumes to become an Englishman. 
Despite his fearsomeness, he sees to Harker’s safety in the castle. Even worse, perhaps, is 
that the women in his vampire harem mock and laugh at him, telling him he is unable to 
love. Emotionally wounded by their taunts, Dracula feebly replies, “Yes, I too can love” 
(43). As if to add injury to insult, Dracula must also bring home food—a living child—
for these hardhearted, insulting women. Even Mina, who has been sexually assaulted by 
Dracula, pleads with the men sworn to the count’s destruction to have sympathy for his 
“poor soul” for he “is the saddest case of all” (269). Just after Dracula’s head has been 
nearly severed, and just before his body disintegrates, Mina describes an unimagined 
“look of peace” on his face (325). In Jekyll and Hyde, Hyde becomes the victim of 
Jekyll’s guilt and poor decisions. His creation was unsolicited, and after murdering 
Carew, he fears hanging. Before his death, he begs Utterson for “mercy” from inside a 
locked room and emits a “dismal screech ... of animal terror” before poisoning himself 
(39).  Likewise, Moreau’s Beast People were victims of the doctor’s unethical science. 
Their plight generate pathos even in Prendick, and he kills the Leopard Man who had 
stalked him earlier in the novel rather than let the monster be captured and returned to 
Moreau’s “House of Pain” for more torture (240). In Dorian Gray, Dorian’s infatuation 
with the actress Sybil Vane makes him seem more like a teenage boy and less like an 
immortal terror. Dorian’s cruelty to Sybil is the first indication of his monstrous nature, 
but he tries to make amends by choosing not to deflower a country girl he falls in love 
with later in the novel. Readers fear for Dorian when Sybil’s vengeful brother, James 
Vane, threatens to shoot him, but Dorian’s cunning nature saves him. What innocence 
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that survives in Dorian’s character is displayed when he tries to stop a hunter from 
shooting a rabbit on an outing at Selby Royal in the English countryside. On the other 
hand, when his new nemesis James Vane is accidentally shot and killed during the same 
outing, Dorian feels “joy” (205). By this time, Dorian is looking forward to the end of the 
world. “‘I wish it were fin du globe,’” he says. “‘Life is a great disappointment’” (177). 
The Bakhtinian significance of this desire is underscored when Dorian’s death ironically 
resets the natural cycle of his life and his body rots. Of all the monstrosities examined in 
this study, Frankenstein’s creature is the only one that can be said to approach gigantic 
stature. Throughout the novel, it is unclear if readers are to believe the creature’s 
reckoning of himself as essentially good. However, readers can finally feel sympathy for 
the monster at the end of the novel. Speaking over the lifeless body of his creator, the 
monster shares his death wish with Walton and relates his demise to nature: the heavens, 
the winds, the trees and the birds. His plan is to immolate himself. He imagines “dying in 
the agony of the torturing flames” and his “ashes” being “swept into the sea by the 
winds” (179). Around the time that Shelley was working on her 1831 revision of 
Frankenstein, she also wrote the story “The Mortal Immortal,” which ends with the main 
character, Winzy, saying that to escape the curse of immortality he accidentally brought 
on himself he will commit suicide by “scattering and annihilating the atoms that compose 
my frame…” (326). Within the rubric of the creation myth in grotesque realism, the 
giant’s disintegrated body seeds the earth and renews creation. However, the only novel 
in which there is a perception of change in the earth is Dracula. In a journal entry about 
his family’s “summer” trip to Transylvania, Harker recalls that “Seven years ago we all 
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went through the flames...” He has his “vivid and terrible memories” of the place, but the 
horror has been “blotted out” (326). The monster has been dismembered, fertility has 
been restored, and the landscape has been altered from darkness to light.15     
Hopefully, this study will help other critics find new approaches not only to late-
Victorian horror fiction, but also to other nineteenth-century texts that do not feature 
supernatural characters and situations. For example, this study mentions Robert 
Browning’s poem The Ring and the Book, but it has not pointed out that Guido 
Franceschini is constructed as monster in the text and that he is also the orator in two of 
the poem’s twelve books. Likewise, Mr. Creakle’s teaching with a cane in 1850’s David 
Copperfield is metaphorized as “cutting” (Dickens 82). In the same novel, there is Mr. 
Dick and his eccentric obsession with King Charles I’s beheading. And, then, there is 
John Keats’s 1820 poem Isabella, or the Pot of Basil, in which the grieving title character 
cuts off her murdered lover’s head as a macabre keepsake after he speaks to her in a 
dream. However, rather than looking back, perhaps the best direction to look to apply this 
critical approach is forward to the Modernist era and its seminal poet, T.S. Eliot. 
Disarticulation promises fresh insights into poems such as The Waste Land, in which 
tensions between creation and destruction are captured in images of death and rebirth, 
and barrenness and fertility. The poem certainly features mutilation and dismemberment, 
with allusions to Philomel in “A Game of Chess” and Phlebas the drowned Phoenician 
sailor whose bones are picked clean by whispering currents in “Death By Water.” So, 
                                                          
15 Bakhtin writes that the Romantic grotesque is oriented toward darkness: “It is in most 
cases nocturnal” (41).  
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when one of the speakers in “The Burial of the Dead” asks, “‘That corpse you planted 
last year in your garden, / Has it begun to sprout?’” (I.71-2), readers can no longer be 
certain that is a botanical reference to a reeking flower. Has the earth been seeded with 
the grotesque body? Perhaps the ever-allusive Eliot understood disarticulation and was 
drawing on an extensive horror tradition, one that constructed bodies as grotesque and 
subjected them to the social controls of rhetoric, violence, and refashioning to produce 
order, knowledge, and art.
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